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DIPLOMATIC REMINISCENCES

OF

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LORD AUGUSTUS LOFTUS,

P.C., G.C.B.

1862—1879.

SECOND SERIES.

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Arrival at St. Petersburg—Interview with Prince Gortschakoff—Audiences of the Emperor and Empress—Cordial Reception by His Imperial Majesty—The Foreign Ambassadors—Great Sympathy evinced on the Assassination of Lord Mayo—Conversation with Prince Gortschakoff on the Relations with the Pope—Renewal of Diplomatic Relations with the See of Rome—Mode of Appointment of Roman Catholic Bishops in Russia—Public Thanksgiving at St. Paul's for Recovery of the Prince of Wales—Enthusiastic Demonstration of Loyalty—Queen's Letter of Thanks to the Nation—Attack on the Queen by O'Connor—Differences between the Bulgarian Church and the Patriarch at Constantinople—General Ignatieff—Unsatisfactory Relations with the Khan of Khiva—An Expedition meditated against Khiva—Gortschakoff's Concurrence in Warning Roumanian Government against Disorders between Christians and Jews at Easter Festival, but Refusal to participate in Joint Representation against Persecution of Jews—His Reasons for Declining—Celebration of Bi-centenary Anniversary of the Birth of Peter the Great—Observations on the Greek Church—Russian Customs—The Court—The Society.

We arrived at St. Petersburg on the 4th of February, after a prosperous journey, although somewhat cold. But the railway carriages, both in Germany and Russia, are heated; in the former by hot air from the engine into every carriage; in Russia by iron stoves plentifully supplied with wood, and carefully looked after. In

this respect the comfort of travellers in England is less well provided for. Even foot-warmers are very scantily given, and then only when asked for. There is no reason why the carriages should not be heated by hot air from the engine, as in Germany. After the first outlay there is no further expense in providing it, and the valves of the tubes conducting it can be opened and closed in each carriage, according to the temperature. For invalids this is a question of primary importance.

On arriving at Wirballen (the Russian frontier) every attention was paid to us. An excellent dinner was served in the Imperial rooms at the station; an Imperial carriage had been sent from St. Petersburg for our comfort, with a saloon and sleeping compartments, and our luggage was passed without examination. In short, nothing could exceed the attentions and civilities we received from all the Imperial authorities.

The country from Berlin to Königsberg is flat, and the soil of a sandy nature and poor. It is astonishing to see what the industry of the German peasant has produced from it. It is well tilled, and the houses of the peasant-farmers are neat, well built, and comfortable. What a contrast with the country on the other side of the frontier, where everything betokens poverty, negligence, want of care and industry! The severity of the climate may be some excuse, as the country is under snow for four or five months of the year; but there is a want of cleanliness, of order, and of tidiness which cannot be attributed solely to

the effect of climate. The Russian peasant, however, is easy-going, good-natured, and patient. As long as he has his daily meal of a very ordinary kind, his tobacco and his "vodka," he is happy and contented. Without much, if any, education, he is shrewd and intelligent. He will build his own house of wood, with no other implement to construct it than a plain ordinary axe. His religion consists in the worship of God and his devotion to the Czar, and I am not certain that the latter does not predominate over the former; though I have been often astonished at seeing the driver of an ordinary "Isvoschik," or sleigh, take off his hat on passing within sight of a church, and cross himself three times on his breast. This may be habit, but nevertheless in the act there is an outward sign of religious feeling—a recollection of his Maker.

The Russian peasant has many good qualities. He is warm-hearted and unselfish, charitable, and easily governed. He is a good husband and father, and there is certainly less maltreatment of wives by their husbands in Russia than in civilised England.

When education and civilisation are more advanced —and the two go hand-in-hand together—the Russian people will become a powerful nation. With their kindred Slavs, they may be destined to be the "coming race."

St. Petersburg is an imposing capital. The churches with their gilded spires, the squares, the palaces and the public buildings, give to it an air of grandeur, to which the blue waters of the "Neva," when not frozen, adds

an additional charm. It is a noble river, issuing from Lake Ladoga, and intersecting the capital. No city possesses a more beautiful promenade than the drive for over two miles along its quays.

It is reported to be built upon piles, and is traversed by numerous canals, as at Venice. These canals have never been cleaned, and, having been for years the receptacle of all the sewage of the town, are becoming annually more baneful to the health of the capital. To this cause I attribute, in a great measure, the prevalence of fevers, and the severity of the cholera whenever it has attacked St. Petersburg.

In consequence of the city being built on piles, and of the numerous canals to which I have alluded, it is subject to inundations whenever a strong westerly wind blows for any length of time from the gulf. Guns from the fortress announce the gradual rise of the river, as a warning to the large population which lives in the cellars, which are flooded; and these inundations have frequently caused great loss of life. It is said that if this wind were to continue in the same quarter for any lengthened period, the capital would be entirely submerged; but there appears to be no possibility of providing for or averting such a catastrophe.

On arriving at St. Petersburg, having sent on my servants previously, I found my house ready for my reception, and my carriage awaiting me at the station, with the members of the Embassy. Shortly before my arrival Mr. Ford—now Sir Clare Ford, Ambassador

at Constantinople—then acting as Chargé d'Affaires, had the misfortune to lose his wife, and, under these afflicting circumstances, was not present. She was an Italian by birth, clever, fascinating, and much liked by Society.

On the day after my arrival I waited on Prince Gortschakoff, placed in his hands the usual copies of the Queen's letters to the Emperor and Empress of Russia, and requested His Highness to solicit audiences for me to present them to their Imperial Majesties.

Prince Gortschakoff, with whom I had been personally acquainted for some years, received me very cordially, and said he would take their Majesty's orders as to my official reception.

My audiences took place on February 8th. On this occasion the usual formalities for the reception of an Ambassador were strictly adhered to. Imperial state carriages were sent. A master of the ceremonies, accompanied by an officer of his department, was in attendance. On my arrival at the palace I was received by the Grand Chamberlain and Grand Master of the Ceremonies, and the officers of the Imperial household, who conducted me to the door of the Emperor's cabinet. I was then ushered in, and announced in my official capacity. The door was then closed, and I was alone with the Emperor.

I delivered the Queen's letter to His Majesty, accompanying it with suitable compliments in the Queen's name. The Emperor shook hands cordially

with me, and welcomed me as Her Majesty's representative to his Court. He expressed his warm acknowledgments of the Queen's kind and friendly sentiments, and said that he sincerely rejoiced at the good relations existing between the two Courts. He expressed with great sincerity his hope that I would do all in my power to cement the good understanding between the two Governments.

He expressed his deep sympathy with the Queen during the illness of the Prince of Wales, and his admiration of the enthusiastic loyalty which had been shown by all classes of the British nation.

I observed to His Majesty that it was on occasions of this nature that the British nation evinced its deep attachment to the throne. His Majesty inquired in gracious terms after the health of Lord Granville, and charged me to say how deeply he appreciated the courtesy he had shown during the conferences in London on the Black Sea question.

On leaving the Emperor, after having presented to His Majesty the members of my Embassy, I was conducted to the Empress, to whom I delivered the Queen's letter. Her Majesty received me very graciously, inquiring tenderly after the Queen and the Prince of Wales, and expressing her great sympathy with Her Majesty during the late illness of the Prince.

I had also the usual audiences of presentation to all the members of the Imperial family.

My colleagues as Ambassadors were—General Le Flo, a strong anti-Buonapartist, and Minister of War

in France under the Republic. Prince Reuss represented Germany. He had been my colleague at Munich. He married a Princess of Saxe-Weimar, daughter of the reigning Grand Duke—a very clever and distinguished princess. Prince Reuss was subsequently, and is now, the German Ambassador at Vienna. General Langenau was Austrian Ambassador. Rustem Pacha was the Turkish representative until he was appointed Governor of the Lebanon. He was an able diplomatist and a very genial colleague, and was duly appreciated and much regretted on leaving St. Petersburg. The Italian representative was the Marquis de Bella-Caracciolo, who was later succeeded by the Chevalier Nigra.

Shortly after my arrival I received the sad intelligence of the assassination by a convict of the Earl of Mayo, Viceroy of India, on his visiting the Andaman Islands. It was received in the higher and official circles with the deepest regret. At a ball at the Cesarewichs the Emperor expressed to me the deep concern which this intelligence had caused him, and his sympathy for the loss which the country had sustained. He said that he had fully appreciated the noble qualities of the late Viceroy and his conciliatory policy in Central Asia, which had so much contributed to the good relations between England and Russia, and His Majesty hoped that the same policy would be continued. I replied to His Majesty that the policy of Her Majesty's Government and of Lord Mayo had been dictated by a sincere desire to cultivate harmonious relations with Russia,

both in regard to Central Asia and other parts, and I felt that I could assure His Majesty that, deeply regretting the loss of the able services of the late Viceroy, the same policy would be pursued, and that Her Majesty's Government would continue, as heretofore, to use their best endeavours to maintain and strengthen the good understanding now so happily existing between the two Governments. His Majesty expressed his satisfaction at this assurance, and his ardent wish that the most cordial relations should continue between England and Russia.

I assured His Majesty that my humble efforts would be devoted to the furtherance of an object of such vital importance to the mutual interests of both nations.

Prince Gortschakoff, M. de Westmann, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and M. de Stremooukoff, the Director of the Asiatic Department, in referring to the sad tragedy in India, expressed in the warmest terms their admiration of the pre-eminent qualities of the late Viceroy, and their deep regrets for the serious loss which his untimely death had occasioned.

I had an interview with Prince Gortschakoff on March 5th. I found official relations with him very easy and agreeable. He had much charm of manner, and his conversational powers were remarkable. He told me that happily there was nothing going on in the political world. He said, in proof of this, that when the Emperor of Germany sent to Prince Bismarck to ask why he received no despatches, the answer was "that happily there were none."

He said that the state of France was very regrettable. No one could foresee or foretell what would happen. He spoke very satisfactorily of Count Andrassy, and appeared anxious for his maintenance in office. The language of the Emperor and Prince Gortschakoff was most pacific. Peace was indispensable to the internal prosperity of Europe, and, therefore, it was not likely to be lightly exposed to danger.

In conversation with Prince Gortschakoff I referred to the improvement of the relations between the Imperial Government and the See of Rome, announced by the Press and confirmed by the "preconisation" by the Pope of five Catholic Bishops to the vacant dioceses in Poland and Russia. His Highness informed me, with evident satisfaction, that the Pope had "preconised" the appointment of five Bishops, three of whom were designated for Poland, and two for Russia; and he observed that this act opened the door to a renewal of diplomatic relations with the Holy See. He said that the Russian Government had been at all times most tolerant in religious matters, and they had every wish and interest to be on harmonious terms with the Pope so long as the Roman Catholic clergy confined its action to spiritual matters. The rupture with the Court of Rome had taken place some years ago, in consequence of the Catholic clergy in Poland having allied itself with the elements of revolution. There was a limit, beyond which no Government could allow its authority to be set at naught.

I inquired of His Highness in what mode the

appointment of Catholic Bishops took place in Russia. Were names submitted to the Pope for selection or confirmation, or did the initiative appertain to the Holy See?

Prince Gortschakoff replied that it was usual to inform the Papal Government that a certain candidate was designated (not appointed) by the Imperial Government for a vacant See. Unless there were any cogent reasons against his confirmation, he was "preconisé"—or proclaimed—by the Pope. On the present occasion the five candidates had been accepted by the Pope without hesitation, and the interests of all parties had been mutually served by this judicious and conciliatory course.

His Highness stated that the Roman Catholic Bishops in Russia were not free to communicate with the See of Rome without reference to the Government, and that no bull or Papal edict could be published without the previous consent of the Imperial Government.

Prince Gortschakoff also related to me the negotiations which had taken place with the See of Rome on the subject of appointing a Nuncio to reside at St. Petersburg. These negotiations were finally broken off, in consequence of the Papal Government claiming rights and privileges which were not enjoyed by the representatives of the Pope in France or other Catholic countries.

The appointment of the five Roman Catholic Bishops, more especially of those in Poland, and the

renewal of diplomatic relations with the Court of Rome, were events of importance, as tending to promote the tranquillity and contentment of the Polish population.

The Queen, accompanied by the Prince and Princess of Wales and the Royal Family, attended, on the 27th of February, a divine service of public thanksgiving at St. Paul's for the recovery of the Prince of Wales. It was a solemn occasion, when the nation heartily joined the Sovereign in offering its heartfelt thanks to the Almighty Ruler of events for His merciful preservation of a life so dear to all Her Majesty's subjects. The Queen was received by millions of her subjects, on her progress to St. Paul's Cathedral, with intense enthusiasm, thus attesting to the love and affection of a loyal and devoted people. In evidence of the deep impression it made on the Queen, the following are the fervent terms in which Her Majesty conveyed her thanks to the nation:—

The Queen is anxious, as on a previous occasion, to express publicly her own personal very deep sense of the reception she and her dear children met with on Tuesday, February 27th, from millions of her subjects, on her way to and from St. Paul's.

Words are too weak for the Queen to say how very deeply touched she has been by the immense enthusiasm and affection exhibited towards her dear son and herself, from the highest down to the lowest, on the long progress through the capital, and she would earnestly wish to convey her warmest and most heartfelt thanks to the whole nation for this great demonstration of loyalty.

The Queen, as well as her son and daughter-in-law, felt that the whole nation joined with them in thanking God for sparing the beloved Prince of Wales's life.

Two days after this magnificent demonstration of loyalty and love to the Queen an untoward incident occurred, but, happily, with no serious consequences. On the Queen returning from her drive, during which she had been enthusiastically received, a young man of eighteen or nineteen followed the carriage, and when it drew up at the door presented himself first at one side and then at the other, and pointed a pistol at Her Majesty. He was immediately seized. The pistol had not been fired. He had a document for the Queen to sign for releasing certain Fenian prisoners then under confinement. It was the act of a maniac, and he was sentenced to be kept in confinement, and was subsequently sent to the colonies. His name was Arthur O'Connor.

Her Majesty, with that strong-minded self-possession and courage which so distinguish her, evinced no agitation, and, happily, suffered no ill-consequences from an attack which might have shaken the strongest nerves.

I communicated to Prince Gortschakoff a despatch from Lord Granville, instructing me to express to the Emperor the Queen's great satisfaction at receiving the gratifying assurance of His Imperial Majesty's sympathy on this occasion. Prince Gortschakoff said that he would undertake to convey to the Emperor the gracious message of the Queen, as the Emperor was much preoccupied with the illness of the Empress, and was unable to grant audiences.

Some differences arose between the Bulgarian

Church and the Patriarch of the Greek Church at Constantinople. These differences had been existing for some years without any solution. The grievances of the Bulgarian Church were fully recognised by the Russian Synod and other Churches of the Greek confession; and had they been timely listened to by the Patriarch of Constantinople, and had the concessions, justly required, been acceded to by the Patriarch, they would not have assumed their present importance.

The Bulgarian Church specially claimed two concessions—first, that they should be allowed to elect their own bishops; and, secondly, that the services of their Church should be performed in Bulgarian, and not in Greek, which to them was an unknown tongue.*

Hitherto the appointments of the Bulgarian Bishops were vested in the Patriarch at Constantinople, and had been exercised in an irregular and corrupt manner. The candidates who offered the highest recompense to the Patriarch at Constantinople were the favoured ones, the result being that they were obliged to recoup themselves for this corrupt expenditure at the expense of their flock by the levy of exorbitant dues upon them.

These grievances had been rife for many years, and still remained unredressed. On the persistence of the Patriarch of Constantinople not to yield to

* I may observe that the High Mass of the "Orthodox Greek Church" (the Russian) is performed in the Slavonic and not the Russian language.

the remonstrances of the Bulgarians the Porte resolved to sanction the election of an Exarch for Bulgaria. The action of the Porte in this matter gave a striking proof of the tolerance and impartiality of the Turkish Government, whilst the squabbles and contentions between members of the same Christian faith presented no edifying example of Christian charity to the Mussulman rulers.

An occasion of further discord between these Christian Churches soon occurred, when the Porte was obliged to maintain the law. Certain Bulgarian delegates were sent to Constantinople to treat with the Patriarch on these matters. They were induced to preach without the previous sanction of the Patriarch. For this illegal act they were excommunicated by the Patriarch. The Turkish Government, when applied to by the Patriarch to maintain obedience to the law, was obliged to interfere, and, on the members of the deputation refusing to express contrition, they were sentenced to banishment.

The Porte, however, then said to the Patriarch: "We have upheld the law; we have inflicted punishment on these priests; we now call on you to put an end to these differences with the Bulgarian Church, by making necessary concessions to it, in order to restore harmony, and to terminate a state of discord which may lead to disorder and bloodshed."

After three days of deliberation granted to the Patriarch, and on his refusal to make any concessions to the Bulgarian Church, the Porte sanctioned the

election of an Exarch as head of the Bulgarian Church, but insisted that the election should not fall on any of the priests excommunicated by the Patriarch.

The Bishop of Widdin was elected, a very conciliatory and worthy man.

The result was the formation of an autonomic Bulgarian Church, on a similar basis to those of the Churches of Jerusalem, of Cyprus, of the Russian Orthodox, and of the Servian Church. These Churches are all branches of the Greek Church under the Patriarch of Constantinople; they elect their own Chief or Metropolitan, who is recognised and confirmed as such by the Patriarch; they hold the same dogmas, the same faith, but their services are performed in their respective languages, and not in Greek.

The Russian Government, as well as the Holy Russian Synod, viewed these differences with great interest. The Synod addressed a strong appeal to the Patriarch in favour of the Bulgarian Church, but without effect.

General Ignatieff, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, was not felicitous in his treatment of this question. He so managed affairs as to hold a balancing influence over the two contending parties, and, by endeavouring to cajole each, ended in disgusting both. By supporting the claims of the Bulgarians he hoped to maintain the prestige of Russia over his "co-religionists," and to assure them of her sympathy and support. At the same time he thought it incumbent on him to recognise the authority of

the Patriarch, and to maintain his rights as head of the Greek Church.

The result was that his support of the Bulgarians, being lukewarm, was of no effect, while his attitude in regard to them alienated from Russia the confidence and support of the Greek population at Constantinople.

Shortly after my arrival at St. Petersburg I perceived that a storm was brewing against Khiva. It portended a threatened further advance of Russia in Central Asia. I learnt that the acts and attitude of the Khan were not satisfactory. Several attempts had been made by General Kaufmann to open conciliatory negotiations with him, but had failed. To the General's first letter he made no reply, and to the others he had replied in a tone of defiance.

The Emir of Bokhara sent an Envoy to the Khan to expostulate with him, and, in a friendly tone, to advise him to come to an amicable arrangement with the Russian Government, instancing the benefit he had himself derived from the support of Russia, citing also the increase of commercial wealth which his country had acquired by entertaining friendly relations with Russia.

The Khan apparently turned a deaf ear to these seductions, and resisted the Russian demands. The accusations of Russia against the Khan were that he was in community with the nomadic tribes who pillaged the caravans, and participated in the booty; that he sheltered the marauders; and that Russian

prisoners who had fallen into his hands were treated as slaves, and otherwise maltreated.

"The difficulty we have," said a Russian to me, "in dealing with Khiva, is the fact of its being so weak. If we were to chastise the Khan, the whole fabric would fall like a pack of cards. We have done everything we can to bring the Khan to reason, but without any result."

It was then evident to me that an expedition against Khiva, at a favourable moment, was decided upon, which would give to Russia a further advance southward towards the Persian frontier, and enable her to acquire (which she obtained later) full command over the Turcoman tribes.

On the other hand, I was convinced that the Emperor and Prince Gortschakoff desired peace, and would not engage in any ambitious or adventurous policy. The difficulty was to imbue the Russian military authorities in Central Asia, so far removed from the central Government, with the same spirit. Every Governor-General aspired to obtain the "St. George" by some daring feat, and every new acquisition laid at the feet of the Emperor, and gained by the bravery and blood of his troops, could not well be rejected. When conversing on this topic with Prince Gortschakoff, I suggested that the "St. George" might be given to the Governor-General before he entered on his functions, which might render him less bellicose and ambitious of glory. But a Russian army in those distant parts of the Empire must be

employed—it must be fed by "loot" and "military honours."

If anything could prove the pacific disposition of the Emperor and the Imperial policy, it was notably demonstrated by the ferment and fears produced when the Black Sea question was under discussion, lest it should give rise to war.

Two Embassies came from the Khan of Khiva: the one intended for Tiflis waited to know whether it would be received by the Grand Duke Michael, then Governor of the Caucasus; and the other proceeded to Orenburg, with the intention of opening amicable negotiations with General Kryanowski, and with the ultimate view of repairing to St. Petersburg for the purpose of presenting gifts to the Emperor, and of bringing about a good understanding with the Russian Government. These Embassies were informed that they could not be received until the Khan had placed his relations with General Kaufmann on a proper footing. The Khan was called upon (1) to liberate all Russian prisoners, and (2) to address a letter to General Kaufmann expressing his readiness to enter into an amicable understanding with him.

When he had thus placed his relations with General Kaufmann on a friendly footing his Embassies would be received.

At this time I was instructed by Lord Granville to submit to the Imperial Government the desirableness, in the cause of humanity, of warning the Government of Roumania of the danger to which the Jews would be

exposed at the approaching season, if the Passover should be taken advantage of to revive the charges made against them of mixing Christian blood in their religious ceremonies, thereby giving cause to a renewal of the disorders which had so frequently occurred. Prince Gortschakoff at once accepted the suggestion, and said he would send instructions to the Russian Council General at Bucharest in the sense indicated.

On a subsequent occasion (the 22nd of May, 1872), at an interview I had with Prince Gortschakoff, I stated to His Highness that, in view of the continued persecution of the Jews in the Principalities, Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that the Powers parties to the Treaties of 1856 and 1858 were called upon to interpose in a more solemn manner than heretofore, in order to bring before the Government of Roumania the obligations imposed by the 46th Article of the Convention of 1858, which, if duly observed, would secure to the Jews the same treatment and the same security for their lives and properties as are enjoyed by the other inhabitants of the Principalities. I inquired, therefore, of His Highness whether the Imperial Government would take part in a joint representation to the Roumanian Government to the above effect.

Prince Gortschakoff first observed that there existed a great difference in the character and standing of the Jews in London and other capitals, and of those in the Principalities. "We would gladly give you," said His Highness, "all our Jews in exchange for half-a-dozen of your Jewish magnates." He had always favoured

religious toleration, and had been the prominent member of the Council of the Empire who had pleaded in behalf of the Jews. But there were two classes of Jews, and the rights and concessions which might undeniably be granted to the distinguished and enlightened members of that community could not, with equal safety or prudence, be conceded to the Jewish population in Eastern Europe.

His Highness said that these observations were merely intended as a preface. He then went on to state that he had telegraphed to the Russian Consul-General at Bucharest in the sense requested by Her Majesty's Government, to urge on the Roumanian Government such precautions as might prevent disorder between the Christians and Jews at the Easter Fêtes. Where the cause of humanity was concerned the Imperial Government were ever ready to raise their voice.

But the Imperial Government had not been able to participate in the Collective Note lately addressed to the Roumanian Government by the Consular Body at Bucharest.

The outrage which had occurred at Ismail, and which had given rise to the disorders there, bore a much graver character than that of mere robbery.

The altar of the church had been wilfully profaned, and the Sacred Chalice had been treated with ignominy and contempt, thus evincing a wilful outrage on religion, which amounted to an act of sacrilege. These were not exaggerated accusations. They were facts, which had been proved on evidence.

The Imperial Government could not participate in an official representation, in the circumstances referred to, which might appear in the eyes of their co-religionists as if they viewed with indifference and apathy such wilful desecration of their religion. "Nor," observed His Highness, "could they join in a representation which passed over in silence these insults to their religion, without an expression of disapproval and condemnation of such acts." It was on these grounds that the Russian Consul had abstained from participating in the Collective Note.

With regard to the present invitation of Her Majesty's Government, Gortschakoff said that the Imperial Government were not disposed to take part in a joint representation to the Roumanian Government.

In the first place, His Highness observed that the 46th Article of the Convention of 1858 contained "facultative" as well as "positive obligations." Among the former were "equal" political rights, which could not be conceded by local legislation.

He further observed that, in all justice and equity, both parties ought to be heard, and that before proceeding to any condemnation of the Roumanian Government, an appeal should be addressed to them for information on the various incidents which had given rise to the disorders complained of. He therefore charged me to suggest that Her Majesty's Government should, in the first instance, separately address a direct appeal to the Roumanian Government, requesting that a strict inquiry should be made into all the circumstances

which had caused the late disorders between the Christians and Jews, reminding the Roumanian Government of the obligations contained in the 46th Article of the Convention of 1858, and calling on them to provide for their strict fulfilment. This, in the opinion of His Highness, would be a more just and equitable course to pursue than to address a joint representation of an accusatory (*comminatoire*) nature, without having previously elicited an explanation from the Roumanian Government, or afforded them the opportunity of repelling the accusations laid to their charge.

His Highness was further under the impression that any fresh collective step taken by Europe might be attended with serious consequences to the position and authority of the Prince, which had been already reduced to a low ebb. The result would be an encouragement to the revolutionary party, which would neither be advantageous to the interests of the Principalities, to the repose of Turkey, nor to the benefit of Europe.

I was of opinion that several causes induced Prince Gortschakoff to decline a joint representation to the Roumanian Government. Amongst them I may mention the following :—

(1) The Jewish community in Russia is subjected to very restrictive laws. The Jews are only allowed to reside in towns, and are precluded from possessing land. They are not allowed to settle in the country, or become cultivators of the soil. They have not equal rights with the other Russian citizens. The Russian

Government are, therefore, restrained from urging on the Principalities a greater freedom for the Jews, fearing that the same arguments might recoil on themselves. (2) The Russian Government are obliged to take into account the strong religious feeling which exists throughout the Empire in regard to the Orthodox Church, and more especially in matters where the Jewish community may be suspected of offering an insult to it. (3) Prince Gortschakoff was somewhat afraid of the consequences which might result from any collective action of a nature to humiliate or wound the susceptibilities of the Roumanian Government and people.

His Highness remarked to me that he had been opposed to the union of the Principalities, and to the election of a foreign Prince, but that it was for the general welfare the Government of the Prince should be maintained, and that any disruption of the *status quo* would re-invigorate the revolutionary party, and produce a state of things dangerous to Turkey and intolerable to Europe.

Prince Charles had only lately strengthened his position and authority, which had been greatly weakened; but any fresh stimulus given to the opposition party, by external pressure of a nature to humiliate his Government, might prove fatal to his Sovereignty.

The celebration of the bi-centenary anniversary of the birth of Peter the Great took place on the 11th of June, 1872, in the presence of the Emperor

and Empress and the Imperial Family, with great state on the part of the Court, and great enthusiasm on the part of the people. It was an impressive sight, and had a traditional interest, it having been an exact repetition of the centenary celebration on the inauguration of the "statue" to Peter the Great by the Empress Catherine.

As is usual in Russia, there was a large mixture of military pomp and religious rites, of priests and soldiers. The ceremony commenced with a Divine Service at the Cathedral of St. Peter and St. Paul. On the disembarkation of the various memorials of Peter the Great, which are preserved in the fortress, a procession was formed at the landing-place, and proceeded to St. Isaac's Church, headed by the Emperor and the Imperial Family. On leaving the church Divine Service was again performed in front of the statue of Peter the Great, and the clergy, in full canonicals, proceeded to bless and sprinkle with holy water the various memorials, which were placed round the statue. In this ceremony the Emperor, on horseback, supported the clergy. After accompanying the clergy back to the church, a review of the troops which had assembled in honour of the occasion was held in the square where the statue is placed, forming in all about 32,000 men. The statue represents Peter the Great, on horseback, mounted on a large granite rock, on which the simple words are inscribed—"Catherine II. to Peter the Great."

It was an imposing sight. The greatest order

prevailed, and the assembled masses joined with patriotic feeling in veneration for the great founder of the Russian Empire.

I have been present at many religious ceremonies in many parts of Europe. I have heard the impressive chant of the "Miserere" at St. Peter's at Rome, and the High Mass at the Cathedral at Milan, but I have never heard anything grander, more solemn, or more touching than the funeral service of the Orthodox Greek Church.

There is no music—no organ—in the service of the Greek Church. The deep tones of the Greek priesthood supply its place, and they produce an indescribable effect of solemnity and reverence. I have attended Imperial christenings, marriages, and funerals, and they have always imbued me with a deeply religious feeling; and I can well understand the influence which the Orthodox Church exercises on the minds of all classes of the Russian people.

The observances of the Orthodox Church are strictly adhered to by all classes in Russia, high and low. The fasting in Lent is rigidly observed, as also is confession in the Holy Week. The Emperor is the head of the Church, but the "Synod" is the supreme and arbitrary ruler of it. The wealth of the Church is very great, and the chief part of it is enjoyed by the upper hierarchy. The lower clergy, called "Popes," are of a low class, illiterate and miserably paid, and exercise no influence over their flock. This is much to be regretted, for were they of a higher order, better educated and

better paid, they would be more respected, and would be enabled by their example to instil into their parishioners those principles of religion, of moral duty, and of probity, which are the foundation of a nation's greatness and prosperity.

The Russians have many notable customs, which have been handed down from the earliest times. There is one which is the expression of a religious benediction. On Easter Sunday everyone, high and low, on meeting, exchanges the glorious announcement, "Christos voskrés" ("Christ is risen").

On an Easter Sunday the Emperor Nicholas, on leaving his apartment, addressed this customary phrase to the "sentinel" on duty, who replied, "So they say, sire." The Emperor, astonished at this reply, inquired what it meant, and learnt that the sentinel was a Jew. He gave orders thereupon that no Jew was to be henceforth on duty at the Winter Palace on Easter Sunday.

Before closing this chapter I must briefly refer to the Court and Society at St. Petersburg. The Court is very brilliant and admirably maintained. It has something of an Oriental grandeur. The Court balls, with the romantic appearance of the Circassian Guard—the brilliant variety of uniforms—the Oriental costumes of the "negroes" posted at the various doors—the picturesque appearance of the Cossacks—the magnificence of the ladies' toilettes (the perfection of a certain Mr. Worth) and the splendour of their jewels (especially turquoises, diamonds, and sapphires)—and the stately rooms of the Winter Palace, lit with thousands of wax

candles, are unsurpassed in beauty and splendour at any Court where I have resided.

The guests are received by their Majesties with that grace and courtesy which at once gratifies and sets them at ease, and there are no fêtes more enjoyable than those at the Winter Palace.

There is one special fête, called "Le Bal des Palmiers," where the supper, in a salon transformed into a Winter Garden, is served at round tables encircling each palm-tree. These palm-trees are brought on each occasion from the conservatories at Zarsko-Séloe, and I was told that they require three years to recover from the exposure they undergo in one night's decoration.

During the ball there was a tea-room for the Emperor and Empress and the Imperial family, to which the Ambassadors were invited. It was in that part of the palace which the Empress Catherine inhabited, and is said to have been the scene of her gaieties.

Society at St. Petersburg was very select and exclusive—very *distinguée* and agreeable. The Russian ladies are affable, prepossessing, and very attractive by their manners and complete absence of affectation. I found on all occasions on the part of the Russians an anxiety to be serviceable to strangers, and an innate good-nature and friendliness. If they have any failings (and we all have), they show great tact in concealing them. They are most hospitable to strangers, and always ready to do them a kind service. I have many friends in Russia, of whom I shall always retain a pleasing reminiscence, and to whom I am truly attached.

CHAPTER II.

Peaceful State of 1872—Rising Discontent in Christian Provinces of Turkey—Visit to St. Petersburg of Sir Moses Montefiore—His Reception by the Emperor—General Ignatieff—Visit of the Archduke William of Austria—Visit of Emperor of Russia to Emperor of Germany at Berlin to meet Emperor of Austria—Motives of Emperor of Germany in Wishing for Presence of Emperor of Russia—Complete Reconciliation between Emperors of Austria and Russia—Probable Subjects of Deliberation between the Three Emperors—Success of Count Andrassy—Dinner at Governor of Moscow on Emperor's Fête Day — General Kaufmann — Object of his Visit to St. Petersburg — Disorders on the Russo-Chinese Frontier—Occupation of Kuldja by Russia—Apathy and Weakness of China—Arrival of General Kaufmann—Negotiations for Delimitation of Afghan Frontier—Final Arrangement and Hopeful Results from It—Count Schouvaloff's Mission to London—Conversation with him on his Return—Death of the Grand Duchess Helen.

THE year 1872 commenced as one of peace and calmness. Prince Gortschakoff's last words to me when I took leave of him, on his departure for Wilbad on the 20th of July, were—"*Qu'il ne laissait pas un seul nuage à l'horizon politique.*"

France, under the sagacious rule of M. Thiers, was recovering from the severe losses she had sustained by the late war, and he had made satisfactory arrangements (to which I have previously alluded), without any appeal to extraneous aid, to pay the war indemnity, and thereby to liberate the country from the foreign occupation within the period fixed by her treaty engagements.

M. Thiers, whatever may have been his personal

feelings or his monarchical tendencies, soon perceived that the Republican form of government was the only one then possible for France, or, as he himself said, "it was the one which most united the various political parties of the French nation."

At this time there was no political question of importance engaging the attention of the European Cabinets, and there was an anxious wish on the part of all to preserve the existing harmony and peace of Europe. The religious dissensions of Greeks and Armenian Catholics, and of the Greek Patriarch with the Bulgarian Church, were not likely to lead to anything serious. The quarrels among the Christian subjects of Turkey rather tended to strengthen than to weaken the Porte. They were only formidable when united against the Turk. But there was a growing discontent in Servia and the Christian provinces of Northern Turkey—the growth of seeds sown by political agitators and Panslavist leaders—which augured ill for the continued peace and tranquillity of the East, and foreboded troubles at no distant date.

In July, 1872, Sir Moses Montefiore paid a visit to St. Petersburg, with the object of appealing to the Emperor and the Imperial Government in behalf of his co-religionists. I obtained for him an audience of the Emperor. His Majesty was very gracious to him. I was told that he was much taken with his patriarchal appearance and his benevolent expression, and that His Majesty felt great admiration for an old man bordering on ninety having undertaken, solely for a philanthropic

object, so fatiguing a journey. Sir Moses expressed himself to me as enchanted with his audience of the Emperor, and with his gracious and kind reception of him. Although Sir Moses did not expect any immediate result to his appeal, he was content to leave it to the impression produced and the working of time. The result, however, has not been in accordance with his hopes.

General Ignatieff, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, arrived at St. Petersburg two days before the departure of Prince Gortschakoff. I was glad on this occasion to make his acquaintance as a politician of note. He was a man of pleasing manners, of considerable ability, and of endless resource; of indefatigable mental and bodily energy, and of a sanguine temperament in all he undertook. He was also of an imaginative disposition, and consequently his statements and hopes were not always to be depended upon, although they gave an agreeable vivacity to his conversation. General Ignatieff was originally brought into notice and patronised by Prince Gortschakoff, who, however, soon discovered that his pupil was "growing too fast" and becoming his own rival, and he was not sorry that he was at a distance.

General Ignatieff was the representative of a party which exercised an influence at Court, and the appointment of his father as President of the Council of Ministers, in the place of Prince Gargarin, considerably strengthened his position. The political party to which I have referred was that of which General

Fadéef was the literary exponent, and the tendencies of which were in favour of Panslavism. It was anti-German, and was impregnated with pure Muscovite ideas. It considered that Russia ought to be entirely under Russian tulelage, and that Western civilisation would rather destroy than elevate the morality and welfare of the nation.

Madame Ignatieff was very distinguished and attractive, both by her charm of manners and by her social qualities.

During the summer the Archduke William of Austria announced his visit to the Emperor of Russia, with the intention of attending the military manœuvres in the neighbourhood of Zarsko-Séloe, and arrived at St. Petersburg on the 9th of July. His Imperial Highness was received at the railway by the Emperor and the Imperial family. I was informed that the Archduke William was charged by the Emperor of Austria to invite the Emperor of Russia to visit the Vienna Exhibition, which was to be opened the following year. The Emperor, accompanied by the Archduke William, on the termination of the Zarsko-Séloe manœuvres, left for Moscow on the 1st of August to close the Exhibition there. His Imperial Majesty proceeded thence to Livadia, and the Archduke William returned to Vienna *viâ* Warsaw.

This visit was of happy omen. The Archduke was received with great cordiality by the Emperor and the Imperial Family, and left a favourable impression on His Majesty. It broke the ice between the two

Courts, and paved the way to the visit of the Emperor of Russia shortly after to the Emperor of Germany at Berlin, to meet the Emperor of Austria.

In referring to the projected visit of the Emperor of Austria to the Court of Berlin, M. de Westmann, the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the absence of Prince Gortschakoff, observed to me that the meeting of the three Emperors at Berlin might be considered of good omen to the general peace. On the part of the Emperor of Austria, it was the natural and courteous response to the visit of the Emperor of Germany.

The Emperors of Austria and Russia being attended by Count Andrassy and Prince Gortschakoff, gave an importance to the meeting of the three Sovereigns which occupied the attention of Europe. But I learnt at the time that the object of the meeting was personal to the Sovereigns, and not of a political character.

I learnt from an undeniable source that the invitation to the Emperor of Russia to meet the Emperor of Austria was the act of the Emperor William, and that he earnestly pressed its acceptance.

The meeting was recommended to the Emperor Alexander by the Emperor William, as offering a means of strengthening Conservative principles, of giving confidence in the maintenance of peace and order, and as calculated to place the future relations of the three Empires on a friendly and cordial footing.

The path had been cleared for the Emperors of Russia and Austria by the visit of the Archduke William to St. Petersburg, the initiative of which was

due to Count Andrassy. It was attended with the best results. The Archduke was received with great attention and cordiality by the Emperor, and his great tact and charm of manner won the esteem and respect of His Imperial Majesty.

I was also informed that the presence of the Emperor Alexander was not wished for by Prince Bismarck simultaneously with that of the Emperor of Austria. He would have preferred that the meeting of the Emperors of Germany and Austria should have taken place alone; the presence of the Emperor of Russia gave another character to the Austrian visit. It deprived the interview of its purely German character, in which the Emperor of Germany would have played the prominent part.

It was stated to me that the Emperor William, guided by that chivalrous and noble feeling which characterised him, was desirous of the presence of the Emperor of Russia for two motives: first, out of delicacy towards the Emperor of Austria, and to remove any embarrassment which his visit might occasion; and, secondly, to bring into cordial and harmonious accord the Emperors of Russia and Austria, between whom during late years the relations had been somewhat estranged.

If these, as I have every reason to believe, were his real motives, the thoughtful consideration of the Emperor William re-established the equilibrium between the two Emperors of Germany and Austria, and gave to the visit of the Emperor of Austria a character of

greater independence, or, as Count Andrassy graphically remarked, "*Cela nous met du foin dans nos bottes.*"

The meeting of the Emperors of Russia and Austria, which placed their relations on their former good footing, was an important event, which could not fail to have its beneficial result on all questions relating to the two Empires.

The Emperor of Russia conferred on the Crown Prince Rudolf of Austria the colonelcy of the 34th Regiment of Infantry, and a similar distinction on Field-Marshal Count Moltke.

Similar honours were conferred by the Emperor of Austria on the Grand Dukes Vladimir and Nicolas Nicolaievitch, who had accompanied his Imperial Majesty to Berlin.

On the occasion of the meeting of the three Emperors, attended by their Prime Ministers—statesmen of European renown—it was natural to suppose that opinions would be exchanged between them on the political questions of the day. But it was a meeting of friendly and confidential intercourse, and there were no protocols or diplomatic documents of any kind signed or exchanged. Whatever took place between the sovereigns was entirely of a private and secret character, and nothing transpired to gratify the avidity for news of the inquisitive public. But if my surmise may be permitted, there were three questions of general interest and importance which no doubt formed the subject of their deliberations.

The first was the question of the secret society,

termed the "International," which was the hot-bed in which the revolutionary plans and designs of the Socialist party in Europe were hatched. A conference was to have taken place between Austria and Germany at Berlin on this subject, but it was postponed till after the meeting of the Sovereigns.

In conversation with Prince Gortschakoff on this subject in the early part of the year, His Highness stated that he had declined to take part in that conference, considering that the question of the "International" was as yet geographically far removed from Russia, and more immediately affected Austria and Germany. But His Highness had then stated that Russia was in a more favourable position as regarded the treatment of this question than the other two Empires, inasmuch as she was not under the restraint of Constitutional Government; and he then added, that as regarded the co-operation of Russia, he was prepared beforehand to accept the "maximum" of any proposals submitted to him. In any discussion on this subject by the Sovereigns and their Ministers at Berlin, the co-operation of Russia was assured to them.

The second subject may have been the religious question, and the attitude of the three Empires towards the See of Rome.

On this subject Prince Gortschakoff had on several occasions expressed to me his wish to be on friendly terms with the Pope. He had represented Russia as imbued with feelings of religious tolerance, and as anxious to have harmonious relations with the See of

Rome. He had stated to me that so long as the Papacy and the Roman Catholic clergy should confine themselves to "Catholicism," he would be their ready supporter and defender; but if they engaged in "Polonism," he should be their determined enemy. The relations with the See of Rome were now on a friendly footing, and Prince Gortschakoff stated that he should not allow himself to be drawn in the wake of Prince Bismarck, in assuming a hostile attitude against the Pope and the Catholic subjects of the Empire.

The third subject which rumour said might come under deliberation, was that of a mutual guarantee of the territorial possessions of the three Empires, as a means of securing and consolidating the peace of Europe. But this would imply a guarantee of Alsace and Lorraine, to which neither Austria nor Russia could have assented. The possession of Alsace and Lorraine was by right of conquest; it was a *fait accompli*, in which the other Powers had taken no part, and for which, consequently, they could not be called upon to assume a future responsibility.

The principal result of the Imperial meeting appears to have been a general good understanding between the three Sovereigns to further the maintenance of peace and order in Europe. To this may be added the signal success of Count Andrassy, on this his first appearance on the great political stage as a political actor, when he laid the foundation of that high reputation which he subsequently enjoyed at Berlin and St. Petersburg, having acquired the confidence and appreciation of the

Emperors of Germany and of Russia, which in later years bore their fruit. On his return to St. Petersburg Prince Gortschakoff spoke to me of him in terms of the highest praise.

I was told that the meeting of the Emperors of Russia and of Austria at Berlin was marked by very friendly feelings on both sides, the Emperor of Russia saying to the Emperor Francis Joseph, "*Qu'il n'était pour rien dans les opinions Panslavistes.*"

The Emperor Francis Joseph, on the other hand, gave tranquillising assurances to the Emperor of Russia in regard to his Polish provinces, to the effect that he did not intend making further concessions than those already granted. To this the Emperor is reported to have replied that he was satisfied, "*Comme les concessions accordées jusqu'ici ne le gênaient pas.*"

Being at Moscow on the 11th of September, to visit the Exhibition there, I was invited to dine at an official dinner given in honour of the Emperor's fête day by Prince Dolgoroukow, the Governor.

On that occasion General Kaufmann, the Governor-General of Turkestan, introduced himself to me in a friendly manner. He said he had just arrived from Turkestan, and was on his way to St. Petersburg, where he hoped to pass the winter.

In reply to my inquiry as to the state of the negotiations with Khiva, he said they were not progressing. The Khan had not yet restored the Russian prisoners, and was seeking to gain delay by subterfuges.

The object of his visit to St. Petersburg I learnt was to submit to the Emperor a plan for the organisation of the Government of Turkestan. The proposals he had hitherto made had met with much opposition from the Minister of Finance, on account of the heavy charge on the Imperial exchequer. He had, therefore, come in person to plead his cause with the Emperor, in the hope of overcoming the opposition of M. de Reutern.

The expenses of Turkestan were beginning to press heavily on the Imperial finances, and every fresh annexation added to them. The "extension of territory" was well defined by Prince Gortschakoff as the "extension of weakness" to Russia. The merchants of Moscow were also beginning to exclaim against the vast sums expended in Turkestan for the spread of "civilisation," as it was termed, and they urged that it would be more profitably spent on "civilising" in Russia. In this respect there was a continual struggle between the military and civil advisers of the Crown, in which the former were generally triumphant. At this time some trouble was caused to the Imperial Government by the disorders which had taken place on their Chinese frontier in the province of Ili, which led to a frightful loss of life, and to an extermination of the Chinese population by the Doungans, a Mussulman race inhabiting that province, and originating from Kashgar (or Izarkund).

This latter province had rebelled against China, and an adventurer named Yakoub Beg had assumed the rulership of it, under the title of the Atalik-Ghazee.

I obtained the following information respecting this almost unknown country from Mons. de Stremooukoff, the Imperial Director of the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Office, who was specially conversant with all Eastern and Asiatic affairs. He said that it was now eight years* since the population of Djungaria—composed of tribes of various races, mostly Mahomedan—rose in rebellion against the Chinese authority. After much bloodshed, having first exterminated the Chinese, and then fought among themselves, they made raids on Russian territory for the sake of plunder, till at length, having completely cut off the Russian trade with China, which at that time was considerable, and seized Russian subjects to make slaves of them, the Russian Government were obliged to assume the offensive, and, after several encounters, the Russian troops occupied Kuldja.

At that time Yakoub Beg, who had placed himself at the head of the rebellious Mussulman population in Yarkand, south of the Thian-Shan range, gave signs of moving towards the north, and had occupied some of the passes of the Thian-Shan Mountains. The Imperial Government remonstrated against this apparent design of Yakoub Beg to extend his territory, obliging him to retire and abandon all idea of conquest in that direction.

Since that period the Imperial Government had repeatedly called on the Chinese Government to re-occupy the Province of Ili and its capital, Kuldja, with

* This conversation took place in 1872.

a sufficient force to put down insurrection and to maintain peace and order on the frontier, promising at the same time their support and assistance.

General Boguslawski, formerly First Russian Dragoman at Constantinople, was despatched to Kuldja, in order to meet a Chinese Plenipotentiary, and to concert with him for the re-occupation of Kuldja by the Chinese.

On his arrival there he found that the Chinese Plenipotentiary had neither sufficient powers to treat with him, nor was he supported by an efficient force to re-establish the Chinese authority. He was only attended by some flag-bearers, but he stated that some 1,500 men were on their march to join him.*

In the meantime the inhabitants of Kuldja, who had enjoyed peace and order during the Russian occupation, besought the Russians not to leave them to be exposed to fresh pillage and massacre.

General Boguslawski, finding that the Chinese Plenipotentiary had no powers to negotiate, and was unable to resume the government of Kuldja if delivered over to him, was instructed to proceed direct to Pekin, in order to report to the Russian Minister there the state of affairs; and to concert with him as to further negotiations with the Chinese Government. The

* As a proof of the tediousness of the march of Chinese troops to the outlying provinces, I may mention that the Chinese army sent to re-establish Chinese authority in Yarkand (which they eventually succeeded in effecting) took about three years to arrive there. There being no means of provisioning the army *en route*, they were obliged to halt for months—to sow the corn and other grain, and to await their maturity before continuing their march.

Imperial Government were ready, and even anxious, to restore Kuldja to the Chinese, provided they had the assurance that they would be able to maintain peace and order. But they were unwilling to continue the existing state of things, in which they were acting as policemen for China, and which imposed on them the maintenance of order at a considerable cost and sacrifice, without any counterbalancing advantage.

The Chinese proposed that their troops should march to Kuldja by a circuitous route traversing Russian territory, but the Russian Plenipotentiary declined this offer, urging that it would be useless and dangerous for them to have an insurged province in their rear, and he accordingly suggested that they should march through the insurgent province, thus re-establishing their authority on the whole line of march. This was sound advice, but the Chinese Government had neither the troops to send, nor could they have marched through a hostile population direct on Kuldja. From the Russian reports, the whole province—embracing a very large tract of country—was in permanent insurrection against the authority at Pekin. Constant fighting and massacres were taking place between the different races interspersed through that province, and the Chinese were not in a position to re-occupy it. It was, therefore, probable that the Russian occupation would have to continue for an indefinite period, for if the Russian troops retired the previous anarchy and bloodshed, which their presence had put an end to, would recommence.

The arrival of General Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, at St. Petersburg, revived the question of fixing the frontiers of Afghanistan, the negotiations for which had been for some months dormant.

On my arrival at St. Petersburg, in the early part of 1872, these negotiations had been suspended, awaiting the answer of General Kaufmann to a despatch of the Indian Government of May 20, 1870.*

The tragic death of the Earl of Mayo further postponed the renewal of these negotiations until his successor should have entered on his duties. In the meantime no report had been received from General Kaufmann.

I accordingly suggested to Lord Granville that we should profit by the presence during the winter of General Kaufmann at St. Petersburg to resume these negotiations, and to bring them to a final conclusion. It was of essential importance that the northern frontier of Afghanistan—the bulwark of India—should be strictly defined; and the presence of General Kaufmann at St. Petersburg rendered it the most opportune moment for a definite settlement, so desirable for the mutual interest of both countries.

In treating this question, I represented to the Imperial Government that, to obliterate all past jealousy or suspicion, there should be perfect frankness and unreservedness; and on this basis there was no reason why the two Governments should not act cordially together on Asiatic affairs.

* *See* Appendix.

At the end of October I received a despatch from Lord Granville (of which I annex a copy in the Appendix),* submitting the proposals of Her Majesty's Government for the delimitation of the Afghan frontier.

On the 4th of November I had an interview with M. de Westmann (in the absence of Prince Gortschakoff), and read to him that despatch, leaving a copy of it in his hands, in conformity with my instructions. He made no observations during the communication of the despatch. The only points to which he referred afterwards were in regard to Badakshan and Wakhan, adding, however, that he was not sufficiently informed on the subject of the frontier to hazard an opinion.

I then stated that in the interest both of Great Britain and Russia, it was of importance that the frontier of Afghanistan should be strictly defined, and that the conclusion which Her Majesty's Government had come to was in complete harmony with the understanding which had been agreed upon with Mr. Forsyth, when he visited St. Petersburg in 1869.

I strongly urged the value to both countries of a cordial understanding on all matters relating to Central Asia. For Russia, indeed, this understanding was even of greater moment, as her influence and status in Central Asia were of recent date, and could only be consolidated by acquiring, through peaceful means, the respect and obedience of the Asiatic population, and by developing the internal resources of the country. M. de Westmann heartily concurred in these opinions, and stated, with all

* *See* Appendix.

sincerity, that the opinions I had expressed were identical with those of the Imperial Government. He said Russia required peace in Central Asia, and he admitted that a cordial understanding between our respective countries was more necessary to Russia than to England. India, he said, was an established Government, and the country, under the judicious rule of England, was far advanced in civilisation.

In referring to Mr. Forsyth, M. de Westmann remarked that he had entertained some plan of establishing a neutral zone between the English and Russian frontiers in Central Asia, which, in fact, would necessitate two frontier lines. I replied that the neutral zone, as far as I understood the idea, merely referred to those Khanates north of the Oxus, between the frontier of Afghanistan and the Russian frontier; and that in this idea would be comprised Bokhara and Khokand. Further than this I could see no object in a neutral zone. Finally, M. de Westmann said that Lord Granville's despatch would be translated, and immediately submitted to the Emperor.

I will not inflict on my readers the lengthy details of the negotiations with the Russian Government for the settlement of the Afghan frontier question. I will only state that they were conducted in the most friendly manner, both Governments being animated by a sincere desire to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion; and the acceptance by Russia of the line of frontier proposed by Lord Granville was courteously conveyed by Prince Gortschakoff in a despatch addressed to Count Brunnow,

dated January 19-31, 1873.* But, as a matter of history, I think it right to annex, in an appendix, those despatches and official documents which may be of interest to my readers, and enable them to form their own opinions on the questions to which those negotiations gave rise.

By the final arrangement accepted by Russia, the Oxus, from "Woods'" Lake to Khoja Sale, was to form the northern frontier of Afghanistan, which is really the "strategic frontier of India," the term used by the late Lord Beaconsfield in another sense.

The remainder of the Afghan frontier, from Khoja Sale on the Oxus to the Persian boundary, has within later years, since the advance of Russia to Merv, and her occupation of the Turkoman territory, been definitively fixed, and so strictly determined, that any infraction of the frontier laid down would constitute a *casus belli*.

Repeated and formal assurances were also given officially, verbally, and in writing, by Prince Gortschakoff to Her Majesty's Government, that "the Imperial Government considered Afghanistan as entirely beyond its sphere of action;" but this solemn assurance did not restrain the Imperial Government from sending General Stolétoff on a secret mission to Shere-Ali-Khan in 1878.

Assurances were given by the Imperial Government that there was no intention to annex Khiva, to attack the Turcomans, to occupy Merv, or to extend Russian

* *See* Appendix.

territory further southward, but when the favourable moment came, these assurances were discarded without the smallest hesitation. It is unfortunate that this non-observance of formal assurances should cast discredit on Russia, as it tends to diminish the confidence reposed in her by foreign States.

Russia has now reached the limit of her advance southwards, and I augur from this fact that her relations with England in Central Asia will rest on a firmer and more lasting basis than heretofore, and that their rivalry will henceforth be confined to their mutual promotion of peace and civilisation in their respective spheres. Cordially aiding each other in this philanthropic aim, they may effect much good, and mutually benefit their own interests. By pursuing a different course they will not only do injury to themselves, but greatly arrest that progress of advancement in civilisation and commercial wealth which it is their duty, as it is their interest, to further.

I have never been one of those who attributed to Russia designs on India, nor have I attached importance to the reputed Will of Peter the Great. The late Emperor Alexander II., in referring to it in conversation with me, declared it to be apocryphal, and to have been devised at Paris. But the misfortune has been that its ambitious designs have been in some measure acted upon and realised. This result has not originated with the Sovereign, although he is an absolute monarch, but rather from the dominant part played by the military administration. Where an

enormous standing army is maintained, it is absolutely necessary to find employment for it. Every officer is anxious to gain the St. George, or some such decoration, while both men and officers seek to enrich themselves. When a system of conquests sets in, as in Central Asia, one acquisition of territory leads to another, and the difficulty is where to stop. It was so with ourselves in India, and even now it still continues.

The Czar is very powerless in this question. Fresh conquests of territory are laid at his feet, gained by the prowess and blood of his troops. He cannot refuse it without offending his army; and troops, so far distant as Central Asia is from the control of the central power, are difficult to restrain.

It must also be borne in mind that the army in Russia is the support of the sovereign. Everything bears a military character, even to the rank and precedence of the several classes of society. The lowest class of "tchinovnic" wears an uniform. Revolutions or dynastic changes in Russia have all borne a military origin.

There was no more peaceful sovereign than the late Emperor Alexander II., but he was unable to withstand the racial fanaticism—supported by the military influence—when he declared war against Turkey in 1877.

From these considerations, therefore, I augur well from the settlement of the Afghan frontier. Russia has now reached the limit of conquest, and she must see that any attempt to overstep that limit will entail on her a costly and serious war.

I regard the idea of an invasion of India as impracticable. The Emperor Alexander II. himself said to me, "*Que ce serait une folie.*" Independently of the cost of such an expedition, which Russia could not bear (for whenever she crosses her own frontier she has to pay in gold or silver—her notes would not be accepted), it would be a most venturesome proceeding to march an army into a hostile and difficult country, so far from its basis of operations, and it would require a large force to keep up its line of communication. I am aware that some enterprising Russian officers—and among them the late General Skobeloff, with whom I was personally acquainted—viewed an invasion of India as practicable, but I do not think that the military staff of Russia partook of this opinion.

The wish of Russia was certainly to reach the Hindu Kush, and to make that range the northern frontier of Afghanistan. The late Grand Duke Constantine avowed it to me, when I replied to him, "*Jamais, Monseigneur: l'Oxus est la frontière naturelle.*" Should Russia obtain possession of the Hindu Kush she would command the entry to India. It was for that purpose that so much stress was laid by Russia on furthering the independence of Badakshan and Wakhan. But this danger is definitively settled by the Oxus being recognised by Russia as the northern frontier of Afghanistan.

I hope also that in time Russia will see the immense benefit to her of a cordial understanding with England on Central Asian affairs, and that the two countries

will join hands for a common object, and that we shall work harmoniously together for our common good.

At a meeting of the Committee of the Council of the Empire, under the presidency of the Emperor, it was decided that an expedition should be undertaken against Khiva in the following spring, and the Minister of War was charged to prepare a plan of operations, and submit it to the Council of the Empire.

At this meeting General Tchernaieff, the predecessor of General Kaufmann, read a paper censuring the system of government in Turkestan, protesting against the heavy expenses caused to the Imperial treasury, and concluded by showing that disaffection would increase among the native population of the occupied districts should this system be continued.

At the close of the year Count Peter Schouvaloff was sent by the Emperor on a confidential special mission to London. The ostensible object of his mission was to prevent any misunderstanding with England on the Asiatic question. But the real object —to which Central Asia served as a cloak—was on a question of a confidential and private nature.

On his return to St. Petersburg on January 22nd, he called on me, and expressed his gratification at the gracious reception given to him by Her Majesty the Queen, and his grateful sense of the courtesy shown to him by Lord Granville and Her Majesty's Government. He said that the Emperor was much pleased with the result of his missson, and of the courteous and conciliatory disposition with which Her Majesty's

Government received the friendly and pacific assurances in regard to the Russian policy in Central Asia, with which he had been specially charged by the Emperor. He had reported to the Emperor the deep interest taken in England on all questions referring to the Indian Empire, and had observed to His Majesty that he could only compare it to the national feeling evinced in Russia when any question arose concerning Poland. He said that very absurd and exaggerated notions were current in Europe in regard to what was termed the "Eastern Question" and the projects of Russia in Turkey. Very absurd and incorrect importance was attached to a supposed will of Peter the Great. For his part he was convinced, and every rational man in Russia shared in the conviction, that the acquisition by Russia of Constantinople would be immediately followed by the disruption of the Empire.

Count Schouvaloff stated that he had been charged to give to Her Majesty's Government the most positive and categorical assurances from the Emperor that there was no intention to incorporate Khiva, nor to extend the Russian possessions in Central Asia. It had never been the wish of the Emperor, or of the Imperial Government, to do so; but unpremeditated annexation, under exigencies and events which could not be controlled, had nevertheless taken place, and the Emperor and the Imperial Government were determined not again to be so entrapped. (His expression was, "*Que l'Empereur ne se laisserait pas prendre une seconde fois dans cette souricière.*")

Notwithstanding this explicit language of Count Schouvaloff, an attack was made against the Turcomans, and Merv has been captured and annexed by Russia.

On the 21st of January expired the Grand Duchess Helen, widow of the Grand Duke Michael, younger brother of the Emperor Nicholas, and daughter of Prince Paul of Würtemberg. The loss of this highly respected Princess was severely felt by the Emperor and Empress and the Imperial family. Her advice was frequently sought by the Emperor, who had the greatest confidence in her wisdom and her intellectual ability. She was the patroness of art, science, and literature, and her salon was the resort of the most distinguished artists of the day. Her daughter married Duke George of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, brother of the reigning Grand Duke.

CHAPTER III.

Removal of the Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem—Observations thereon—Evil Effects of Polemic between English and Russian Press on Central Asian Affairs—Warning to Russia not to Infringe on Afghan Frontier, as Mutually Agreed to—Reasons for the Two Governments to Act in Union—Attempts of Russian Press to Invalidate Agreement with England—Conversation with M. Stremooukoff—Rustem Bey appointed Governor of the Lebanon—Dinner at Court to the Foreign Ambassadors—Conversation with the Emperor in the Summer Garden—The Seclusion of the Court, in consequence of the Death of the Grand Duchess Helen—The Russian National Hymn—Theatres—Life of the Fashionable Ladies in Winter—Exclusion of Daylight—Prolongation of Night—Ladies' National Court Dress—Attempt of Captain Wiggins to establish Direct Trade Between Siberia and Scotland—Communication by M. Stremooukoff of Non-existence of Merv—Internal Defensive Power of Russia—Her Weakness for Aggression—Faith in Her Pacific Professions—Visits of the Emperor of Germany and of the Shah of Persia.

At the close of 1873 the removal of the Greek Patriarch at Jerusalem produced a deep religious impression in Russia, both on the clergy and the laity of the orthodox faith. The Russian people, even to the lowest classes, are extremely sensitive on all questions relating to their Church, and attach the highest value to the maintenance of its independence and unity, especially when any hand should be raised against it within the Turkish territory.

But in this instance the litigation arose between the Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem and the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, both being of the same faith, the

Porte being in no way mixed up with the religious part of the question.

The Patriarch of Jerusalem was removed from his ecclesiastical ministry by the Synod of Jerusalem, in consequence of his opposition to the Decree of Excommunication issued by the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople against the Bulgarian prelates, to which I have previously referred.

The Patriarch of Jerusalem receives a "Berat" or "Exequatur" from the Sultan, consequently his removal from office by the Synod, without the previous assent of the Sultan, was an act of usurpation of a power which appertained to the Sovereign alone.

During the conflict between the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople and the Bulgarian bishops, the Holy Synod of St. Petersburg had remained entirely passive, receiving communications addressed to it on the subject, but without expressing any opinions on passing events.

But viewing the dismissal of the Patriarch of Jerusalem by the Synod of that city as illegal and beyond its powers, the Emperor of Russia ordered those funds which are annually allotted in Russia to the Church of Jerusalem to be placed under sequestration. These funds amounted to about 120,000 roubles annually.

The Church in Russia, including the monasteries and convents, is enormously rich, being possessed of considerable landed estates, in addition to the voluntary contributions of the people. The gold and silver and the precious stones which adorn the churches also

represent a large capital; but I was told that very much of this wealth has been converted into money, in times of national need.

It had been hoped, and by no one more sincerely than by the Emperor, that the final agreement between England and Russia, in regard to the frontiers of Afghanistan, would have finally dispelled those mists of jealousy and suspicion which had so long overshadowed the relations between England and Russia in regard to Central Asia. In this hope and expectation Count Schouvaloff, on his return from his special mission to England, heartily participated, for he observed to me that he considered that the questions between England and Russia regarding Central Asia were now "definitively settled for at least twenty-five years." The intended approaching matrimonial connection between the Royal and Imperial families strengthened this conviction, and gave hopes of a lasting and cordial understanding between the two States. This union had been favourably received in Russia by all classes, and had given universal satisfaction in England. It had been consequently hoped that the political effect of it would be to confirm the good understanding between the two countries on Asiatic and Eastern affairs, and to give solidity to their friendly relations. But, unhappily, such was not the case, and a polemic arose between the English and Russian Press, evincing distrust on the one part, and disapproval of the Afghan agreement on the other, which caused a soreness of feeling little calculated to produce that harmony and cordiality in the

relations between the two States so desirable for their mutual interests.

The *Moscow Gazette*, a very influential paper, edited by M. Katkoff (of Panslavistic tendencies), contested in its columns the right of England to make any representations to Russia respecting her extensions in Central Asia, and the *Golos* and other Russian newspapers adopted the same tone and followed in the wake of the *Moscow Gazette*, seeking to invalidate and render nugatory the agreement which had been entered into between the two Governments in regard to the Afghan frontier, and to nullify the formal assurances therein given by the Imperial Government. The language held by the military, scientific, and literary persons of note who took an interest in Central Asian affairs, tended to prove that they viewed the agreement between the two Governments as being of no value, and worthless in regard to restricting the policy of Russia in Central Asia. Even a high official in the Asiatic Department of the Imperial Foreign Office designated it as "*un pain à cacheter sur une voie d'eau.*"*

The fact was that, without imputing any preconceived insincerity on the part of the Imperial Government when they accepted the agreement, the formal recognition by Russia of the possession of Badakshan and Wakhan by the Ameer of Afghanistan, as having been included in the territory of Dost Mahomed, and as having given their allegiance to Shir Ali, frustrated all hopes of Russia crossing the Oxus, and

* "A wafer on a water leak."

of her approach to the Hindu Kush. "Hinc illæ lachrymæ."

Although the Russian Government have not been scrupulous in the fulfilment of their engagements, they will, I doubt not, bear in mind that any attempt to cross the Oxus, forming the north-eastern frontier of Afghanistan, from Wood's Lake as far as Khoja Sale, will constitute a *casus belli*, and in the uncertain state of the Khanates in Central Asia under Russian protectorate (with which no Power wishes to interfere), serious consequences may result.

They may rest assured that the eye of England in that quarter is not obscured, nor is her arm shortened when it is a question of protecting her interests and those of her Indian Empire. Unless Russia should evince aggressive designs, or endeavour to encroach on the line of frontier of Afghanistan as now fixed and mutually agreed upon, there is no reason why the two Governments should not cordially act in union, and by their joint efforts promote the advancement and civilisation of Central Asia, each, in its own sphere, contributing to the maintenance of peace and order and to the establishment of good government.

My anxious hope is that the Imperial Government will heartily endorse these views, and that the military element, so predominant in the councils of Russia, will recognise, before it be too late, that the extension of the frontiers of Russia is the extension of weakness; and that the patriotism of every class in Russia should consist in furthering the spread of civilisation and the

promotion of trade and wealth in the boundless possessions of Russia, without seeking to enforce them on a wild and uncultivated race beyond its frontiers for the purposes of military glory.

In a conversation I had with M. Stremooukoff on the subject of the tone of the Russian Press above referred to, I said that, as an Englishman, I could make no complaints regarding the Press, but I might, however, express my regrets that no corrective had been applied by those organs which were known to be under the influence of the Government. In England, I observed, questions of this nature were treated by Parliament, and public opinion was thus prevented from being led astray, but in Russia there were no means of ventilating questions of this nature but by the Press; and I added that the articles of the *Moscow Gazette* and *Golos*—supposed to guide public opinion—if left uncorrected, were not calculated to inspire confidence in Russian engagements. He said that the Emperor had spoken to Prince Gortschakoff on the tone of the Russian Press—specifying the *Golos*—and asked "what it all meant?" Prince Gortschakoff had replied that when the Russian Press had written against him he had taken no steps to repress it, and he thought it would be impolitic to interfere. This, to say the least, was an egoistical excuse.

It must be admitted that articles in the London Press, and especially one from the *Times*, in reply to articles of the Russian Press, expressive of distrust in Russian policy, naturally called forth Russian articles

in a similar strain as regarded English views and feelings, and thus was produced a spirit of rivalry and hostility which was embarrassing to both Governments. It was evident to me, from my conversation with M. Stremooukoff, that some soreness had been produced by the articles of the English Press and the questions in the British Parliament, and it was feared that if this polemic should continue it would place the relations between the two Governments on a less friendly footing than they then were.

Rustem Bey, the Turkish Ambassador at the Court of Russia (now Rustem Pacha, Ambassador in London), having been appointed Governor-General of the Lebanon, had an audience of the Emperor to take leave. Rustem Pacha's departure was greatly regretted by Society in general and by his colleagues. He was genial in society, agreeable in conversation, and attractive by his kindly disposition and pleasing manners. Personally, he was a great loss to me, for we had lived on intimate terms, and I shall always retain an agreeable reminiscence of our friendly intercourse. He was a diplomatist of a high order, of a very conciliatory nature, of great resources, and of great tact and judgment. He was also endowed with remarkable perspicacity.

Rustem Pacha possessed all the qualities required for the difficult and delicate post of Governor of the Lebanon. He was of the Roman Catholic faith. With firmness and energy of character he united a mild and pacifying disposition ; and the experience he had gained in the high diplomatic posts he had filled was of great

utility to him in administering the affairs of a province where so many various conflicting interests were concerned. He was succeeded at St. Petersburg by Cabouli Pacha, a Turk of the old school.

A dinner was given at the palace to the foreign Ambassadors on the 21st of February, to which Lady Augustus, my daughter, and myself were invited. It was the first appearance of the Empress since her return from the Crimea. Their Imperial Majesties, and the Cesarewich and Cesarevna, expressed to me in the warmest terms their grateful acknowledgments for the deep interest and sympathy which Her Majesty the Queen had evinced during the illness of the Cesarewich.

Their Majesties, with the Imperial Family, retired immediately after the dinner, and consequently there was no opportunity offered to the Emperor for any reference to political questions.

On the following day I met the Emperor, taking his usual walk in the Summer Garden. His Majesty stopped me, and said, "*Nous avons reçu des lettres de Londres,*" in a tone which indicated that the information had been satisfactory. (They evidently referred to the intended marriage of his daughter.) I profited by the opportunity to state to His Majesty (as I had been instructed to do by Lord Granville) that the Queen had much appreciated the mission of Count Schouvaloff, and that he had had great personal success in London with all with whom he had come in contact during his stay in England. His Majesty expressed his satisfaction

at the result of Count Schouvaloff's mission, adding, "*J'espère que nos relations seront toujours bonnes.*"

I assured His Majesty that all my endeavours should be devoted to render them so. The Emperor then shook me by the hand, saying, "*Vous pouvez compter sur moi.*"

During the winter of 1872-73, the Court lived in the strictest retirement, owing to the death of the Grand Duchess Helen and to the delicate state of the Empress's health. There were no Court receptions of any kind. But there were frequent balls and parties given by Society and the foreign Embassies. There was likewise the Italian Opera, with the incomparable Patti, who was always received with unbounded applause, and who was socially as charming as she was transcendent on the stage. There was also a French play alternating with a German theatre, and likewise a Russian Opera, which was said to be very good.

The Russians are passionately fond of music, and there have been several Russian artists and composers of high repute. The national air, "God Save the Emperor," is, next to our "God Save the Queen," the grandest national air in the world.

The Russians exercise great taste, and a lavish expenditure on their entertainments. They have hot sitting-down suppers, to any hour in the morning, displaying every luxury from Paris and southern Europe. The toilettes of the ladies are mostly from Paris, and are very costly, and the display of jewels is very remarkable, particularly of turquoise, diamonds, and sapphires. There is much beauty among the fair sex, and what is

even more attractive, a grace, ease, and charm of manner which seeks to please, as well as to be pleased. There is a natural heartiness and friendliness, and a refinement of courtesy, especially to foreigners, which give a charm to Russian society, and I shall always retain a grateful reminiscence of their kind welcome and hospitality.

The Russian ladies experience little of the rigour of their long winter. Their usual life during the wintry months is a singular one. They keep very late hours (I refer to the fashionable world), and appear to wish to exclude the light of day as far as possible. The fashionable lady rises late, and does not appear in her salon before two or three o'clock. If it is sunny, and the temperature is not too low, she will generally take an hour's drive in her sleigh. On her return she will find her salon lighted and the curtains drawn, and she will then be prepared to receive her visitors, whom she regales with tea. If going to the Opera she dines early, and returns at about ten o'clock. If going to a ball or party afterwards she rests till it is time to dress, so as to appear at the ball or party at twelve, from which she does not get home till between three and four.

Suppers are the great fashion at St. Petersburg. They continue till an early hour in the morning. The men play at cards, and the ladies indulge in small talk; but in the winter they rarely manage to retire to rest before three or four in the morning, consequently they rise late, and have not more than two or three hours of daylight to contemplate the snow-clad earth and the dismal wintry aspect without.

The Russian ladies are wonderful linguists: the higher class generally know and speak four or five languages. This facility of acquiring foreign languages arises from the fact that in every Russian family of note, as also in the Imperial family, English nurses are engaged to bring up the children from their earliest infancy, French and German governesses or tutors being engaged later as the children advance in age.

The wealth of the landed proprietors has greatly decreased since the abolition of serfdom and the liberation of the serfs, the greatest act of the Emperor Alexander II., one which will immortalise his reign. The effect has been that the landed aristocracy has lost much of its former wealth (although in time it may be regained by the new system of farming), and that economy of living has taken the place of the lavish extravagance of former times. The want of roads has been a great drawback to the agricultural population; it has been somewhat relieved by the introduction of railways. But during six months of the year all locomotion and transit of merchandise is carried on by sleighs. The mining interests have greatly progressed, and the production of gold and other minerals from the Ural mountains, and in other parts of Russia, has within the last few years nearly doubled.

An enterprising citizen of Glasgow, Capt. Wiggins, has for nearly fifteen years been making efforts to introduce a trade with Siberia by direct steamers from Scotland to the Gulf of Obi, and to the mouth of the Yenisei, which traverses Siberia to the Chinese frontier.

The Obi and the Yenisei flow through the heart of the country, and, with their tributary rivers, would convey the exports to the seaport for shipping. The open navigation cannot be depended upon for more than six or eight weeks, but a large amount of export produce could be collected at the nearest port during the winter season, and the lading of the vessels on their return voyage could be easily effected within that time. The splendid virgin forests and rich mines of black-lead (on the surface, for Capt. Wiggins told me that he procured specimens of rich quality with the aid of a walking-stick) abound, and he was satisfied that, by proper organisation, a very profitable trade could be established. But I find myself digressing, although on a very interesting subject, from the charms of the society at St. Petersburg to the back-woods of Siberia.

In resuming my account of the fashionable life of St. Petersburg, I cannot fail to mention the national costume of the ladies when they appear at Court. The Russian national Court dress, as worn by the ladies of the Court and the wives of the high officials, is as follows:—A white silk or satin skirt, with gold braid or embroidery round the hem, and down the front in two rows, between which are gold or jewelled buttons. The low body and train are of crimson velvet, bordered with gold embroidery. The train falls from the waist, and to the low body are attached long flowing red velvet sleeves, with gold embroidery. The head-dress is termed "Kakoshnick," and is in the shape

of a diadem, composed of red velvet and embroidered in gold, or covered with jewels by those who possess them. Over the hair, which is dressed low, there is a gold net attached to the "Kakoshnick," which covers the hair, and over this again a white tulle or lace veil falling down to the waist. The Empress and Grand Duchesses wear the same description of costume, but more profusely embroidered, the train with them, as well as the skirt, being trimmed with diamonds. They may have any colour, though they usually adopt the same. The "Kakoshnick" of the wealthy is a blaze of jewels of great value, and I noticed that the net attached to those worn by the ladies of the Imperial family was in diamonds. All Russian ladies have to wear the national costume on occasions of Court ceremony, except balls and semi-official occasions, but are at liberty to have their velvet train and the embroidery of any colour they please.

This national Court dress is very Romanesque and effective. It is especially rich in colour, and bears a somewhat Oriental character.

I will now return to subjects of political interest.

In a conversation with M. Stremooukoff, he informed me that he had lately learnt to his surprise that "Merv," which had been considered as a centre of trade of some importance, did not really exist as a town or even a village, although it was so designated in the maps. Prince Ourossow, who had lately returned from Teheran, where he had acted as Russian Chargé d'Affaires, had reported to him the above information,

on the authority of a person who had lately been at Merv. He said that it was merely a square portion of land, encircled with a mud wall, and that during the hot season it was the resort of the nomad tribes for shelter and pasturage of their cattle, but that during nine months of the year it was uninhabited. He said that it was entirely devoid of any trade, and that there was no agricultural produce of any sort in its neighbourhood.

I confessed my astonishment, as I had been under the impression that it was a place of some trading activity, being situated near the Murghab river, and at the junction of the roads leading to Khiva, Bokhara, and Herat.

It is surrounded by a barren desert, infested with nomad tribes and marauders, who live on plunder and man-stealing.

Public opinion in England does not appear to estimate, as those do who have lived in the country, the power and strength of Russia externally if contrasted with its prodigious defensive power internally. The Empire is of enormous extent, and has a large population scattered over its surface. It resembles a colossal bronze statue with legs and arms of clay. Beneath the apparently tranquil surface of this gigantic Empire there is a spirit rising which, as education advances, will, at no distant date, make itself known and felt. This spirit of independence, fostered by the class of "literati" who disseminate it, is beginning to exercise great influence with the bourgeoisie and

lower classes, who are very illiterate, but very impressionable, and are easily led by those of superior education. It is not that they are disloyal to the Czar, whom they reverence as a god, but that the seductive appeals of those possessing a higher grade of education lead them to yearn for more freedom and independence. Like the lower class of Irish, they listen to the voice of political agitators without discerning the dangerous nature of the poison they are imbibing. I cannot, therefore, foresee those dangers to our Indian Empire which are foretold in articles and letters of a sensational character published by the English Press, however plausible they may appear. I have confidence in the pacific professions of Russia, and more especially of her present ruler, for I am fully persuaded that it is for her interest, if not a necessity, for her to cultivate peace.

A Court was held on the 29th of April, on the occasion of the Emperor's birthday, to which the Diplomatic Corps was invited. I felicitated the Emperor, in Her Majesty's name, on this happy anniversary. His Majesty, in expressing his thanks, desired me to convey to the Queen the great satisfaction he felt on his son's approaching visit to England, adding that he only wished that he could have gone himself.

The Emperor of Germany, attended by Count Bismarck, General Moltke, and a numerous suite, arrived at St. Petersburg at the end of April on a visit to the Emperor Alexander. His Majesty was received at the frontier by Field-Marshal Count Berg,

Prince Souwaroff, and the Russian officers appointed to be in waiting on His Majesty during his stay at the Imperial Court.

The Emperor met His Majesty at Gatchina, accompanied by the Cesarewich, the Grand Dukes Constantine and Michael.

The Cesarevna, the Grand Duchesses Alexandra Petrovna and Olga Feodorovna, the two younger sons of the Emperor, and other members of the Imperial family, received the German Emperor at the station on his arrival. The streets to the palace were flagged and ornamented, and in the evening many houses were illuminated.

This visit gave rise to many conjectures of a political nature, but it had no political motive. In former times it would have caused much sensation, and a mysterious object would have been attached to it, affecting, perhaps, the destinies of Europe. But it bore no such character. It was simply the visit of an aged uncle to the son of his favourite sister. It combined also his first appearance, as German Emperor, at the Court of St. Petersburg, and as giving evidence of the Emperor's friendly feelings towards Russia. It was likewise a return visit on the part of the Emperor William to the Emperor Alexander, who had so cordially accepted his invitation to meet the Emperor of Austria at Berlin, and it was dictated also by the wish of the Emperor William to express in person his thanks for the decoration of St. George, which had lately been conferred on him by the Emperor of Russia.

The Emperor was received with every mark of respect and cordiality by the Emperor and the Imperial family. A series of festivities was given in his honour, and at a Court dinner, in giving the health of the German Emperor, the Czar observed that the friendship of the two Empires was a guarantee for the peace of Europe, to which the Emperor William replied in a cordial and similar strain. At his age, and at that season of the year, the long journey was a great undertaking, but His Majesty bore the fatigues with wonderful vigour, and participated in the festivities with that amiable and cheery spirit which was his nature.

The Emperor of Germany left for Berlin on the 8th of May. His Majesty, I was informed, was much gratified at his cordial reception by his Imperial host and the Imperial family. The visit bore more a private and personal, than a political, character; but it offered, if such were wanting, an additional proof of the intimate relations existing between the Imperial Courts. It followed so closely on the Imperial meeting in the previous autumn at Berlin, that there could scarcely be any fresh political subject to engage the attention of the Monarchs, and it may, therefore, be reasonably supposed that in any political conversation that may have been exchanged, the one prevailing idea would be the maintenance of peace and order in Europe.

But although such were the cordial and intimate relations between the two Sovereigns, the same friendly feeling did not exist between the two nations. There

is a marked dislike on the part of the Russian nation towards all Germans. It exists very generally among the aristocracy, in the army, and in the middle and lower classes. Whether it arises from their proximity as neighbours (for neighbours are often querulous), or from a feeling of jealousy of the higher education of the German nation, I cannot say; but it was manifested during the Emperor of Germany's visit, for although His Imperial Majesty was received by the public with every respect, there was no enthusiasm, no popular outburst of satisfaction.

I was unable to discover what were the real grounds for this anti-German feeling in Russia, unless it were that the Russian nation generally dislikes all foreigners. There is no doubt a feeling of jealousy on account of the late military successes of the German army, and of the preponderating influence which Germany has in consequence acquired in Europe. There may be also a latent fear that the same Germanising spirit which has absorbed the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein may one day extend itself to the Baltic provinces of Russia. But these are scarcely feelings which would animate a whole nation, unless some more deeply rooted motive existed to engender them. Perhaps this motive may be found in the traditional hatred of the Slavonic to the German race. Although the Russian nation is not purely Slavonic, there has existed, and still exists, a belief in the union of the whole Slavonic race under Russian tutelage. If the Panslavist idea has decreased of late, there is still a considerable party of influential

and intellectual men who entertain it, and who look to its realisation, and they consequently regard Germany as their most powerful opponent.

The Shah of Persia arrived at St. Petersburg on the 22nd of May with a numerous suite. General Prince Menschikoff had been sent to Enzeli on the Caspian, to receive His Majesty at the port of his embarkation, on board of a Russian steamer for Astrachan. The steamer had been specially fitted up for the use of the Shah, and was escorted by a flotilla of Russian steamers. His Majesty was received at Astrachan with military honours, and from thence proceeded by steamer on the Volga to join the railway to Moscow, where he was lodged at the Kremlin.

From the date of the Shah's embarkation at Enzeli, the expenses of his journey and of his suite, which was very numerous, were defrayed by the Imperial Government, inclusive of the special train which conveyed him to St. Petersburg, and from St. Petersburg to the German frontier. These expenses were estimated at 300,000 roubles, or about £40,000.

The Shah was received, on his arrival at the St. Petersburg station, by the Emperor, and conducted by His Majesty to his apartments in the Winter Palace. Immediately after his arrival the Emperor sent him the Order and Ribbon of St. Andrew. The Shah, attended by the Grand Vizier, as interpreter, went at once to express his thanks in person for this attention. He expressed also his warm friendship for the Emperor, and his anxious wish for the continuance of cordial

relations between the two countries. The Emperor, after accepting the friendly assurances of the Shah, turned to M. Jamasoff, the Russian interpreter, and expressed through him his regrets that there were some persons who were not so friendly disposed to Russia, and that his sentiments towards the Shah had been misrepresented to His Majesty. This speech was very embarrassing to the Shah, and still more so to the Grand Vizier, who felt that the allusion of the Emperor more particularly referred to himself.

Mr. Thompson and Dr. Dickson, two members of Her Majesty's Legation at Teheran, who had been invited by the Shah to accompany him, were refused by Prince Menschikoff to be regarded as forming part of the suite of the Shah, and they had to find their own way to St. Petersburg.

Whether Prince Menschikoff acted by instructions or by his own judgment I am unable to state; but it was an act of discourtesy very unusual with Russians, who are always most kind and obliging to foreigners.

The Shah amused the Emperor by his droll manners and conversation, and his ignorance of European habits and customs. The Emperor remarked that he was "*un bon enfant et quelque chose du tout nouveau.*" He was much charmed with the Cesarevna. He gave her a Persian decoration and a diamond star. At the parade he asked her if she admired his horse. Her Imperial Highness replied that it was a pretty animal. On which he said, "*À vous,*" and presented it to her. On seeing the troops at the parade, the Shah turned to the Emperor

to express his admiration of them, adding, "*Majesté—point d'ennemis.*"

It appears that the Shah's favourite wife insisted on accompanying the Shah on his tour. With her came a negress, who had been the Shah's nurse, and also two female attendants. At Moscow difficulties arose. Some said that the Persian women wanted to amuse themselves, to go to the theatres, and to go about unveiled. Others said that an embarrassment arose as to the reception of the Shah's wife at foreign Courts. The Grand Vizier was called in, and induced the Shah to send them all back to Teheran, in charge of a high priest and three or four other fanatics, who would eat nothing but what they had brought with them.

The Shah gradually became more accustomed to European habits. His Majesty had never before dined with his attendants at the same table. The first occasion on which he did so was at a breakfast given by Prince Peter of Oldenburg, after the review of the troops. His Majesty only once dined with the Emperor at a grand banquet of two hundred covers, on which occasion the Emperor gave the health of the Shah, to which the Shah responded by drinking the health of the Emperor of all the Russias.

The Shah left St. Petersburg on May 28th for Berlin, en route for England, highly pleased with his reception by the Emperor and the Imperial family.

CHAPTER IV.

Visit of the Emperor of Russia to Vienna—Fall of M. Thiers—Election of Marshal MacMahon as President of the French Republic—Surrender of the Khan of Khiva—Betrothal of the Duke of Edinburgh and Grand Duchess Marie—Favourably received in Russia—British Cemeteries in the Crimea—Suggestion for their Permanent Conservation—Grand Parade at Krasnoe-Seloe—Arrival of the Duke of Edinburgh, of the Prince and Princess of Wales, and of Prince Arthur—Lord Sydney—The Dean of Westminster—The Crown Prince and Princess of Germany—The Duke of Coburg—Reception of the Diplomatic Corps by the Prince of Wales and Duke and Duchess of Edinburgh—Private Audience of the Emperor—Death of Count Berg, Viceroy of Poland—Appointment of Count Kotzebue — Marriage Ceremony—Magnificence of the Court Fêtes—Influence of Royal Marriages—Festivities at the British Embassy—Strained Relations between France and Germany, arising from Reported Language of Prince Bismarck—Arrival of the Emperor of Austria—Toasts at Gala Dinner to His Imperial Majesty—Departure of English Princes.

The Emperor of Russia, accompanied by the Cesarewich and the Grand Duke Vladimir, left St. Petersburg on the 30th of May for Vienna, on the invitation of the Austrian Emperor, to visit the International Exhibition in that Capital. He was brilliantly entertained by his Imperial host, and a series of fêtes was given in his honour. It was a successful visit, also in a political sense, although undertaken with no political object, for it completely restored the friendly relations which in former years had existed between the Imperial Sovereigns, but which since the Crimean War had undergone some diminution of their previous cordiality.

Early in the year 1873 a change had taken place in

the Government of France, Marshal MacMahon succeeding M. Thiers as President of the French Republic. It was the act of the "Extreme Right" of the French Chamber, and was not a grateful return for the services which M. Thiers had rendered to his country. It would appear that the chief motive for removing M. Thiers was to prevent the Provisional Republic from becoming the permanent form of government. But such are, unfortunately, the caprices of French politicians —ever fitful, ever changing. As was said by a Frenchman of the Government of France, "*C'est une bête que chacun monte à son tour.*"

The Khan of Khiva delivered himself up to General Kaufmann on the $\frac{2}{14}$ July unconditionally. He was reinstated as Khan by the General, but an Administrative Council was appointed by the latter to govern the Khanate during its occupation by the Russians. A decree was issued liberating all slaves and abolishing slavery. It was reported, but not officially, that the occupation of Khiva by the Russians would continue till the indemnity demanded by General Kaufmann, said to be two millions of roubles (about £260,000 sterling), was paid. Under such circumstances the occupation was likely to be a prolonged one, and would probably cost the Russian Treasury more than the amount of the indemnity claimed.

I had the satisfaction to receive from M. de Westmann, on the 13th of July, a telegram dated from Jugenheim July 11th, announcing the betrothal of His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh to Her

Imperial Highness the Grand Duchess Marie Alexandrovna; and this happy intelligence was confirmed by a telegram from Lord Granville.

The announcement was very favourably received by the Russian press, which published articles approving the union and in praise of the Duke of Edinburgh.

The Russian press is not allowed under existing laws to discuss matters that relate to the private life of the Imperial family. The leading journals, however, neglected no opportunity of acquainting their readers with the articles which appeared in foreign journals, and especially in the English newspapers, on this interesting and important subject, but in reproducing those portions which were most flattering, and which best expressed the joyful feelings with which the announcement of the betrothal was received in England, the leading Russian journals added their expressions of approval and sympathy with the language used.

The marriage was extremely popular in Russia, and it met with the sincere approval of those who desired a cordial political understanding with England.

I was present with Lady Augustus and my daughter at the grand parade of the Russian Guards, which took place at the camp of Krasnoe-Seloe, on the termination of the autumn manœuvres. The moment we were perceived we were invited to the Imperial tribune, where the Empress, the Grand Duchess Marie, and the Imperial family were assembled.

I availed myself of this opportunity to present my sincere and respectful felicitations to their Imperial

Majesties on the betrothal of the Duke of Edinburgh and the Grand Duchess Marie Alexandrovna, with my fervent wishes for their health and happiness. Their Majesties expressed most cordially their great satisfaction at this happy event, and spoke in the most affectionate terms of the Duke of Edinburgh.

The Grand Duchess Marie received our felicitations with that graceful expression of pleasure which clearly indicated the feelings of her heart.

I was rather amused by an expression of the Emperor to me, in referring in terms of endearment to the Grand Duchess, to whom he was devotedly attached, "*C'est une bonne petite chatte.*"

On the termination of the parade we were invited to lunch with the Emperor and Empress in the Imperial tent.

The question of the cemeteries and of the monuments to those who had nobly fallen in the service of their country in the Crimean War had been brought under the notice of Her Majesty's Government. They had been greatly neglected, and the contrast of their condition with the care bestowed by France on the graves of her brave soldiers was not creditable to the British nation.

Immediately on this subject being known to Her Majesty's Government, General Sir John Adye and Colonel Gordon were sent by the War Office to the Crimea to report on the state of the cemeteries, and I was instructed to communicate with the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and to request that the

necessary facilities should be given them to enable them to perform the duties with which they were charged.

M. de Westmann, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, entered into the question with much sympathy and interest, stating that he fully understood the difficulties of Her Majesty's Government in this question, inasmuch as too short a period had yet elapsed to efface the painful reminiscences of the war. He observed that the English cemeteries were said to be scattered over a district of some 60 versts. He considered it a wise and judicious measure to concentrate them into as small an area as possible. It would even be desirable, if practicable, to centralise the various monuments into one large cemetery, but probably, added his Excellency, it would be yet some time before this could be carried out.

M. de Westmann begged me to write to him on this subject, at the same time assuring me that the Imperial Government would be most willing to do all in their power in furtherance of the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, and of the object they had in view. I accordingly addressed a note to M. de Westmann, requesting the sanction and co-operation of the Imperial Government for carrying out the measures which should eventually be decided on by Her Majesty's Government.

I suggested that the most practicable plan would be to concentrate the various monuments, tablets, and crosses into one cemetery, as had been done by the French Government. To enclose it with a substantial

wall. To construct an octagon votive chapel in the centre of the cemetery, in which, inside and outside, should be inscribed the names of those who fell in the defence of their country, thus furnishing a lasting record of their patriotism and devotion.

I further suggested that at the entrance a small cottage should be built for a permanent guardian (an old soldier), who would be charged with the custody of the cemetery and with the duty of keeping the grounds in proper order.

The expenditure for the above plan would probably be less than the construction of nine different cemeteries, which, from being scattered over a considerable extent of ground and separated from each other, would be more difficult to protect and supervise, and more expensive to keep in repair.

There were two difficulties. It was a very delicate question as regarded the sentimental and religious feelings of the families and relatives of the deceased, which necessarily would have to be taken into account; and, secondly, the problem of the expense, as £4,000 was the limit to be voted by Parliament. But in suggesting the larger scheme, I considered that a national subscription would afford the means of carrying it out, including the capital necessary to insure the annual stipend of the guardian.

I visited in 1877 some of the English cemeteries which had been repaired, but it was evident to me that what had been done was not permanent but provisional.

I also visited the French cemetery, admirably constructed and in beautiful order.

M. de Westmann replied to my note, stating that the Imperial Government had no objection to the proposals of Her Majesty's Government, but he observed that the nine cemeteries to be given up would no longer be considered as subject to any supervision or responsibility of the local authorities. As regarded these nine cemeteries, he stated that four of them were private and not State property, of which the Imperial Government could not arbitrarily dispose, but they would undertake the negotiations for their acquisition, and to arrange the amount of the indemnity to be paid by her Majesty's Government. The land thus acquired would be conveyed by an official act to Her Majesty's Government, confirming the use of these grounds for their pious object.

With regard to the three obelisks at Inkerman, Balaclava, and the Redan, M. de Westmann observed that the Imperial Government were not informed as to the signification and purpose of these obelisks. If they were monuments over the common grave of the soldiers who fell in the three battles referred to, there would be no objection to consider them in the same light as the other funeral monuments; but if they should be merely commemorative monuments, the Imperial Government felt themselves called upon to make some reserves in regard to them, as being monuments which were not comprised among those which the Imperial Government had taken an engagement to respect.

He stated that there would be no objection to the appointment by Her Majesty's Government of a custodian, to whom exclusively the care and preservation of the cemeteries would be confided; and he added, that, under all circumstances, the aid of the local authority will always be forthcoming to insure to those monuments of English national piety the respect due to them.

I have thought it desirable to enter into the foregoing details in regard to this question, as being one of deep interest to every British subject, and also because a period of twenty years having now elapsed since the nine cemeteries were formed, it is more than probable, in view of the severity of the climate, that they now require fresh inspection and restoration. In such event, the plan I have suggested of concentration into one cemetery, thus ensuring their preservation for years to come, might be adopted and carried out by a national subscription, without any fresh appeal to Parliament. Great Britain will assuredly be ever ready to pay a tribute of respect and honour to those of her brave sons who have heroically died on the battlefield in the service of their Queen and country.

The Duke of Edinburgh arrived at St. Petersburg on the 4th of January, 1874, attended by Admiral Popoff and Captain Krämer, of the Imperial Navy, who had been appointed by the Emperor to be in waiting on His Royal Highness during his stay in Russia.

The Duke was received most affectionately at the station by the Emperor and all the members of the

Imperial family. I was present, with all the members of Her Majesty's Embassy. The streets leading to the Winter Palace were decked with flags, among which the British ensign floated with the Russian flag, and His Royal Highness was received with warm enthusiasm by the assembled crowd.

The Prince and Princess of Wales, accompanied by Prince Arthur, arrived at St. Petersburg on the 15th of January, and were cordially received by the Emperor and Imperial family at the station. I have also to note the arrival, on the 19th January, of Viscount Sydney, accompanied by Colonel H. Byng. I presented Lord Sydney to Prince Gortschakoff on the 20th, as Lord Chamberlain to the Queen, and deputed to represent Her Majesty at the Royal marriage. He was received here, and on his journey from the Russian frontier, with every mark of distinction, and was lodged in the Winter Palace. He was received by the Emperor on the same day, and was much pleased with his gracious reception by His Majesty. Lord Sydney was a "Grand Seigneur" of the old school in every sense of the term, with charming manners, and a dignified, noble appearance—the type of an English nobleman. I was much pleased by his appointment to represent Her Majesty at the marriage, and as an old friend our relations were most cordial.

On the 18th January the Prince and Princess of Wales and the English Princes attended divine service at the English chapel, where Dean Stanley preached a most eloquent and touching sermon, the text being,

"There was a marriage at Cana in Galilee," which, at her desire, was afterwards read to the Grand Duchess Marie.

Dean Stanley, who had been selected by the Queen to perform the English marriage service, and Lady Augusta Stanley, as also Lady Emma Osborne, who had been appointed Lady-in-Waiting to the Duchess of Edinburgh, were lodged in the Winter Palace.

Dean Stanley was possessed of great mental acquirements and of great learning. He was a distinguished classical scholar, and a theologian of broad views. One of his strongest aspirations was in the direction of an union between the English and Greek Churches, as represented by the Russian Orthodox Church. The idea was not a novel one: it had been put forth and discussed by theologians, but it never reached the stage of practical solution. One chief difficulty was that in the Articles of the English Church there are only two sacraments, whereas in the Russian Orthodox Church there are five. There are other points —some of dogma, some of forms—which appear to render a fusion of the two Churches impracticable, if not impossible.

In conversation Dean Stanley was most agreeable both in language and charm of manner, and my intercourse with him has left an indelible impression on my mind.

The Crown Prince and Princess of Germany arrived at St. Petersburg on the 19th January, as also the Crown Prince of Denmark and the Duke of Saxe

Coburg Gotha, and were received by the Emperor and the members of the Imperial family, as well as by all the English Princes.

I was also present with the members of the Embassy at the station to receive the Imperial Crown Prince and Princess of Germany and the Duke of Coburg.

Each party of Royal visitors had a special train from the frontier provided by the Emperor.

It was customary at the Court of Russia for the Diplomatic Corps to be received by foreign Sovereigns and hereditary Princes on their visiting the Imperial residence. General Le Flo, the French Ambassador, as Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, conveyed to me the wish of the foreign Ambassadors and Representatives to have the honour of presenting their felicitations and respects to the Duke of Edinburgh. The reception was held at the Winter Palace, when I had the honour of presenting them to His Royal Highness.

A similar reception was held by the Prince and Princess of Wales at the Anitchkoff Palace, when I presented the Ambassadors, the Foreign Ministers, and the ladies of the Diplomatic Corps to their Royal Highnesses and to Prince Arthur.

I had the honour of a private audience of the Emperor on my return from England. On this occasion I renewed my felicitations on the happy event which was to unite the Royal and Imperial families, and which I trusted would establish an intimate and cordial feeling of amity between the two nations. I expressed my satisfaction at seeing the two

flags floating together on the arrival of the Duke of Edinburgh, and I hoped that they would ever continue to do so. His Majesty graciously reciprocated these felicitations and good wishes. He expressed his anxious desire to cultivate the most friendly relations with England, in the interest of peace, of civilisation and humanity. He stated that he had no aggressive policy. The expedition to Khiva had been forced upon him by the lawless behaviour of the Khan towards the traders who passed through that country, and that it had been found absolutely necessary to put an end to the state of pillage and robbery carried on by the nomad Turcoman tribes in those districts.

I replied that there had been one act of His Majesty which would form the brightest page in the history of his glorious reign, namely, the abolition of slavery in Khiva and the bordering Khanates. No measure would tend more to arrest the robberies carried on by the nomad tribes, for when the markets were closed there would be no further inducement for the horrid practice of man-stealing, so resorted to of late years by the Turcomans.

I then observed to His Majesty, in regard to the groundless fears mentioned by the English press, of the advance of Russia towards India, to which His Majesty had referred, that the punishment inflicted on the Khan of Khiva for his maltreatment of foreigners and commercial travellers had not alarmed the public mind in England. But I confessed to His Majesty that there was a feeling of alarm in some portion of

the English public—a feeling, I might say, that was in no way dictated by hostility to Russia, but rather by a fear lest unforeseen events should engender future difficulties which might affect the existing happy relations between England and Russia—a feeling, namely, of alarm at reports propagated by the press of an intended Russian expedition in the spring against the Independent Turcoman tribes—a restless race who led a wandering life in the Steppes situated between the Caspian Sea and Afghanistan. Such an expedition might be productive of complications now unforeseen. It might drive the Turcomans on the territory of Afghanistan and into the province of Herat, and thus produce serious difficulties with the ruler of Afghanistan. This was a danger which it would be wise to foresee in order to avoid.

The Emperor said at once that there was no intention of making any expedition against the Turcomans, but should they attack the Russian settlements, they must suffer the consequences of their acts.

I stated that I was happy to learn a refutation of these reports from His Majesty's own lips, and that in referring to them I had merely acted as a pilot, whose duty it was to point out the rocks, to warn the navigator against them.

The Emperor expressed his anxious wish that no cloud, as regarded Central Asia or any other question, should darken the happy relations between the two Governments, and His Majesty instructed me, on every occasion when any difficulty manifested itself, to address

myself directly to the Chancellor, adding, that he would be happy to receive me whenever I judged it necessary.

I thanked His Majesty for his gracious permission, and said that I should gladly avail myself of it if circumstances should render it necessary.

Nothing could exceed the gracious kindness of His Majesty, nor the heartiness of his expressions of good-will and friendship towards England.

On the 18th of January, 1874, Field Marshal Count Berg, Governor of Poland, died, at the advanced age of 85. He was the brother of Count Berg, for many years Consul-General of Russia in London, who was widely known and greatly esteemed. His funeral, which I attended, took place with full military honours, and was attended by the Prince of Wales and the English Princes. He was succeeded in the Governorship of Poland by General Count Kotzebue, now Governor of Bessarabia. The title of Lieutenant or Viceroy, enjoyed by the late Field-Marshal, was abolished, and General Kotzebue was invested solely with the title of Governor-General, on a par with the Governors of the other provinces.

The marriage of His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh with Her Imperial Highness the Grand Duchess Marie Alexandrovna was solemnised on January $\frac{11}{23}$, in the chapel of the Winter Palace at St. Petersburg, with great pomp and magnificence. The morning was ushered in by the roar of cannon from the fortress, as a notification of the approaching felicitous event.

The ceremony was first performed in the chapel of the palace, according to the rites of the Greek Church, by the Metropolitans of St. Petersburg, Kief, and Moscow. At the appointed hour, one o'clock, when the persons specially invited to the chapel had previously assembled—namely, the Diplomatic Corps, the Catholic Church, represented by the Archbishop of Mohilef, the German Protestant Church, and the Established Church of England, represented by the Dean of Westminster and the Rev. A. Thompson, British Chaplain at St. Petersburg, as also the Members of the Council of the Empire and Senators—the Imperial *cortége* arrived.

The Greek service was performed with due impressiveness. The deep tone of the choir, the thrilling force of the chants mingled with the grand voices of the clergy, the magnificent dress and jewelled ornaments of the priesthood, and the impressive forms of the Greek service, gave an imposing and solemn effect to the ceremony.

The Emperor, who took his usual place on the right of the altar, looked pale and appeared deeply moved, no doubt feeling acutely his separation from his only daughter, to whom he was devotedly attached—who had been his daily companion—his idol of love and affection. The Empress, who had been in delicate health, and showed symptoms of suffering, both physical and mental, stood on the right of the Emperor and next Her Majesty the Crown Princess of Germany, as sister of the bridegroom. Then came the Cesarevna and the Princess of Wales, the two sisters, beaming with beauty

and delight at being together, and on whom the eyes of all rested with admiration and pride.

On the left of the altar were the Prince of Wales, the Crown Prince of Germany, the Duke of Coburg, the Crown Prince of Denmark, and the other foreign Princes, and the members of the Imperial family.

Immediately behind the bride and bridegroom stood the three brothers of the bride, the Grand Dukes Vladimir, Alexis, and Serge, and Prince Arthur, who relieved each other in turn in holding, according to the Greek rites, the golden crowns over the heads of the bride and bridegroom.

The morning had been dull and cloudy, but on the termination of the sacramental portion of the Greek service, a bright sunbeam descended and lit up the cupola under which the illustrious bride and bridegroom were standing, appearing as a ray of heavenly light betokening a divine benediction on the happy couple.

On the termination of the Greek service the procession moved to the Alexander Hall, which had been prepared for the ceremony of the Anglican service. It was most impressively performed by the Dean of Westminster, aided by the Rev. A. Thompson.

On the arrival of the procession the choir sang a hymn, selected for the occasion, with great effect. At the conclusion of the English marriage service, and previous to the Benediction, a prayer, composed for the occasion by the Dean of Westminster, was offered up by the Dean, and finally a hymn was sung by the choir,

without any instrumental music, with that force and effect known only in the service of the Greek Church.

On returning from the Alexander Hall the Court proceeded to the *salle* prepared for signing the register destined for the Court of England, after which the company retired.

At half-past four the grand banquet took place at the Winter Palace, when 700 guests were seated at table. On this occasion I was seated immediately opposite the Emperor, having on my right Prince Gortschakoff and on my left Prince Reuss, the German Ambassador. Nothing could exceed the grandeur of this banquet. The display of magnificent jewels, the brilliancy of the uniforms, the mass of ornamental gold and silver plate, the priceless value of the rarest Sèvres china, added to the vocal talents of Patti, Albani, and Nicolini, who sang the most lovely airs during dinner, gave a charm and perfection to a scene, which, for its unrivalled beauty, is quite indescribable.

After the banquet a Bal Polonaise was given at the palace, at which I was told 3,000 persons were present. No one but the Imperial family and the foreign ambassadors took part in the Polonaise. The only exception was that of Lord Sydney, who, with myself, was invited to dance the Polonaise with the Imperial bride.

The ball terminated at ten o'clock, and at twelve o'clock the Duke and Duchess of Edinburgh, accompanied by the Emperor and the whole Imperial family, left for the station to proceed by special train to Czarsko-Seloe.

The streets through which the Imperial party passed were brilliantly illuminated, and a dense throng had assembled along the whole line to give a parting cheer and blessing to the daughter of their beloved sovereign.

Thus terminated a day which I trust will be one of blessing and happiness to the illustrious couple, and will bind in closer amity and friendship the two nations.

Although royal marriages have not the political importance of former times, yet they greatly tend to produce amity and a friendly feeling between nations, and to bring them into more direct communication with each other. But we may assuredly, in the present instance, count on it proving to be a powerful auxiliary in promoting pacific relations between England and Russia, and in assuring thereby the general peace. Family interests and feelings have a happy influence in dispelling clouds of rivalry and dissension which may suddenly arise to obscure the political horizon, and thus they prove to be of inestimable worth to the welfare and happiness of nations.

General Peroffski was selected by the Emperor to announce the solemnisation of the marriage to the Queen, with His Majesty's felicitations on this happy event.

Among the festivities after the marriage, a ball was given by their Majesties, to which 3,000 persons were invited; a ball given by the Cesarewich and the Cesarevna; a ball to their Majesties, the Duke and Duchess of Edinburgh and the foreign Princes, by the nobility of St. Petersburg. Several official dinners were given at

the British Embassy, a banquet was given to the Duke and Duchess of Edinburgh, and a banquet to the Crown Prince and Princess of Germany and their Royal Highnesses Prince Arthur and the Duke of Saxe Coburg Gotha; and the festivities of the Embassy were concluded by a ball and sitting-down supper to their Majesties and the Royal Princes, to which 500 persons were invited. At the latter, Lady Augustus was prevented doing the honours by a serious illness, which preoccupied my thoughts and attention, and, I fear, greatly interfered with the performance of my duties as host.

The Emperor and the Royal Princes, including the Duke and Duchess of Edinburgh, then left for Moscow, to attend the fêtes given there in honour of the illustrious bride and bridegroom. I was prevented being in attendance on this occasion by the critical state of Lady Augustus's health.

The only political incident worth recording at this time was an alarm created by some supposed threatening language of Prince Bismarck in regard to the attitude and language of the Catholic Bishops in France. I mentioned the circumstance to Prince Gortschakoff, but he did not attach much importance to it, considering the language to have been much exaggerated, and observing that Prince Bismarck had probably used it as a parliamentary stratagem to influence the German Parliament, and to facilitate the passing of the Military Budget and his ecclesiastical measures.

At the Gala Theatre the Emperor addressed General

Le Flo, the French Ambassador, inquiring, "*Quelles nouvelles avez vous?*" To which he replied, "*De bonnes et de mauvaises*"—good as regarded Versailles, where the Ministry maintained their majority; bad as regarded the relations with Germany on the question of the Catholic Bishops.

General Le Flo observed to the Emperor that, after the sad disasters which France had undergone, she could not be accused of warlike propensities; in fact, she was quite unable to undertake war; but the French were a high-spirited nation—very punctilious in regard to its honour, which, notwithstanding its misfortunes, was unsullied; and that, if attacked, France had still the means of a powerful and serious resistance, but she must not be driven *le pied contre le mur* by Prince Bismarck. He spoke with warmth and earnestness, expressing a hope that Europe would not passively permit the aggressive and hostile language of Prince Bismarck towards France.

The Emperor was moved by the passionate appeal of General Le Flo, and shaking him by the hand, said, "*Rassurez vous il n'y aura pas de guerre.*"

In February, 1874, a change of Ministry took place in England. Mr. Gladstone retired and Mr. Disraeli, afterwards Earl Beaconsfield, was charged to form a new ministry, in which the Earl of Derby succeeded Earl Granville as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Emperor of Austria, attended by Count Andrassy and a numerous military suite, arrived at St. Petersburg

on the 13th February, the Emperor having gone to Gatchina to meet him. His Majesty was received at the station by the Imperial family and the Prince of Wales with the usual honours. The streets were decorated with Austrian flags, and His Imperial Majesty was heartily greeted by a large concourse of people. The city was illuminated in the evening.

A grand banquet of 240 persons, at which I was present, was given by the Czar, who gave the health of the Emperor Francis Joseph, observing that his friendship with the Emperors of Germany and Austria and with Queen Victoria offered the best guarantee for the maintenance of the peace of Europe.

The Emperor of Austria responded by giving the health of the Emperor Alexander, the Empress, and the Imperial family.*

The first act of the Emperor Francis Joseph on his arrival was to visit the Cathedral of St. Peter and Paul (where the members of the Russian Imperial family are interred), and especially the tomb of the Emperor Nicolas, on which His Imperial Majesty placed a

* The exact words of the toasts are the following :—The Emperor Alexander said: "*Je bois à la santé de mon ami l'Empereur François Joseph, que nous sommes heureux de voir au milieu de nous. Dans l'amitié qui nous lie tous les deux avec l'Empereur Guillaume et la Reine Victoria, je reconnais la plus sure garantie de la paix en Europe, si désirée par tous, et si indispensable à tout le monde.*"

The Emperor Francis Joseph replied: "*Pénétré de reconnaissance pour l'accueil cordial que je rencontre ici, et partageant de tout cœur les convictions et les sentiments exprimés à l'instant par mon auguste ami, je bois à la santé de sa Majesté l'Empereur, de sa Majesté l'Impératrice, et de toute l'auguste maison Impériale. Que la bénédiction divine repose sur eux.*"

wreath of flowers, which made a deep impression on the public mind.

The visit of the Emperor Francis Joseph was the first visit paid to the Russian capital by an Emperor of Austria, and I may truly say that the kindly feeling which it produced was calculated to extinguish many prejudices (dating from 1853) against Austria, which had existed in the public mind, and to resuscitate the cordial feelings which had animated the Imperial Court and the national sympathies previous to that epoch. Both the Emperor personally and the Imperial suite (among whom I may more especially name Count Andrassy) produced and left a most agreeable impression, both with the Court, the Government, and the nation.

The Imperial visit could not fail to occupy the attention of Europe and give rise to political speculations of every shade, to which the impressive words of the Emperor Alexander, on giving the health of His Imperial guest, added a further stimulus. The visit itself was a necessary act of courtesy in return for the visit of the Emperor Alexander to Vienna, and was a confirmation of the friendly reconciliation of the two Sovereigns at the Berlin meeting in 1873. Nothing of a political nature took place further than the renewal of the understanding then agreed upon. That understanding had produced good results. The agitation among the Slav races, on the one hand, had greatly abated, if not entirely ceased, and no encouragement had been given on the other, the object of both the

Imperial Governments being to preserve the *status quo*, and to avoid any questions which could disturb the good feeling existing between them.

The Prince and Princess of Wales left St. Petersburg on the 27th February for England, having gained during their stay fresh laurels of popularity among all classes.

The Duke and Duchess of Edinburgh left on the 28th February for England, *viâ* Antwerp. They were attended by Princess Wiasemsky, Prince Vladimir Bariatinsky and General Ozeroff. From the frontier their Royal Highnesses had the use of the Empress's special train, which is not only provided with sleeping apartments, but a complete kitchen apparatus, so that they did not require to stop at any station for refreshments.

The Emperor and the Grand Dukes accompanied them to Gatchina.

CHAPTER V.

The Emperor of Russia's Visit to England—His Reception –Banquet in St. George's Hall—Reception by His Imperial Majesty at Buckingham Palace of Diplomatic Corps and Distinguished Personages—His Visit to the Comte de Paris and to the Empress Eugénie at Chislehurst—Fête at the Crystal Palace—Reviews at Aldershot and Woolwich—State Ball at Buckingham Palace—Luncheon at the Guildhall—His Departure from Gravesend —Betrothal of Grand Duke Vladimir and Princess Marie of Mecklenburg-Schwerin—Russian Law in Regard to Imperial Marriages—Letter to Lord Derby on his Return to the Foreign Office—Retirement of Count Brunnow —Appointment of Count Schouvaloff—His Wish for Cordial Relations with England—His Disapproval of Course Taken in regard to Khiva—His Explanation of it—Conference at Brussels to Discuss Means of Diminishing Calamities of War—Naval Warfare Excluded—Emperor Declines German Proposal to Recognise the Spanish Government—Letter from Don Carlos – Reuter's Persian Concession Obnoxious to Russia—Empress of Russia's Visit to England—Turcoman Tribes—Their Submission to Russia.

EARLY in May the Emperor Alexander, accompanied by the Grand Duke Alexis, left St. Petersburg for Stuttgardt, to attend the marriage of his niece the Grand Duchess Vera, daughter of the Grand Duke Constantine, to Prince William of Würtemburg. His Majesty, on leaving Stuttgardt, proceeded to Flushing, to meet the Imperial yacht, the *Derjava*, which was to convey him to Gravesend.

The *Derjava*, with the Emperor on board, grounded on leaving Flushing. The Duke of Edinburgh had gone with the Trinity yacht *Galatea* to meet His Majesty, and he made every attempt, aided by two Dutch steamers, to drag the *Derjava* off the sandbank, but without success, and she had to remain

there during the night. On the following morning at high tide she was floated, but, instead of Gravesend, the Port of Dover was chosen for landing.

I was instructed to be in attendance during His Majesty's stay in England, and I arrived in London a few days before the Emperor's arrival.

The delay in the Emperor's arrival, and the change of port of his landing, disconcerted all the arrangements and preparations for his reception, and instead of going to Gravesend we had all to go to Dover. The meeting of the Emperor with his daughter, whom he fondly embraced, was most tender and touching, and he affectionately greeted the Prince of Wales and the other Princes. His Imperial Majesty was vociferously cheered by the assembled crowd as he entered the special train for Windsor, which arrived there at ten o'clock. He was received by the Queen and Princesses, and Officers of State, at the grand entrance. The following morning the Emperor, with the Prince of Wales, visited various places of interest in Windsor Park and the interior of the castle, and later in the day the Queen and Czar, with the Princess of Wales and the Duchess of Edinburgh, drove to Virginia Water and the Flemish farm. In the evening a State banquet was given in St. George's Hall, at which 130 guests were present. After the banquet, Count Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador, who had become very infirm and feeble, was obliged to retire. I was then ordered to undertake his functions and to present to Her Majesty the members of the Emperor's suite.

On the following day the Emperor went to Buckingham Palace and received the Diplomatic Corps, and afterwards the Cabinet Ministers, as also those of the late Government, and several noblemen and gentlemen who had been invited to pay their respects to His Majesty. He then paid visits to all the members of the Royal family, and to the Comte de Paris, who was then residing at Claridge's Hotel, after which he dined with the Prince and Princess of Wales at Marlborough House, and in the evening accompanied them to a ball given by the Duke and Duchess of Sutherland at Stafford House.

On the following day the Emperor went to Chislehurst to pay a visit to the Empress Eugénie. His Majesty, previous to his leaving St. Petersburg, had made known to the French Government this intention through General Le Flo and Prince Orloff at Paris. He said to General Le Flo, that it was simply a "*visite de courtoisie.*" The Empress, during his visit at Paris, and at the time of the attempt on his life, had been most kind and attentive to him, and that now in her time of adversity, his feelings of chivalry and grateful recollection of former kindness made it obligatory to him to pay this compliment. His Majesty said that he was aware that it would give rise to much comment on the part of the European press, but that he should take care that it was represented in its true light. It may be easily imagined how grateful this attention must have been to the Empress. It was a noble act of the Emperor, and is worthy of being recorded.

On his return from Chislehurst the Emperor visited the Houses of Parliament and Westminster Abbey.

After lunching at Buckingham Palace, His Majesty went to a fête at the Crystal Palace, where on his arrival the Russian National Hymn was performed by twelve military bands. It was a most imposing sight; all the fountains played, and at the conclusion of the concert dinner was served for one hundred guests. After the dinner there was a splendid display of fireworks.

On the following day, Sunday, he attended divine service at the Russian Embassy chapel with his son and daughter, and dined privately with the Prince of Wales at Chiswick.

On the following Monday the Emperor went in State to the Guildhall to receive an address and to partake of a luncheon given by the Lord Mayor and Corporation, which His Majesty had preferred to a ball or concert. He read his reply to the address in English. He declared himself afterwards to have been much gratified by the hearty reception accorded to him on his way to and from the Guildhall.

Reviews were held at Aldershot on Tuesday and at Woolwich on Wednesday. A State ball was given at Buckingham Palace on Tuesday and a State dinner by Lord and Lady Derby at the Foreign Office on Wednesday, followed by a large reception.

His Imperial Majesty left England on Thursday, embarking on board the *Derjava* at Gravesend. Thus ended most successfully the Imperial visit to

London. Everything went smoothly and without a *contretemps* of any kind. I learnt afterwards that the Emperor was much impressed with the orderly behaviour of the vast crowds of people which greeted him on his way to the City, and with his reception on every occasion when he appeared in public. He was also impressed with the appearance of wealth and opulence among all classes of the people, and with the admirable organisation of the police.

His Majesty had expressed to me at St. Petersburg his wish that his visit should be regarded as of a private nature to the Queen and his daughter, without any public demonstration, stating that it was a visit "*de cœur et de famille.*" His wishes were conformed to as far as was possible in a country like England; but it was not possible for an Emperor of Russia to preserve an *incognito* in a city like London, nor could the public abstain entirely from those outward demonstrations which both duty and inclination dictated. The visit was a pleasing one in many respects—pleasing to the Emperor, as testifying the good opinion of the public towards him—pleasing to those who evinced satisfaction at his presence among them, and pleasing to all as a happy omen of cordial relations between England and Russia.

His attachment and devotion to the Duchess of Edinburgh—his only daughter—was well understood and appreciated, and formed another link of happy union between the two countries.

The marriage of the Grand Duke Vladimir, second

son of the Emperor, with Her Grand Ducal Highness the Princess of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was announced in May. It had been hitherto the rule, and an obligation for foreign Princesses marrying a member of the Imperial family, to change their religion and to embrace the Orthodox faith. The result was that none but German Princesses of the Protestant faith have been married to Imperial Grand Dukes. This obligation was so distasteful to the German sovereigns, to the princely families, and to the German nation, that its discontinuance became necessary, and this was the first occasion on which, in consequence of the Princess of Mecklenburg-Schwerin (who had been already confirmed) declining to change her religion, the rule in question was relaxed. I was informed that the Emperor desired the law officers of the empire to report on the existing law in Russia with regard to Imperial marriages, as it was not very clear whether there existed any positive prohibition by Russian law for an Imperial Grand Duke to contract a marriage with a Princess of a different faith.

The jurists reported that the Russian law merely provides that no member of the Imperial family can ascend the throne who is married to a Princess not of the Orthodox faith, but that it does not formally forbid the marriage.

Without, therefore, changing the law, which might have acted prejudicially on the public mind in Russia, so sensitive on religious questions, the Emperor gave his sanction to the opinions expressed by the jurists,

confirming thereby the principle that no member of the Imperial family, married to a Princess not of the Orthodox faith, can succeed to the throne, although the children of such marriage are eligible to do so.

My first letter to Lord Derby, on his return to the Foreign Office, was as follows:—

St. Petersburg, April, 1874.

You will find Europe much changed since you left the Foreign Office, and I cannot say for the better. The war with France, which I once foretold to you as certain, but not imminent, has come and gone, and left a chaos behind it. There is an universal desire for peace, and nowhere more than here; but it is accompanied with an universal arming, as if war was close at hand.

The Conservative reaction in England is, I consider, in some degree attributable to the "Commune" at Paris, which foreshadowed to the British nation the horrors of democracy. The French appear alone not to have profited by the lessons they have so dearly purchased.

In Germany the International has been and is making rapid strides, and leagued with the Ultramontane party, is preparing troublous times.

Spain is torn by discordant factions, and I defy anyone to foresee to what extent of ruin they may reduce it.

Italy, crushed under the weight of taxation and Bureaucratic Government, is hopelessly struggling to advance in progressive industry and civilisation.

Turkey, in a state of bankruptcy, is looking to Providence for salvation and money.

Austria, after all her reverses of fortune, is trying to unite her races and to live at peace with all the world.

Russia is, perhaps, the country which has been the least affected by the turmoils of Europe, but in Russia there is a party of movement, which, under the term of "Nihilism," is

secretly endeavouring to foment disorder. The party is infinitesimally small, and is chiefly composed of the class called the "Literate." The country is advancing rapidly in the construction of railways, in industry and in commercial extension, but Russia is also borne down by the weight of her military Budget. She has now adopted the military system of her neighbour.

I may felicitate you on the good relations now existing between England and Russia, and I may add that I have every confidence in their continuance. The Emperor is actuated by the most pacific sentiments. The interests of humanity and civilisation require that we should act in harmony, and I consider that a different course can only lead to our mutual disadvantage.

The Emperor, during his visit to London, saw that the great age and infirmity of Count Brunnow incapacitated him for the active duties of his post, and it was signified to him that, in view of the presence of a Russian Grand Duchess at the English Court, it was absolutely necessary that the Russian Ambassador should have the assistance in his social duties of an Ambassadress.

Count Peter Schouvaloff was accordingly appointed Ambassador in the place of Count Brunnow, and this selection was entirely approved by the Queen. Count Schouvaloff was personally known to Her Majesty, having been sent on a special mission to the Queen in 1873.

The selection of Count Schouvaloff appeared the most judicious and the most favourable one that could be made, in regard to the maintenance of cordial relations between the two countries. Count Schouvaloff, in

addition to his many high qualties which specially fitted him for the post of representative of the Emperor at the Court of Her Majesty the Queen, had been a personal friend of the Emperor and on intimate terms with His Majesty for some years past, and the Emperor was known to have the greatest confidence in him. It was a matter of surprise at St. Petersburg that, in view of the influential post he held at Court, he should have accepted a foreign Embassy, which removed him from the immediate vicinity of his Sovereign and of his friends and supporters. There was a party at Court, and even in the Ministry, which, either from jealousy of the influence he exercised, or from other motives, was not favourable to him, and would not regret his absence from St. Petersburg. Their political opinions did not harmonise with those of the Count. Those of the former were of a retrogade and autocratic bearing. Those of the latter were progressive and in favour of salutary reforms. But Count Schouvaloff was too loyal and devoted to his Sovereign to decline any service proposed to him by his Imperial master.

Count Schouvaloff expressed to me his anxious desire for a thorough understanding and community of action between England and Russia, not only in regard to questions of European policy, but also in regard to the Eastern and Asiatic questions. He considered that the two countries had a common interest in furthering civilisation, and the promotion of order and progress, and that their mutual interests would be better served by a frank and cordial understanding than by the

influences of a jealous and suspicious rivalry. These were the opinions expressed to me by Count Schouvaloff, and I felt confident that in his new vocation they would form the basis of his political action.

I believed him to be strongly opposed to that restless activity of the military party in Central Asia, which had been continually urging an extension of territory for their own glory and aggrandisement, rather than for the true interests of their country.

Count Schouvaloff was much annoyed on learning the stipulations of the treaty of Khiva, which were in opposition to the assurances he had given to the English Government during his mission to England. The fact was, that the treaty was sent by General Kaufmann direct to the Emperor in the Crimea for His Majesty's approval. The Emperor, without consulting Prince Gortschakoff (who was absent), and without calling to mind the assurances which he had charged Count Schouvaloff to give to Her Majesty's Government, and being moreover under the sole influence of his military advisers, returned the treaty to General Kaufmann with his approval, and when it came to the knowledge of Prince Gortschakoff and Count Schouvaloff, it was too late to recall the Imperial sanction, and it was thus that Count Schouvaloff was exposed to the reproach of having given formal assurances which were subsequently departed from.

When I saw Count Schouvaloff previous to his departure for England, he referred to his previous mission, and to the assurance he had given to Lord

Granville in regard to Khiva. He said that he had only faithfully expressed what the Emperor had charged him to say—viz.: "*Que pas un pouce de terrain ne serait pris par la Russie.*" He explained how this assurance had not been fulfilled—by the circumstance that, through the indiscretion of General Kaufmann, the text of the treaty with Khiva was published in the *Turkestan Gazette* before it reached the Emperor and Prince Gortschakoff, consequently the Emperor's hands were forced, for he could not withhold his approval after the publication of the treaty. The Emperor told Count Schouvaloff that, in the opinion of Prince Gortschakoff, the assurance given to England referred to the town of Khiva and not to the Khanate.

Count Schouvaloff, however, maintained that the assurances with which he had been charged were clear and positive, that "*pas un pouce de terrain*" should be annexed. He told the Emperor (as he said) that the non-fulfilment of these assurances reflected on the Imperial Government, and he even went so far as to suggest to the Emperor that he should be disavowed and should leave the service for a time. The Emperor refused to adopt this suggestion, remarking on the explanation given by Prince Gortschakoff.

The Count said that General Kaufmann was the person to blame, and that he was so aware of it, that when he had the courage to face Prince Gortschakoff, his first words were, "*Je vous apporte ma tête.*"

The Archduke Albert of Austria arrived in July, 1874, to attend the autumn manœuvres, and accom-

panied His Majesty to the camp at Krasnoe-Seloe. His Imperial Highness was named by the Emperor Colonel-in-Chief of the 86th Regiment of the Line.

On the initiative of the Emperor of Russia, a conference of the Powers was held at Brussels, to discuss the rules of military warfare.

All the Powers accepted with the exception of the United States of America. Her Majesty's Government agreed to the conference, under certain conditions and with certain reserves. In reply to the conditions required by Her Majesty's Government, M. de Westmann stated by order of the Emperor, that the object of the conference was to deliberate in common as to the practical means of diminishing the calamities of war. That in order to assure to these deliberations a successful issue, it was necessary to lay down a precise basis, which the Imperial Government had communicated to all the Cabinets, as a starting point, but which could be altered in the course of the deliberations, and was not a definitive proposal.

M. de Westmann said that it was understood that neither maritime operations, nor naval wars, nor the relations of belligerents at sea, nor the generally recognised principles of the law of nations would be called in question or discussed. He added that each Cabinet would be able to make its own reservations and to exclude points of discussion contrary to its views.

There are certainly several questions relating to warfare now undefined, which cropped up during the Franco-German war, which ought to be settled, viz. :—

1. The treatment of prisoners taken out of a balloon. During the late war Prince Bismarck threatened to shoot these as spies, but Count Moltke intervened and informed him that, as Chief of the Staff, this question was under his control.

2. The question as to the right of exacting hostages—for instance, as was resorted to by the Prussian Army during the late war, when respectable and peaceable French citizens, and even persons of birth, were forced to be on the railway locomotives to prevent the Franc-tireurs from firing at the engine-drivers; as also in other cases, when the principle of hostages was exercised.

3. The question of recognising as prisoners of war armed men, like the Franc-tireurs in France, who were not in a military garb, and who were, therefore, not recognised as regular combatants.

4. The question as to the employment of prisoners of war. It appears that the French prisoners of war had been employed in very hard work at the fortifications of Königsberg and on other public works.

No naval delegates were sent either by France or Russia to the conference, nor by any other Government, as had been first intended.

The Emperor took a great interest in this conference, and was well satisfied with the manner in which the discussions were conducted.

I was informed by M. de Westmann that the Imperial Government had received from Berlin a proposal for the recognition of the Spanish Government,

and that the Emperor declined to do so until the Government of Spain should be established on a more legal basis. The Emperor observed that he saw no urgent necessity for changing the footing on which the relations between Russia and Spain had been hitherto carried on, and which had proved sufficient for the protection of the interests of his subjects in Spain, which were neither as important nor as numerous as those of England and France. In taking this decision, M. de Westmann said that His Majesty was not actuated by any sympathies either for the Carlist or for the Ultramontane party, but was simply guided by the fact that the Government of Marshal Serrano had no legal basis, and that, as a matter of principle, the recognition of a Government by a foreign Power should succeed, and not precede its recognition by the nation over which it presided.

About the same time M. de Cuba, a Carlist agent, arrived at St. Petersburg, charged to deliver a letter to the Emperor from Don Carlos. This letter, I was told, merely sought to explain the motive which had actuated him in claiming the throne of Spain. It disclaimed any personal ambition or vanity, but stated that sincere patriotism and love of his country had induced him to come forward to save his country from the ruin into which constant revolutions had plunged it. It was on these grounds he claimed the sympathies of Europe.

M. de Westmann, to whom M. de Cuba addressed himself, replied that the Imperial Government had no relations with Don Carlos, and that consequently

he could not be received by the Emperor, but that he would, as in other private cases, deliver his letter to the Emperor.

A courteous but short reply was delivered to the bearer of the letter from Don Carlos, and the incident was thus terminated.

The question of the concession granted to Baron de Reuter for the construction of railways and the working and development of the mines in Persia now engaged public attention. These concessions from the beginning were very obnoxious to the Russian Government, and strong representations against them were made to the Shah during his stay at St. Petersburg. On these failing to produce the desired effect, it was reported that certain parties in Russia were put forward to negotiate with Baron de Reuter for the acquisition of that part of the concession which the Russian Government wished to see in Russian hands.

Baron de Reuter arrived at St. Petersburg during my absence, and for a certain time conducted these negotiations, and from what I subsequently learnt, I believe it was mainly owing to the notice which Baron de Reuter received from the Persian Government, to the effect that he had forfeited his concession, that the negotiations in Russia were either suspended or broken off. It may, perhaps, be assumed that, apart from the inherent defects of the Reuter concession, consisting chiefly in its vastness and exclusiveness, amounting to a monopoly of all industrial and commercial enterprises in Persia, the Russian Government contributed not a little, for political

reasons, towards making the concession valueless, and to a certain extent inoperative.

Her Majesty's Government, as was pointed out by the Shah himself, never interfered in the matter of the concession, either from a political point of view or with the object of promoting the commercial enterprise of the British subjects directly interested in the matter.

From the decided and dignified tone which the Shah manifested in his telegrams to his representative at St. Petersburg it would appear that he was inclined to resent the pressure put upon him by the Russian Government with the evident object of rendering the Reuter concession null and void, and that he considered himself at that time still bound to Baron de Reuter under that concession.

I cannot but think that it would have been for the interest of Baron de Reuter to obtain a revision of the concession in the direction of narrowing its compass and its objects. He might also have voluntarily surrendered the right he had acquired to the collection of the customs revenue of Persia, and have received in return some other material guarantee of a character less alarming and distasteful to the Russian Government; and finally Baron de Reuter might have negotiated with influential persons in Russia—capitalists, merchants, and others—in regard to the terms on which they could be associated with him in carrying this grand enterprise into execution. As it was the whole plan proved abortive, and I consider that its failure has thrown Persia fifty years back.

On the 28th August the marriage of the Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovitch, second son of the Emperor, with the Duchess Marie of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was solemnised in the chapel of the Winter Palace according to the rites of the Greek Orthodox Church, and subsequently according to the rites of the German Lutheran Church. After the marriage their Imperial Majesties left for Moscow and the Crimea.

In October the Empress repaired to England, for the confinement of the Duchess of Edinburgh. The Queen placed at her disposal Osborne or Buckingham Palace, but Her Imperial Majesty declined both, intending to be with her daughter at Eastwell Park, the country residence of the Duke of Edinburgh. But *l'homme propose, Dieu dispose*, and the expected event suddenly and unexpectedly took place before the Duchess left Buckingham Palace. This necessarily prolonged the stay of the Empress at that residence.

Nothing of any special interest occurred during the remainder of 1874. I may, however, remark, that efforts were being made to gain the submission of the Turcoman tribes, who frequented and had hitherto held sway over the Steppes comprising the wide extent of territory stretching from Khiva to the Caspian and the Persian frontier, of which Merv was the centre. They formed distinct and separate tribes under an elected chieftain, and roved about the uncultivated and unsettled Steppes, as the "wild sons of the desert." They were robbers and man-stealers, and lived on plunder. They were well mounted and well armed. Their exact

number no one could tell, but I have heard them estimated at from 60,000 to 80,000.

Since the conquest of Khiva, it was evident that the Russian Government would be obliged to become masters of the Steppes, were it only to ensure safe communication between the Caspian and the Russian possessions. There was also a strategical motive, it being deemed necessary to keep up a military communication from the mouth of the Attrek to Khiva.

To effect this purpose two courses were open to the Imperial Government, viz., either to subdue the Turcoman tribes and bring them under subjection by military force—an uncertain and costly operation—or by a conciliatory process to induce them to submit peacefully to Russian rule.

The former course was at first intended, but it was abandoned by the Emperor's express order. The conciliatory course was adopted, and apparently with success. From the reports received, it appeared that a certain number of the tribes, especially those on the Persian frontier, had, through fear, given their submission to General Lomakin, the Governor commanding at Krasnovodsk. The Tekhé Turcomans of Merv, however, held back, and were not disposed to place themselves under Russian rule.

The object of Russia was partially secured, for, with the aid of those tribes which had submitted, she was enabled at any moment, if the necessity should occur, to bring under subjection the refractory Tekhé tribes, and thus to incorporate the whole Steppe lying between

Khiva, the Oxus, and Persia, including Merv, the central point of importance.

In her progressive aggression of late years, it has been the system of Russia to gain over the nomad population either by force or by seduction, and by their means and assistance to advance to further conquests.

Thus it was with the Khirgis, and the same course is being taken with the Turcomans. With a nomad population, having no fixed settlement or government, this process of conquest or absorption is easy of execution. It may even be said to be a civilising process, inasmuch as the aggressive is more civilised or less barbarous than the population it absorbs. It is a check to robbery and the slavery which had resulted from man-stealing, and to the lawless acts of the nomad marauders, and it may be therefore viewed as a gain to civilisation. But, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that this accession of territory to Russia may become a powerful arm which may lead hereafter to serious complications.

By the subjection of the Turcoman tribes Russia acquired the aid of a warlike population, which can supply at the lowest computation 40,000 armed cavalry —a formidable force in the van of an invading army. With complete command of the Caspian, and of the railroads leading to and beyond it, and with an army of 120,000 men in and eastward of the Caucasus, Russia has acquired a basis for military operations which may seriously menace the independence of Persia and Afghanistan, and thereby become a standing danger to

our Indian Empire, against which the best preservative is a fixed frontier between Russia and Afghanistan under the protectorate of England.

I had full confidence in the pacific disposition of the Emperor Alexander II., and in his sincere wish that no events in regard to Central Asia should disturb his relations with England. But Sovereigns disappear like other mortals, and who can answer for the future? A saying has been reported, by Count Ségur, of a distinguished French Marshal: * *Le hasard a presque toujours plus d'influence sur notre sort que nos calculs et nos penchants. Je me rappelle que l'un des hommes les plus connus pour avoir cherché toute sa vie à fixer la fortune par de profondes et savantes combinaisons, le Maréchal de Castries, à l'époque ou comme aide-de-camp je l'ai suivi en Bretagne, me dit, que pendant tout le cours de sa brillante carrière, les caprices du sort avaient souvent déjoué ses plus vastes calculs—qu'il avait dû la plupart de ses succés et l'accomplissement des vœux de son ambition à des chances imprévues—à des évênements qu'il aurait été impossible de déviner, et quelque fois ajoutait il, en riant, à des fautes.*"

* Memoirs of Comte de Ségur.

CHAPTER VI.

Disquietude in Central Asia—Deposition of Khan of Kokand—Its Final Annexation by Russia—Conversation with M. Stremooukoff on Turcomans—The Porte and Danubian Principalities—Offer of a Burmese Mission to visit St. Petersburg Civilly Declined—Recognition of King Alfonso of Spain—Reception of Diplomatic Corps by the Emperor on 1st January—Differences Between the Porte and Montenegro—Letter to Lord Derby—General Le Flo—On Montenegrin Question—Russian Sympathies towards France—Special Mission of M. de Radowitz—Illness of M. de Westmann—Interview with Prince Gortschakoff—Conversation with Count Schouvaloff—Pacific Assurances of Emperor William and Prince Bismarck—Insurrection in Herzegovina and Bosnia—Count Andrassy Charged with Drawing up Proposals to the Porte—Insurgents Demand European Guarantees for Execution of Reforms before Submission—Increasing Russian Sympathy for Christian Populations in Turkey—No Progress towards a Solution—Baron Jomini's Opinions—Further Action Postponed till the Emperor and Prince Gortschakoff Return.

It would be impossible, within the scope of this work, to refer at any length to the many political questions which came under my notice during 1874-5, the details of which, however important in many respects, would not have any special interest for my readers. I will, therefore, only give a short analysis of the most important of them.

There was in general much disquietude in Central Asia; disturbances at Khiva; continual friction with the Turcomans; distrust of the Emir of Kashgar, and a marked susceptibility on the part of the Russian Government in regard to the action of the Indian Government. The policy of the Russian Government

in all these questions resembled a shifting quicksand, constantly changing, and fluctuating according as the divergent influences of the civil and military parties were in the ascendant.

Disturbances of a serious nature took place in Kokand, caused by the despotic and cruel rule of the Khan, which finally forced his subjects into open revolt, and led to his deposition.

The Khan was informed that it was the sincere wish of the Emperor not to annex Kokand, and that the Imperial Government would endeavour to avoid taking any such measure; but that, on the other hand, if the misgovernment and cruelties practised hitherto should continue, and should a fresh insurrection result, the intervention of Russia would become necessary, and that in such event the Imperial Government would give their support to any successor who would offer the likelihood of being able to establish an orderly and peaceful Government. The Imperial Government could not permit anarchy and confusion to exist on the borders of their own possessions.

As was to be foreseen by a gradation of political stages, the Russian Government finally proceeded to annex Kokand, and to incorporate it into the Russian Empire, under the denomination of the Province of Ferghana.

In conversation with M. Stremooukoff in regard to the Turcomans, he said that it was hopeless to think of any plan to change their nomadic life—they were children of the desert, and would remain so—but that the

Government were trying to induce them by payment to abstain from pillage, and to employ them for the protection of the caravans and trade.

It was evident that the Imperial Government had decided gradually to absorb and annex the whole Steppe, comprising the district between the Oxus and the Caspian, and between Khiva and the Persian frontier.

There was a question, which gave rise to much correspondence, as to the right of the Danubian Principalities to conclude commercial treaties with foreign States. On this question, and others analogous to it, the Porte, in my opinion, evinced little prudence and foresight.

The "Suzerainté" of the Porte was more nominal than real. The slender thread connecting the Principalities with the Porte had been so strained of late, that on the least tension it was certain to break.

By voluntarily ceding to the Principalities these trivial rights of "Suzerainté" which could no longer be exercised, since the Principalities had acquired from Europe their autonomy, the Porte would have gained their goodwill, and would have strengthened their attachment to the Suzerain Power, looking to it in the future as their defender and protector.

But the Porte continued its action of "non possumus," and the result was that within a short time Roumania and Servia were erected into independent monarchies and completely severed from Turkey.

These provinces, for years past, had been a burden

on the Porte; they were a constant source of trouble and expense to the Turkish Government, without any compensation. They were the branches which it would have been wise for the Porte to have cut off, to give more life and vitality to the trunk. But the Porte fell a victim to its obstinacy and imprudence.

A rather curious fact was mentioned to me by M. de Westmann—namely, the presence of a Burmese mission which had arrived at Teheran, and of their wish to proceed to St. Petersburg. A proposal to this effect had been submitted to the Emperor, who replied to M. de Westmann that, as there were no direct interests between Russia and Burmah, and as the presence of a Burmese Envoy might give rise to suspicion on the part of England, he thought it was desirable to decline as civilly as possible the proposed visit.

Inquiries were addressed at this time by the Courts of Europe, as to the course which the Imperial Government would take in regard to the recognition of Prince Alfonso as King of Spain. Prince Gortschakoff replied that the Emperor had viewed with satisfaction the "révivement Monarchique" in Spain, and would be happy to recognise Prince Alfonso as soon as he had been accepted by the nation, and when his accession to the throne had been officially notified to His Imperial Majesty.

Prince Gortschakoff observed to me that Prince Alfonso had two circumstances in his favour. 1. He had not been mixed up or compromised in the events of

late years in Spain, and consequently could have no personal enemies. 2. That his accession to the throne could not have been effected by bribery or corruption, as he was wholly without funds, and his attainment of the crown of Spain might be regarded as representing the true wish of the majority of the nation.

The recognition took place on the $\frac{18}{30}$ January, 1873, and on the same day credentials were sent to Monsieur de Koudriaffski, appointing him Imperial Envoy at Madrid.

Shortly after the Marquis de Bedmar presented to His Imperial Majesty the usual letters accrediting him as Ambassador of his Catholic Majesty at the Imperial Court.

The Diplomatic Corps were received by the Emperor on the 1st January (Russian style), to present their felicitations on the new year. The Empress's health did not permit her return to St. Petersburg, and Her Majesty remained in Italy. The Emperor was very gracious and cordial to me. His Majesty said he had received a telegram from the Queen, which had given him much pleasure. His Majesty expressed his great satisfaction with the happiness of the Duchess of Edinburgh, and said that she had much enjoyed her visits in the country.

The Emperor observed to the Turkish Ambassador, that the state of affairs in regard to Montenegro was very unsatisfactory, and that if the Porte was not prudent the consequences might be serious.

The following are the circumstances referred to by

the Emperor. A raid and collision—as was frequently the case—had taken place between the Turks and Montenegrins at Podgoritza, on the Turco-Montenegrin frontier, in which several Montenegrins were killed. The malefactors were tried and sentenced to death. The Porte refused an urgent appeal of Austria, Russia, Germany, and France, to carry out the sentence, until satisfaction was given for the murder of two Turkish subjects by Montenegrins; and the Porte likewise refused the proposals of the Prince of Montenegro, in regard to the Montenegrin Commission of Inquiry. This refusal of the Porte caused great irritation and dissatisfaction to the Russian Government.

The Prince of Montenegro assented at once, on the proposal of the Porte, that the offenders should be brought to justice, but as the incident occurred on Montenegrin territory, he claimed the right of appointing the commission to try the offenders, in accordance with the laws of Montenegro, and on Montenegrin territory, in the presence of two Turkish delegates.

This claim of the Prince of Montenegro was refused by the Porte. The Turkish Government required that the Montenegrin offenders should be tried before a Turkish tribunal and on Turkish territory; and they declined to carry out the sentence passed on the Podgoritza malefactors, until satisfaction was given for the murder of the two Turkish subjects by the Montenegrins.

On receipt of a telegram from General Ignatieff, stating that the Grand Vizier was inexorable in his

refusals, he was instructed by order of the Emperor to urge the Porte, in strong language, to carry out the sentence at once, and to accede to the proposals of Prince Nicolas. This action was supported at Constantinople by Austria, Germany, and France. It was followed by great excitement in Montenegro and the neighbouring provinces. It was the spark which lit the flame of rebellion, which had been smouldering for some time in Herzegovina, Bosnia and Servia, and was the original cause of that insurrection against Turkey which led to the European Conference at Constantinople, and subsequently to the war between Russia and Turkey, the results of which were the entire liberation of those provinces from Turkish rule, and their complete autonomy.

I wrote to Lord Derby, expressing the opinion that the Porte was acting very unwisely in raising the question as to the position of Montenegro in regard to the Porte. Russia considered the Prince of Montenegro as an independent ruler. Austria and France had never openly declared for or against his independence, but had always supported him. England had regarded him as a vassal of Turkey, and his territory as an integral part of the Turkish Empire. This question, however insignificant in itself, gave birth to the discontent pervading the northern provinces of Turkey, and was eventually the spark which set fire to the edifice.

The consanguinity of race between the Servians and Montenegrins led them to make common cause against their common enemy. Austria had also some two millions of Serbs in the Woivadine, and had vital interests

in Dalmatia and the territory adjoining Bosnia, so that any movement in that country would oblige her to support Montenegro. France was as anxious to conciliate Russia, looking to her as a future ally. Consequently, should Turkey get into hot water (which she subsequently did) she would find herself isolated.

The Porte was obdurate; it evinced no spirit of conciliation. It temporised, as was its usual course: and it was not until the flame of rebellion had spread over Bosnia, Herzegovina, Servia, and Bulgaria, that the Porte at last discovered its total inability to extinguish it.

At the Court reception on New Year's Day, the Emperor expressed to General Le Flo, the French Ambassador, his great satisfaction that the French Government were co-operating with the Imperial Government at Constantinople in the Montenegrin question, and he expressed his hope that on all other questions the two Governments would act in concert in the same way.

General Le Flo told me that he had strongly urged his Government to take this line, foreseeing that, if the Montenegrin question should assume wider dimensions, it might possibly resuscitate the whole Eastern question; and that, in such an eventuality, any division among the Great Powers would inevitably lead to war. In his opinion, the danger to France and to Europe, to which an Eastern complication would give rise, could only be averted by a common action of the European Powers, and that France would be exposed to serious embarrassments by abstaining from acting with them.

He had accordingly telegraphed to the Duke Decazes, warning him that this question was one of serious gravity—that the action now taken by the French Government would be decisive for the future; and suggesting that instructions should be immediately sent to the French Representative at Constantinople, to act in concert with his colleagues, in urging the Porte to make the necessary concessions for an arrangement with the Prince of Montenegro. To this the Duke Decazes replied, that he fully appreciated and concurred in the opinions of General Le Flo, and would immediately communicate with Lord Derby.

During the Franco-German war, and since its termination, Russia had evinced strong sympathies for France, and they were fully reciprocated by France, and there is no doubt that these mutual feelings were prompted by a common hope that, at some future period, the two countries might render material service to each other. It was evident to me that both Russia and France were desirous of a friendly understanding and co-operation on all European questions, and that this mutual desire had for the present no further object than that of mutual co-operation for the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In speaking to me of the Eastern question, General Le Flo observed, "*Que le jour qu'il y aurait deux groupes en Europe, ce serait la guerre.*"*

Early in the year, M. de Radowitz, the German

* This was in 1875. Since then this mutual sympathetic feeling has reached its culminating point in the appearance of the Russian Fleet at Toulon, and the fervour of its reception by the French nation, October, 1893.

Minister in Greece, was charged with a special mission to St. Petersburg, during the absence of Prince Reuss, the accredited Ambassador, on sick leave.

Although the German Government had acted in concert with Austria and Russia on general questions of European policy, it had been lately felt at St. Petersburg that Prince Bismarck was evincing a seeming indifference on Eastern questions, which caused some surprise, not to say distrust, on the part of Prince Gortschakoff, and this was especially felt when, in a question relating to consular precedence in Servia, Prince Bismarck, without any previous communication with the Imperial Government, instructed the German Ambassador at Constantinople to request the intervention of the Porte.

Moreover, a certain jealousy had evinced itself on the part of Prince Bismarck, of the cordial relations existing between Austria and Russia, and of the friendly disposition of Russia towards France; and the sensitiveness of the German Chancellor, which was proverbial, consequently raised up the phantom of a possible future coalition preparing against Germany.

The first announcement of M. de Radowitz's mission was not favourably received at St. Petersburg, as it appeared to indicate, to a certain degree, a distrust of the feelings of the Imperial Government towards Germany. But I learnt from several quarters that this feeling had been entirely removed by M. de Radowitz. He had expressed the most cordial and friendly feelings on the part of the German Government towards Russia. He had stated that it was the wish of Prince Bismarck

to act cordially in concert with the Imperial Government on all questions relating to the East; that the German Chancellor attached a great value to the common action of the three northern Empires; and that the object of the mission of M. de Radowitz was to consolidate and strengthen the relations between Germany and Russia.

I was also informed that he had satisfactorily explained the incident of the Consular Precedence question at Belgrade, stating that the application for the intervention of the Porte had been made through a misunderstanding, and that a German Consul would be appointed as successor to Baron Rosen. In short, to cite the terms made use of to me by a colleague, M. de Radowitz's "apparition at St. Petersburg was that of an angel of peace."

On the 2nd March M. de Westmann, the Assistant-Minister for Foreign Affairs, was suddenly seized with an apoplectic attack at a theatrical representation at the Cesarewich's Palace. He was unable to be removed to his own house, and consequently remained at the palace in a most critical state. In the absence of Prince Gortschakoff, Baron Jomini was provisionally charged with the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Imperial Government were rather annoyed at the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to attend a further conference at St. Petersburg having for its object the diminution of the calamities of war, to which I have previously referred, and the Emperor moreover

was not pleased, for, acting in a spirit of humanity, he had been the initiator of the conference, and took the greatest interest in it.

Baron Jomini, who represented Russia at the late conference at Brussels, said to me: "*Mais pourquoi refuser une invitation? Vous n'êtes pas obligé de manger tous les plats.*" I replied: "*Nous avons déjà assisté à un repas, et nous avons trouvé vos plats un peu indigestibles.*" I confess that I thought the ideas of the Emperor might have introduced practical results, which would have diminished the calamities and sufferings of war, without in any way affecting military strategy or interfering with the freedom of military action.

At an interview with Prince Gortschakoff he took the initiative in referring to Central Asia. He said the articles of the press did a great deal of harm and fanned the flame of discord. He regretted this, and desired that Lord Derby and he should view these matters with calmness and common sense.

The following were, as far as I remember, his exact words:*—"Laissons nous, Lord Derby et moi, fermer les oreilles contre tous ces criards: laissons nous nous guider par le calme et le bons sens. Nous ne voulons pas d'extension de territoire—nous en avons déjà trop. J'étais même toujours contre ces avances. L'idée d'une attaque contre les Indes est absurde, d'ailleurs elle serait

* "Let us, Lord Derby and me, close our ears against all those clamourers. Let us be guided by calmness and good sense. We do not wish for extension of territory. We have already too much. I was even always against those advances. The idea of an attack on India is absurd; moreover, it would be impossible for us to attack India. Why

impossible pour nous d'attaquer les Indes. Pourquoi ne veut on pas avoir confiance en notre parole? En celle de notre Empereur? Nous désirons maintenant le meilleur accord avec l'Angleterre, et je vous déclare qu'aussi longtemps que l'Empereur règne, et que je suis ici, vous pouvez compter sur nos bonnes intentions —sur notre politique pacifique.

"Je n'ai qu'à me louer de Lord Derby, et je compte sur son calme—son bon sens. Je repète que nous ne voulons pas étendre nos possessions, mais nous sommes obligés de punir les voleurs et les brigands qui nous attaquent, et de réprimer les désordres.

"Pourquoi donc cette méfiance de nous? Pourquoi ne pas croire à notre sincérité? Vos agents aux Indes cherchent continuellement à nous créer des embarras. Dernièrement votre Capitaine Napier a distribué des armes aux Turcomans. Votre Gouvernement aux Indes aussi médite l'occupation de la capitale de Beloochistan. Vous avez tort de vous méfier de nous. Je vous parle avec toute franchise, et je vous prie de rapporter mes paroles á Lord Derby."

will you not have confidence in our word? In that of our Emperor? We wish to maintain the best accord with England, and I declare to you, that so long as the Emperor reigns, and that I am here, you may count on our good intentions—on our pacific policy. I have only to praise Lord Derby, and I count on his calmness—on his good sense. I repeat, we do not wish to extend our possessions, but we are obliged to punish the robbers and brigands that attack us, and to suppress disorders. Why, therefore, that distrust in us? Why not believe in our sincerity? Your agents in India are continually seeking to create embarrassments to us. Your Captain Napier lately distributed arms to the Turcomans. Your Government in India is meditating the occupation of the capital of Beloochistan. You are wrong in distrusting us. I speak with all frankness, and I request you to report my words to Lord Derby."

The Prince delivered himself of the foregoing opinions as I have recorded them, without interruption on my part, and I did not enter into any discussion on them, merely replying that I should have much pleasure in reporting them to Lord Derby.

I read to Prince Gortschakoff the report I had sent at his request to Lord Derby of the observations he had addressed to me, the accuracy of which he fully admitted, complimenting me on my memory. I subsequently informed him that Lord Derby, in a private letter to me, fully participated in his opinions, stating that a frank and truthful exchange of opinions was always the surest mode of maintaining a good understanding. He then indulged in a species of homily on the truthfulness of the Emperor, and, of course, of himself, adding: "*Dites à Lord Derby, que je suis comme Adam, tout nu—je ne cache rien.*"

Shortly after this interview I had an interesting conversation with Count Schouvaloff, on his arrival from London. He said that his report of a conversation with Lord Derby before leaving had been most favourably received by the Emperor and Prince Gortschakoff, and he was in hopes that on his return he would be charged with a communication which would establish perfect understanding and confidence between the two Governments in regard to Central Asia. I expressed the pleasure which his communication gave me, as I had always considered that such a course would be for the mutual interests of both countries. He referred to an opinion expressed by Lord Derby in regard to the

maintenance of the *status quo*, and appeared to view it in the sense that England should make no advance towards the occupation of Quetta, or elsewhere, which should oblige Russia to advance likewise.

Here I observed, in regard to the maintenance of the *status quo*, that it would be necessary first to ascertain what constituted the Russian *status quo*. Russia, I said, had been advancing in Central Asia ever since she crossed the Syr-Daria. We had been stationary, and had never gone beyond our frontiers. Let us know first what were the fixed frontiers of Russia towards Afghanistan and Persia. In my opinion, there could be no satisfactory maintenance of the *status quo* without a fixed delineation of the Russian frontier. Count Schouvaloff parried this argument, by observing that I appeared to require more than Lord Derby, who had only desired the maintenance of the *status quo*. The Emperor, he said, was quite determined not to make any further advance, and consequently the maintenance of the *status quo* would be the surest basis on which to establish a perfect understanding between the two Governments. Count Schouvaloff said that he was quite decided not to be the bearer of verbal communications, but that he should require a written paper, bearing the signature of Prince Gortschakoff.

In reporting the foregoing conversation to Lord Derby, I ventured to observe that I could see no advantage to be derived by England's entering into any binding engagements in regard to Central Asia. In my own opinion, I considered that England, while

evincing every friendly and pacific disposition towards Russia, would act wisely in holding aloof from all engagements, reserving to herself full liberty of action to adopt those defensive and precautionary measures which events and circumstances might render necessary for the safety and defence of her Indian Empire.

At this time a war scare arose, the incentive to which was a leading article in a Berlin paper—*The Post*—attributed to official inspiration, entitled "Krieg in Sicht"—"War in Sight." Some expressions of Field-Marshal Count Moltke were also misconstrued into an approaching war with France. There is no doubt that this war scare originated with Prince Bismarck, for the article above alluded to could never have been published without his knowledge and consent.

General Le Flo, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, had an audience of the Emperor on his return from France. He told me he was much gratified by His Imperial Majesty's friendly feeling and sympathy for France. He entered fully with the Emperor into the internal state of France, and explained to His Majesty that it was not by chance, but by necessity, that the Republic was established in France. He stated that France wished for peace, and frankly admitted that, weakened as she had been, she was not in a state, either physically or financially, to undertake war, adding, that no greater calamity could happen to France than to be forced into one.

France had been beaten and reduced to the last extremity, but her honour had remained intact. Were

Germany to attack her without cause, France could still defend herself. She could put under arms within a short time 700,000 well disciplined and equipped soldiers. It would not be a war of six months, but one of ten years, and he expressed his conviction that, before it had lasted six months, it would enlist for France the sympathies of all Europe.

The Emperor listened with deep attention to the earnest and patriotic statement of the Ambassador. He observed that he did not attach so much importance to the rumours of war as was apparently entertained in France. His Majesty said that he knew "*pertinemment et personnellement que l'Empereur d'Allemagne ne voulait pas la guerre,*" and His Majesty added, "*Si la position changerait, je le saurais et vous le sauriez par moi.*" Although the Emperor expressed his firm opinion that no serious danger menaced the peace of Europe, he was silent and reserved as to the future.

The Emperor was on the eve of leaving for Berlin and Ems, and, with a view to influence the Emperor of Germany and Prince Bismarck in a pacific sense, he requested the attendance of Prince Gortschakoff during his two days' stay at Berlin. It was ardently hoped that His Majesty's endeavours, aided by the influential counsels of Prince Gortschakoff, would induce Prince Bismarck to adopt a conciliatory course.

I was instructed to communicate to the Imperial Government the nature of the instructions addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, with a view to support the efforts which the Emperor of Russia

intended to make during his visit to the Emperor of Germany for the preservation of peace. Baron Jomini, Acting Minister in Prince Gortschakoff's absence, expressed his great satisfaction at this communication, which would give additional weight to the friendly counsels of the Emperor Alexander and his Chancellor. Although admitting that there was a strong disposition at Berlin, even among calm and moderate men, such as Count Moltke, to consider a war with France inevitable, and that it was in the interest of Germany to precipitate rather than to defer it, Baron Jomini could not believe it possible that a war with France could be provoked by Germany without just cause or motive, and merely for the purpose of reducing that country to a state of utter prostration.

Europe, he said, could not view such an eventuality with indifference, and he regarded the present action of Her Majesty's Government in the light of a salutary warning to Prince Bismarck, and as being the first indication of a "moral coalition" which could not fail to have a beneficial effect on the Cabinet of Berlin.

On the 12th May Baron Jomini received a telegram from Prince Gortschakoff, stating that he was perfectly satisfied with the result of his conference with Prince Bismarck, and with the pacific assurances he had received from him.

Thus the presence and influence of the Emperor of Russia, and the wise counsels of Prince Gortschakoff, were crowned with success, and the clouds which had darkened the political horizon were dispersed.

It appears that the Emperor William expressed great astonishment on learning the apprehensions entertained of war, and was entirely ignorant of the impressions which prevailed. His Majesty at once denied that there existed any hostile or aggressive intentions on the part of Germany against France, and assured the Emperor Alexander of his ardent desire for the maintenance of peace.

I learnt that Prince Bismarck expressed great indignation to Prince Gortschakoff at the warlike intentions attributed to him. No one, he observed, could take him for such a simpleton as to commence an unprovoked attack against France. He said that very groundless and false importance had been given to certain expressions and opinions of Count Moltke, but it should be remembered that the Field-Marshal merely took a military and strategic view of the question, and did not consider the political side of it; his opinion was purely based on a mathematical calculation, irrespective of other considerations. "Indeed," he added humorously, "Field-Marshal Count Moltke *est un gamin en politique.*"

On my return from leave of absence, on the 26th October, 1875, I found the insurrection in Herzegovina and Bosnia still unquelled, the mediatory attempts of the consular body to bring about an understanding between the Porte and the insurgents having signally failed. Baron Jomini expressed his fears that, should the insurrection continue through the winter till the following spring, a much wider extension would be given to it. He said that the Russian Government,

having full confidence in Count Andrassy, and in consideration of the importance of the question to Austrian interests, which, from the closer proximity of Austria to the disturbed provinces, were more directly concerned than those of Russia, had left free action to the Austrian Minister-President to decide on the measures to be taken for a satisfactory solution of the existing difficulties, the Russian Government being ready beforehand to agree to, and concur in, any mode of solution he might propose. He observed that, as the principle of intervention had already been exercised on behalf of Turkey, by the successful efforts of Russia and Austria to obtain the neutrality of Servia and Montenegro, it was but just that the same good offices should now be exercised on their part on behalf of the Christian populations, and that the principal aim was to seek some guarantee for the faithful execution of the promises and concessions now offered by Turkey to the insurgents, without which they would not lay down their arms.

The Imperial Government were now awaiting Count Andrassy's proposals, which he felt certain would be conceived in an impartial and liberal spirit to both parties.

With regard to the policy of Russia, it might, he said, be stated in two words: "*status quo*" and "amelioration." He observed that there were two currents at Constantinople: One was directed by Mahmoud Pacha, and represented the moderate section. This party sincerely supported the projected reforms, and honestly desired that the concessions given should be faithfully

carried out. General Ignatieff, who was personally well disposed to Mahmoud Pacha, was a supporter of his policy, and was desirous that he should be aided in the course he was pursuing. He considered it essential, in the eyes of the Turkish and Christian populations, that the full credit of the initiative of the projected reforms should be given to the Sultan and his Government, for otherwise, if these reforms should appear to have been granted under external pressure, their value would be diminished, the influence of the Porte would be discredited, and the prestige of the Porte would suffer throughout the whole Empire. Should the present Grand Vizier and his party be removed from power, and be succeeded by the opposite violent party, the most serious consequences might ensue, dangerous alike to the internal tranquillity of Turkey and to the general peace of Europe.

The other current at Constantinople was directed by the party headed by Hussein Avni Pacha, who were strongly opposed to any foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey. They were in favour of the most stringent measures for the suppression of the insurrection, and, considering that the hotbed of the insurrection was at Belgrade, entertained the project of occupying Servia to crush the revolutionary elements in that Principality.

Should the insurrection, said Baron Jomini, hold out till the spring, Servia and Montenegro could hardly then be kept back. Their co-operation with the insurgents would find an echo in Albania, Epirus, and Thessaly, and a civil war of large dimensions, animated

by that fanaticism inherent in the Mussulman race, would devastate the country, and be attended with cruelties and atrocities which would produce a thrill of horror throughout Christian Europe.*

I had not had time to make myself conversant with the question since my return. I, therefore, replied to Baron Jomini, as a personal opinion, that the dangers to which he had referred could only be averted by a perfect understanding of the Powers and the maintenance of the European concert.

The misfortune and difficulty was, that the various engagements and promises of the Porte to ameliorate the condition of the Christian populations had been so often unfulfilled, that the insurgents refused to lay down their arms unless guarantees were given by the European Powers that the concessions now made by the Porte should be strictly fulfilled under consular supervision.

With regard to the public feeling in Russia, various organs of the Russian Press evinced strong sympathies with the Christian populations in Turkey. Several of these organs severely criticised the acts and policy of the Government, and censured their apparent apathy and indifference in regard to the interests of the Christian populations.

The municipality of Moscow voted a sum of 20,000 roubles in favour of the victims of the insurrection in Herzegovina, whereupon the official *Gazette* published a "Circular," signed by the Minister of the

* This was in October, 1875, before the Bulgarian atrocities.

Interior, and addressed to the Provincial Governors, reminding them of the terms of the Municipal Law, by which the municipalities were only empowered to vote sums for charity within the limits of their administrative authority, and stating that any pecuniary advances or assistance voted for persons beyond those limits constituted an illegal act. This circular caused much dissatisfaction. I mention it only as a proof of the sympathy shown by the Russian public on behalf of the Christians in Turkey, and of the difficulty in which the Imperial Government were placed by this outburst of national feeling. The misconstruction, however, which might have arisen on this subject, in regard to the sympathies of the Imperial Government, was averted by the communication of a Sovereign order to a meeting of the Slavonic Charitable Institution, authorising the committee to organise throughout the whole Empire subscriptions in behalf of their co-religionists in Turkey—victims of the insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina—on the express condition that this charitable fund should not be dispensed to the insurgents, but merely to those who were sufferers by the insurrection.

I merely give the foregoing details as describing the commencement of a religious movement, which finally drew within its compass the Court, the Government, and the nation, and became the leading spirit of a national policy from which there were no means of receding.

In the meantime no progress was made at Vienna in the work of mediation, and the insurrection remained

in the same state of uncertainty and indecision as heretofore. The cause of this stagnation appeared to be owing to the fact that Count Andrassy had met with obstacles in his path, and had found that he had undertaken a task which it was impossible for him to carry out in the manner he proposed.

It appeared that Count Andrassy had proposed to the Imperial Government that the reforms considered requisite for the future good government and tranquillity of the Christian Provinces should be submitted to the Porte by the Powers, and that an engagement should be taken by the Sultan for their faithful execution. And further, that if the Porte should evince any hesitation in accepting them, or any laxity in their immediate execution, certain threats should be held out, and amongst them that of closing the port of Kleck.* General Ignatieff strongly opposed this course, considering that, in lieu of providing a satisfactory settlement of existing difficulties, it would only aggravate them, and render the position of Mahmoud Pacha untenable.

Thus no progress was made towards a settlement, and the insurrection appeared rather to increase than to diminish.

Baron Jomini expressed his personal opinion that nothing could be done to restore peace in the disaffected provinces without the general concurrence of Europe and Turkey. He cited as a precedent the course taken when the religious disturbances in Syria and the

*The port of Kleck, on the Adriatic, was the only means for the Porte to send troops and provisions to the disaffected provinces.

massacre at Damascus called for the intervention of Europe. At that period England and France, with the concurrence of Europe, occupied Syria. An European commission was formed, which drew up a scheme of government for the Lebanon, which has been the means of ensuring the maintenance of peace and order ever since. He was of opinion that European action of a similar nature would be the only means of restoring peace and order in Herzegovina and Bosnia. But he did not consider that he had sufficient authority to make a proposal of this nature, and he was therefore anxious that the initiative should be taken by Prince Gortschakoff on his return, whose advice and opinions would have greater weight with the Cabinets of Europe.

CHAPTER VII.

The Andrassy Note—General Ignatieff's Audience of the Sultan—Opinions of Prince Gortschakoff—Visit of Archduke Albert of Austria and Prince Charles of Prussia to attend Festival of St. George—The Emperor's Speech—M. de Giers appointed Assistant-Minister for Foreign Affairs—Opinions of Russian Press on Purchase by Her Majesty's Government of Suez Canal Shares—Treaty between Russia and Japan for Cession of Saghalien—Refusal of Insurgents to Submit without European Guarantee—Audience by Emperor of French Ambassador—Prince Reuss Succeeded by General Schweinitz—Death of Grand Duchess Marie Nicolaievna—Disturbances in Kokand—Deposition of Khan—Annexation of Khanate to Russia—Insurgents of Bosnia refuse Submission—Failure of General Rodich's Mission—Conversation with Prince Gortschakoff—Alarm at reported Intention of Turkey to attack Montenegro—Porte's Denial—Conference of the Three Imperial Chancellors at Berlin—Murder of French and Prussian Consuls at Salonica—Turkish Fanaticism—English Fleet ordered to Besica Bay for Protection of British and Christian Populations—The Berlin Memorandum—Its Rejection by Her Majesty's Government—Lord Derby—Despatch stating Motives for Refusal.

AFTER considerable delay, caused partly by the necessity of exchanging opinions with the Governments of Berlin and St. Petersburg, and partly also by his awaiting a project of reform emanating from the Porte, Count Andrassy submitted a project for the amelioration of the position of the Christian population of Turkey, with a view to the pacification of the disaffected provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After some modifications at St. Petersburg and its acceptance at Berlin, it was approved by England, France, and Italy, and the Note—commonly called the "Andrassy Note"—was presented to the Porte by the representatives of the

six Powers at Constantinople on the 30th January, 1876.

Previous to the presentation of this Note, General Ignatieff, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, had an audience of the Sultan, and laid before His Majesty the various grievances which had given rise to the insurrection in Herzegovina, referring to the vexatious system of administration of that province. His Majesty expressed his deep concern, and then expounded to His Excellency the difficulties of his position. He expressed his desire for the introduction of such reforms as were compatible with the maintenance of his sovereign authority, and said he had equally at heart the happiness and welfare of his Mussulman and Christian subjects. He repudiated any foreign interference in the internal affairs of his empire, as being the first step to the destruction of its independence, and as leading to its dissolution. He could not accept any proposals bearing such a character, said His Majesty: "*Car ce serait me suicider et je prefère mourir sur mon tróne.*"

General Ignatieff also reported that Mahmoud Pacha, the Grand Vizier, had received direct orders from the Sultan to prepare a "Code" of reforms such as would fully satisfy the just requirements of his Christian subjects.

In referring to this code, when produced, Prince Gortschakoff styled it, "Un roman!"

It was not without hesitation, therefore, that the Porte accepted the proposals of the "Andrassy Note," conveying the opinions and desires of united Europe.

Prince Gortschakoff returned to St. Petersburg on December 3rd. In an interview I had with him on the following day, he expressed his opinion that if the six Powers acted in unison at Constantinople the Porte could not resist the voice of Europe.

I asked His Highness what influence could be exercised to induce the insurgents to lay down their arms; and whether he was of opinion that the 30,000 refugees (here the Prince corrected me, and said 60,000) now on foreign soil could be persuaded to give in their submission and return to their homes? Prince Gortschakoff replied that if the six Powers could be assured of sincerity on the part of the Porte in accepting the reforms proposed, and could ensure their strict execution, he considered that a successful issue might be the result; that as yet there had been only a question of exercising a "moral" influence, which, representing the voice of united Europe, should suffice.

Prince Gortschakoff appeared to attach great gravity to the present state of affairs in Turkey, observing that whatever was done could only be a "replâtrage," as His Highness expressed it. His language was marked by a great spirit of conciliation, by an earnest wish to effect a satisfactory settlement of the grave difficulties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by the desire that a thorough understanding should exist between the Great Powers as to the surest means of maintaining the general peace.

The Archduke Albert of Austria and Prince Charles of Prussia—both Knights of the Imperial Order of St.

George—were invited by the Emperor to attend the annual *fête* given by His Majesty in commemoration of the foundation of that distinguished order.

The Emperor, in giving the health of the Archduke and Prince Charles, said:—"I drink to the health of my friends and allies, the Emperor William, Grand Cross of the Order of St. George, of which the smaller cross has decorated his breast since 1814, and also to the health of the Emperor Francis Joseph, whom we are equally proud to record among the Knights of our Military Order for twenty-six years. I am happy to be able to state on this occasion that the intimate alliance between our three empires and our three armies, founded by our august predecessors for the defence of the same cause, exists intact at the present moment, having the sole object of the preservation of the tranquillity and of the peace of Europe, I have full confidence that, with God's aid, our common efforts will effect the pacific aim that we have in view, that all Europe desires, and of which all States have need. May God preserve their Majesties for the happiness of their people."

In consequence of the serious illness of M. de Westmann, M. de Giers, Minister at Stockholm, was appointed Assistant-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and was further charged with the direction of the Asiatic Department in that Ministry. Great regret was felt for M. de Westmann, who for many years had filled the post of Assistant-Minister at the Foreign Office with great ability and unceasing fidelity to his Sovereign.

The announcement at this time of the purchase of

the Suez Canal shares by Her Majesty's Government caused some sensation in the political and commercial circles of St. Petersburg and Moscow. The first impression was that of surprise at the suddenness of the transaction, and this was succeeded by a feeling of alarm that it might be productive of complications with regard to Eastern affairs which might endanger the general peace. The Russian Press was divided in opinion. The *Moscow Gazette*—always adverse to England—attributed political motives to this acquisition, and strongly denounced it. The *Exchange Gazette*, the commercial organ, expressed satisfaction, viewing it as tending to consolidate the friendly relations between England and Russia. The *Russki-Mir*, the organ of the landed gentry, approved of the acquisition, as evincing the possibility of an understanding between England and Russia on the Eastern question, which it considered desirable both in the interests of the Christian populations of Turkey and of the general peace. Those organs of the Press in direct communication with the Imperial Ministry, in reporting the incident, abstained at first from any opinions or reflections on the subject.

I casually adverted, in conversation with Prince Gortschakoff, to the purchase of these shares; but he evaded the question, stating that he had no opinion to express on the subject. Several influential persons, however, expressed to me their satisfaction at the step taken by Her Majesty's Government, and their admiration at the manner in which it had been carried out.

I may observe that, subsequent to the purchase by England of the Suez Canal shares, public attention was much directed to the importance to Russia of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, which the Russian journal, the *Russki-Mir*, designated as an " entrance gate without which the Russians were not masters of their own house." The same journal advocated an alliance between Russia and England, from motives of personal advantage to England. The *Golos*, occasionally receiving its impressions from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, published later a leading article on the purchase of the Suez Canal shares extremely favourable to England, stating that neither Russia nor Europe could lose by an increased influence of England in the affairs of Europe, which could only be exercised in the cause of peace and civilisation.

Towards the close of 1875 General Fadéef, the prominent leader of the Slavonic party and the well-known military writer, repaired to Egypt, with the Emperor's permission, on the invitation of the Khedive. I learnt from an official source that he would probably be charged with the reorganisation of the Egyptian army, but it was not stated that he was to receive the appointment of Minister of War.

A treaty was entered into between Russia and Japan for the cession to the former of the southern portion of the Island of Saghalien, in exchange for the Kurile Islands.

Half of the former island belonged to Russia, the other half to Japan. Russia was desirous of establishing

a penal settlement in the island, and of giving up the convict settlements in Siberia, from motives of greater economy and security of the convicts.

The transport to Saghalien by sea of the convicts would be less costly than to Siberia, and their escapes, which now were so frequent in Siberia, would be avoided.

The number of the Kurile Islands was eighteen. They abounded in seals and fish, and by the treaty the right of fishery along the coast of Saghalien was continued to Japan.

The Imperial Government were further anxious, for military reasons, to obtain full possession of Saghalien, as it commands certain approaches by sea to the mouth of the Amour.

But at this moment all political questions paled in view of the clouds gathering in the East, which absorbed the attention of Europe. The negotiations conducted by Austria for the pacification of Herzegovina and Bosnia, notwithstanding the united support of Europe, gave no signs of a successful issue.

The Porte accepted with some reserve the proposals contained in the so-termed "Andrassy Note," which had been presented in the form of identic notes by the representatives of the "Six Powers." The chief difficulty was with the insurgents, who absolutely refused to give in their submission and to lay down their arms without an European guarantee that the reforms and concessions accepted by the Porte should be strictly carried out. They alleged that they had had experience enough of

Turkish promises and Turkish firmans which had never been carried out, and that even the Hatti Humayoun had remained a dead-letter; and they refused to place themselves again in a similar position without an European guarantee for the immediate and faithful execution of the reforms acceded to by the Porte.

The unfortunate result was that the contest was continued, with increased determination on the part of the insurgents and increased resolution on the part of the Turks, which were later succeeded by acts of outrageous cruelty and fanatic atrocity on the part of the Mussulmans.

The Porte showed weakness mixed with obstinacy, and utter powerlessness to restrain the hostility of the Mussulman population against their Christian brethren. It evinced rather a bellicose than a peaceful mood, and the internal struggle of the contending parties at Constantinople for power waxed fiercer than before. Turkish fanaticism had been powerfully roused, and there was no saying to what grave consequences it might lead.

At an audience of General Le Flo (the French Ambassador), the Emperor referred to the unsatisfactory state of affairs in Turkey. He said that he had never entertained, nor did he entertain, any aggressive intentions against Turkey, nor any idea of acquiring Constantinople. His Majesty told the General that the reported will of Peter the Great—on which the ambitious views of Russia were supposed to be based—was a pure "fiction." All His Majesty desired was the maintenance of the *status quo* in Turkey, and of peace and

order. But, said His Majesty, there were certain eventualities which he could not permit. (1) He would never allow the possession of Constantinople to fall into the hands of any Great Power. (2) He would not permit the creation of a Byzantine Empire. The Greeks, His Majesty said, must remain in Greece.

The Emperor expressed great confidence in the Emperor Francis Joseph and Count Andrassy, and hoped that by the joint efforts of Europe the general peace would be preserved.

At an interview I had with Prince Gortschakoff, His Highness expressed great satisfaction at the adherence of Her Majesty's Government to the proposals of Count Andrassy.

He had just learnt from General Ignatieff that a Firman of Amnesty was being prepared by the Porte, a copy of which would be annexed to the answer which that Power would address to the Ambassadors.

I observed to His Highness that with the acceptance by the Porte of the proposals contained in the Andrassy Note, and the spontaneous grant by the Sultan of an amnesty, the next important step should be to put an end to the further effusion of blood.

Prince Gortschakoff fully concurred, but remarked that an "armistice," in its ordinary sense, would be viewed as acknowledging belligerent rights to the insurgents. His Highness thought that a cessation of hostilities might be obtained, and that a line of demarcation might be drawn, so as to prevent any further collision between the contending parties.

I did not, however, foresee any successful results to the efforts of Europe for the pacification of Herzegovina and Bosnia, unless some steps were taken to suspend the sanguinary contest which had now been raging for so many months between the insurgents and the Turkish forces.

Prince Reuss, the German Ambassador at the Imperial Court, being on the eve of his marriage with the Princess of Saxe-Weimar, daughter of the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar, resigned his Embassy, and was succeeded by General Schweinitz, then German Representative at Vienna. Prince Reuss was much esteemed by the Emperor and the Imperial Family, and was very popular in society. We had been colleagues for a short time at Munich, and I fully appreciated his amiable and genial character, and viewed, with many others, his departure from St. Petersburg with regret. His conciliatory and pleasing manners, added to his abilities of high order, ensured to him success in any important position which he might be called upon to fill.

A gloom was cast over the Court and Society by the death of the Grand Duchess Marie Nicolaievna, sister of the Emperor, who expired at St. Petersburg on the 21st February, after a protracted illness.

I will now revert cursorily to the affairs of Central Asia. Fresh troubles of a serious nature had broken out in Kokand, which necessitated the intervention of Russia. An insurrection had broken out and had deposed the Khan, who had only lately succeeded the previously deposed Khan. Anarchy reigned through-

out the Khanate till a Russian force under General Skobeleff was sent to restore order. The result was his complete defeat of the Kiptchacks and Khirgiz, and the entire submission of the population.

General Skobeleff reported the capitulation of the city of Kokand, with sixty-two cannon and a considerable amount of powder and projectiles.

The Khanate of Kokand is the most important of the Khanates of Central Asia. It contains above three millions of population and several populous towns, such as Kokand, Andijan, Manghilan, etc. It is extremely fertile, producing in abundance silk, cotton, and grain, and possessing great mineral wealth.

On the report of the Commander-in-Chief of the military district of Turkestan, the Emperor decreed that the territory recently occupied by the Russian troops, and forming up to the year 1875 the Khanate of Kokand, should be incorporated with the Russian Empire, and converted into the Province of Fergana. This completed the occupation by Russia of all Central Asia north of the Oxus from the frontier of Kashgaria to the Sea of Aral.

On the acceptance by the Porte of the proposals for the pacification of the disaffected provinces, initiated by Count Andrassy and supported by the European Powers, Count Andrassy turned his attention to endeavours to induce the insurgents to give in their submission and to lay down their arms. For this purpose he charged General Rodich, Governor of Dalmatia, with a mission to the insurgents. In conversation with me on this

subject, Prince Gortschakoff expressed his approval of this mission, considering that the influence of General Rodich with the insurgents and refugees would be most salutary. Of Slavonic origin himself, and known to possess strong sympathies for the population of Herzegovina, General Rodich was specially suited for the difficult task committed to him, and Prince Gortschakoff entertained no doubt that his voice and counsel would have just weight with the insurgents and refugees.

But the insurgents declined to listen to the "voice of the charmer—charm he never so wisely," and General Rodich's conciliatory phrases produced no result.

On the other hand, the Sultan and his Government appeared to ignore the weakness and utter prostration of the Empire.

Prince Gortschakoff was beginning to be less sanguine than heretofore of a successful issue to these negotiations—not from any want of energy or goodwill on the part of those charged with them, but from the utter prostration of Turkey. The Porte, he said, had no money, no means for re-establishing the refugees in their homes, and no means for affording them sufficient military protection to induce them to return. There were, besides, no administrators, civil or military, competent for the duties which they were called upon to perform.

"I can say sincerely," said the Prince, "that we wish to maintain the Turkish Empire—it is our object and interest to do so; but we cannot struggle against destiny; and although we have used all our diplomatic

efforts for the pacification of the insurrectionary provinces, we have no means of remedying the internal decay of the Empire."

In observing to His Highness that the want of financial means appeared to be of some moment in regard to the return of the refugees to their homes, I inquired whether any communication had taken place with the Austrian Cabinet on this subject. The Prince replied that no proposal relating to the financial part of the question had been made by Count Andrassy; but he said, very decidedly, that no financial assistance to Turkey would be granted by Russia.

At a dinner at the Winter Palace on the 25th of March, the Emperor mentioned to me that he had just received the unwelcome intelligence that the proposed armistice had been refused by the Porte. I observed to His Majesty that a suspension of hostilities for even the short period of twelve days would be of great importance. It would open a door to conciliation; it would give time for the passions to cool; it would arrest momentarily the sacrifice of life; and further, a renewal of it might be hopefully looked to.

His Majesty said that it was his anxious wish to maintain peace. "Indeed," said His Majesty, "it has been my constant aim for twenty years; and," he added with some emphasis, that "it would be *honteux—car c'est le terme*" (these were His Majesty's words) "if the Christian Powers were not able to bring their pacific efforts to a successful issue."

On the 28th of March Prince Gortschakoff received

a telegram from Vienna announcing that the Governor-General of Herzegovina, the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, and the President of the Reform Commission, through the mediation of General Rodich, had agreed with the insurgent chiefs on a suspension of hostilities during the period of their conferences.

Prince Gortschakoff appeared to be satisfied with this intelligence, and to hope that it might lead to a further understanding between the contending parties.

The conditions on which the insurgents would consent to return to their homes were reported to be the following :—

(1) The withdrawal—or, at least, the concentration —of the Turkish troops at a given point during the reinstatement of the refugees, in order to avoid any possible collision.

(2) Material guarantees for the execution by the Porte of its promises relative to the means of subsistence, and the reconstruction of the destroyed property of the Christians.

(3) The carrying out of the reinstatement of the refugees under the superintendence of an European Commission.

(4) The retention by the insurgents of their arms, for their defence in case of unforeseen attack.

Conditions 2 and 3 presented the chief difficulties. The reconstruction of the " destroyed property "—caused by the insurgents themselves—would require some millions, and there was no money in the Turkish Exchequer to provide it, nor could the Porte raise it by loan. The

third condition would not be accepted by the Porte, on the ground that it introduced foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Empire, and implied a violation of the rights of the Sovereignty of the Sultan.

But Prince Gortschakoff was of opinion that the foregoing conditions of the insurgents ought not to be entirely rejected, and the door thus closed to the possibility of an arrangement. Some means, His Highness thought, might be found of harmonising these conditions with the general necessity of the situation, without sacrifice to the dignity of the Porte, and with evident advantage to all parties concerned.

He was desirous that the negotiations between General Rodich and the insurgents should not be abruptly broken off, but that the armistice should be prolonged, and time thus given for the exercise of the pacifying elements.

This course, unfortunately, was not taken by Count Andrassy, and Prince Gortschakoff expressed to him his regret that he should have taken such decided action without previous communication with St. Petersburg.

Prince Gortschakoff said to me on April 20 that he considered the negotiations conducted by General Rodich as exhausted; that the Porte, by the action of Moukhtar Pacha, had appealed to arms; and that the European Powers had only now to await the decision of the conflict. He said: "*La parole est aux canons, et il faut attendre une dizaine de jours pour savoir l'issue du combat.*"

On the 22nd April I received a note from Prince

Gortschakoff requesting me to call on him at twelve o'clock. On my arrival at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, I found assembled there the Austrian, French, German, and Italian Ambassadors.

Prince Gortschakoff informed us that he had convened us by order of the Emperor. He said that he had received, the evening before, a telegram from General Ignatieff at Constantinople, reporting that after a Council of War on the 20th inst., the Porte had decided to attack Montenegro as soon as the requisite force could be assembled at Scutari; that a portion of the Turkish force now on the Servian frontier would co-operate in the attack on the Herzegovinian frontier; that the new Minister of War, Dervish Pacha, had undertaken to reduce Montenegro, and to put down the insurrection; and the Sultan had consented to advance the necessary funds from his private purse.

This intelligence, the Prince said, had produced the most painful impression on the mind of the Emperor, and, by His Majesty's orders, he had instructed General Ignatieff to remonstrate with the Porte in the most energetic and peremptory language against a course which could only lead to the ruin of the Turkish Empire.

He had convened the representatives of the Powers who had co-operated in the efforts which had been made for the pacification of the insurgent provinces in order to make this communication to them, and to request them to invite their respective Governments to send

similar instructions to their representatives at Constantinople.

His Highness observed that no time should be lost in giving due warning to the Turkish Government of the danger of the course they were about to take, and he hoped for the combined action of the European Powers with a view to avert it.

My colleagues and I assented to the request of Prince Gortschakoff, and stated that we would immediately report to our Governments the communication which His Highness had addressed to us.

I inquired whether any motive had been given for this unexpected grave decision of the Porte.

Prince Gortschakoff replied that none had been mentioned in the telegram from General Ignatieff, but that it had evidently arisen from a telegram from Moukhtar Pacha, which had reported that 7,000 Montenegrins had taken part with the insurgents in a late combat in Herzegovina.

Prince Gortschakoff did not believe the statement of Moukhtar Pacha, and considered that it had been used as a justification of his defeat.

I observed that an inquiry should be made as to the truth of the statement of Moukhtar Pacha. The Prince remarked that in those countries all peasants were dressed alike, and were all armed, and it was difficult to distinguish their nationality.

Prince Gortschakoff then entered into an explanation of his interview with Caboulé Pacha, the Turkish Ambassador, and of the sensation which the Pacha's

telegrams had caused at Constantinople. He also read a letter he had addressed to General Ignatieff on the subject. In that letter Prince Gortschakoff informed the General that, on being asked to support the advice given by General Rodich—namely, to refer their counter-proposals to the Turkish authorities—he, the Prince, had replied that he would do so willingly, provided that he was certain that the Porte would consent to receive those proposals and to treat with the bearers of them; but the Porte had declined all negotiations, and had appealed to arms.

His Highness further stated in his letter that the Imperial Government had never, as stated by the Porte, given any promises that, if the Andrassy Note were accepted, the insurrection should be quelled. All that Russia had done was to promise that her best efforts would be given towards a pacification, on condition that the reforms accepted by the Porte were faithfully carried out.

The Ambassadors, having repeated their assurance that they would immediately report to their Governments the communication addressed to them by Prince Gortschakoff, then retired.

The Emperor, I was told, was exceedingly irritated against the Porte, and on receiving General Ignatieff's telegram wrote on the margin, "*C'est un soufflet qu'on me donne.*"

Previous to the receipt by Lord Derby of my telegram reporting the communication addressed to the Ambassadors by Prince Gortschakoff, a telegram was

received from Sir H. Elliot denying the intention of the Porte to attack Montenegro. Any collective action on the part of the six Powers at Constantinople was thus rendered nugatory. I was informed, however, that the Emperor of Russia had been much gratified by the advice given to the Porte by Sir Henry Elliot, which had been reported by General Ignatieff, and by the energetic language of the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople.

Everything seemed to progress except the pacification, which, after the failure of General Rodich to arrange terms with the insurgent chiefs for their submission, and after their rejection of the proposals of the "Andrassy Note," which had been conditionally accepted by the Porte, came to a dead-lock.

It would require volumes to record the various incidents which occupied the attention of the various Cabinets in their anxious desire to re-establish on a just, firm, and reasonable basis, harmony and peace between the Porte and the disaffected provinces; but for my readers' sake I will not enter on this herculean task, but will confine myself to relating cursorily those facts which exercised a decisive influence on the European Cabinets.

The Emperors of Austria, Germany, and Russia agreed to a Conference of their Ministers, to consider the best means of effecting a pacification between the Porte and its disaffected provinces. It was agreed to hold the Conference at Berlin; and Prince Bismarck, by order of his Sovereign, addressed an invitation to Count Andrassy to join his colleagues at Berlin.

Whatever course of action should be decided on, it was agreed that it should bear the stamp of a decision of the six Powers, and not of three only, with a view to the maintenance of the European concert, and that the Andrassy Note should form the basis of their deliberations.

The Emperor of Russia, who was on his way to Ems, and who was attended to Berlin by Prince Gortschakoff, arrived at Berlin on the 11th May, and their stay in that capital was limited to three or four days.

It was just before the meeting of this Conference that intelligence was received of the murder of the French and Prussian Consuls by a fanatic mob at Salonica.

It was a tragic and untoward event, and a lamentable proof of the lawless and ungovernable fanaticism of the Mussulman population. It proved, also, the insecurity to which the Christian populations were exposed, and how helpless were the Turkish authorities to protect them.

The Conference met, and the Ministers of the three Empires recorded their conclusions in the form of a Memorandum to be submitted for approval to the Cabinets of England, France, and Italy, whose representatives at Berlin were invited by Prince Bismarck to meet the Austrian and Russian Chancellors at his house after the signature of the Memorandum. This they did. Baron Jomini was then invited to read to them the Memorandum embodying the views of the three Imperial Ministers, and the proposals to which they solicited the co-operation of the other Great Powers.

The British Ambassador (Lord Odo Russell) on receiving a copy of this document, said that in the absence of special instructions he received it *ad referendum*.

Prince Gortschakoff observed that he and Count Andrassy were leaving in two days, and that they hoped that the Governments of England, France, and Italy would be able to express an opinion on the telegraphic summary of their proposal before they left. Answers in the affirmative were received from the French and Italian Governments within the forty-eight hours. It was five days before an answer came from London, which was of a negative character, stating that Her Majesty's Government could not accede to the proposals of the "Memorandum," of which the following is an analysis:—

The Memorandum stated—

That the alarming tidings from Turkey impel the three Cabinets (Russia, Austria, and Germany) to draw closer their intimacy. They have agreed to concert among themselves measures for averting the dangers of the situation, with the concurrence of the other Christian Powers.

It was of importance that Europe should consider the general means necessary to guard against the recurrence of events similar to those which have taken place at Salonica, and the repetition of which was threatened at Smyrna and Constantinople. It was necessary to remove the primary cause of these disturbances by the prompt pacification of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Great Powers had demanded and received from the Porte a programme of reforms. The Porte, deferring to this demand, declared itself firmly resolved to execute these reforms, and communicated its intention officially to the Cabinets, by which they acquired a moral right to watch over their accomplishment.

Nevertheless, this programme of pacification, though adopted in principle by both parties, has encountered a two-fold obstacle: —(1) The insurgents declare that past experience forbids them to trust the promises of the Porte, without a positive material European guarantee. (2) The Porte on its side declared that, as long as the insurgents were scouring the country in arms, and the refugees did not return to their homes, it was materially impossible for it to introduce a new organisation of the country.

Hostilities continued: the insurrection spread. Thence arose a revival of religious and political passions; and this explosion of fanaticism reacted on men's minds in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the neighbouring Principalities.

It was essential, therefore, to establish certain guarantees of a nature to ensure beyond doubt the loyal and full application of the measures agreed upon between the Powers and the Porte. It is the more urgent to press the Government of the Sultan to decide on setting itself seriously to work to fulfil the engagements it has contracted towards Europe.

As the first step, the three Imperial Courts propose to insist with the Porte on a suspension of hostilities for the term of two months. This interval would enable action to be brought to bear on the insurgents and refugees—to inspire them with confidence in the vigilant solicitude of Europe. By this means the way might be opened for direct negotiations between the Porte and the Bosnian and Herzegovinian delegates, on the basis of the wishes the latter have formulated, and which have been deemed fit to serve as starting-points for a discussion. These points are as follows:—

(1) That materials for the reconstruction of the dwelling-houses and churches should be furnished to the returning refugees; that their subsistence should be assured to them till they could support themselves by their own labour.

(2) That the Turkish Commissioner should consult with the mixed Commission, to guarantee the *bonâ-fide* application of the reforms and control their execution. This Commission to be presided over by a Herzegovinian Christian, and be composed

of natives faithfully representing the two religions of the country.

(3) To avoid any collision, advice should be given to concentrate the Turkish troops—at least, until excitement has subsided—on some points to be agreed upon.

(4) Christians as well as Mussulmans should retain their arms.

(5) The Consuls or Delegates of the Powers shall keep a watch over the application of the reforms in general, and on the steps relative to the repatriation in particular.

If, with the friendly and cordial support of the Great Powers, and by the help of an armistice, an arrangement could be concluded on these bases, and be set in train by the return of the refugees and the election of the mixed Commission, a considerable step would have been made towards pacification.

If, however, the armistice should expire without the efforts of the Powers being successful, the three Imperial Courts are of opinion that it would be necessary to supplement their diplomatic action by the sanction of an agreement with a view to such efficacious measures as appear to be demanded, in the interest of general peace, to check the evil and prevent its development.

This was the famous "Berlin Memorandum" for the pacification of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to accede to which caused so much sensation.

In the first place, I may observe that the request for an instant adhesion to the combined proposals was somewhat unreasonable. It was almost taking the assent of Her Majesty's Government too much for granted. The three Powers had been concerting their scheme at leisure, and no elucidation of this scheme having been previously given, it was not to be expected that Her Majesty's Government could, without duly

considering its merits, hastily give their judgment of it.

In a despatch* addressed to Lord Odo Russell, the British Ambassador at Berlin, Lord Derby wrote as follows :—

These proposals take the shape of certain definite points for negotiation between the Porte and the insurgents, coupled with an armistice and an intimation of an intention to take further measures should the negotiation be unsuccessful. None of these proposals had previously been discussed with Her Majesty's Government, or, as far as they are aware, with the other Powers, Signatories of the Treaty of Paris; and the inconvenience has consequently arisen again, as in the case of Count Andrassy's Note, of a set of Articles being submitted for the acceptance of Great Britain, without any opportunity having been afforded for a preliminary consideration of their details by Her Majesty's Government, or for the possible objections of Her Majesty's Government to be considered by the three Governments concerned.

Her Majesty's Government attach little importance to forms in matters of this kind, and would readily have accepted the present proposals had they appeared to them to afford a feasible plan for the pacification of the insurgent districts; but they cannot accept, for the sake of the mere appearance of concert, a scheme in the preparation of which they have not been consulted, and which they do not believe calculated to effect the object with which they are informed it has been framed.

I annex in the Appendix copy of the Despatch of Lord Derby giving the motives and grounds for declining, with regret, to accept the proposals contained in the Memorandum of the three Powers.

* See Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, No. 3. 1876. Page 173.

CHAPTER VIII.

Murder of French and Prussian Consuls at Salonica—Fall of Mahmoud Pacha—Deposition of Sultan—His Suicide—Accession of Murad V.—Declared Incapacitated by Ill Health—Succeeded by Abdul Hamid—Murder of Hussein Avni and Reschid Pachas at a Council—Bulgarian Atrocities—War Declared by Servia and Montenegro—Russian Sympathies for Servians—General Tchernaieff—Imperial Efforts to Restrain Servia and Montenegro—Meeting of Emperors at Reichstadt—Conversation with Prince Gortschakoff on Eastern Affairs—Defeat of the Servians—Appeal of Servia to the Powers for a Suspension of Hostilities—Speech of the Emperor to His Army—Proclamation of Prince Milan as King of Servia by His Army—My Mission to the Crimea—Conversation with Prince Gortschakoff—Audience of the Emperor—My Despatch Reporting Conversation with His Majesty—Livadia—Yalta—Orianda—Aloupka—Prince Woronzow—Communication to Prince Gortschakoff of Lord Derby's Proposals as Basis of Peace—Emperor's Departure—My Return to St. Petersburg.

The murder of the French and Prussian Consuls at Salonica, and the excitement it caused at Constantinople and in other parts of the Empire—giving proof of the fanaticism of the Mussulman against the Christian population—was but the commencement of "woes," and was shortly followed by other tragic events, which caused general alarm, and shook the Ottoman Empire to its foundations.

Sir Henry Elliot, who had been transferred from Vienna to Constantinople, foresaw, with remarkable prescience, the coming storm. On May 12, 1876, he wrote with reference to the impending fall of Mahmoud Pacha (the Grand Vizier), as follows:—

The visible leaders of the movement were the Softas, or students of the Koran—a determined and energetic body of men, numbering, as far as I can ascertain, between 5,000 and 6,000, who are, however, able to exercise influence over many others.

It appears that on the 10th May a large assemblage of them met Prince Izeddin on his way to the Seraskierat in Stamboul, and, stopping him, bade him return and inform the Sultan of their demands—viz., the dismissal of the Sheikh-ul-Islam and the Grand Vizier.

His Majesty, on receiving the message, sent his Secretary to the Mosque, where upwards of 2,000 were assembled, in order to ascertain more precisely what it was that they wanted, and by the next day at noon both their wishes had been complied with.

The fall of Mahmoud Pacha gave great satisfaction, and comparative confidence was restored. The demonstration was considered by Sir H. Elliot to have been directed against the Sultan and Mahmoud, and not against the Christians. The Softas were the "instruments," but the movement was evidently under the direction of able leaders, of whom Midhat Pacha and Hussein Avni Pacha were the most notable.*

Caboulé Pacha, the Turkish Ambassador, called on me on the 31st May to announce the grave intelligence he had received of the dethronement of the Sultan, and the proclamation of Murad Effendi, his nephew, as his successor. He had received no further details on the subject.

I saw, later, M. de Giers, who stated that the dethronement had been entirely the act of the new Grand

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 3, pages 179-215.

Vizier, Mehemet Ruschdi Pacha, and the Ministry. He said that they had placed Murad Effendi in the Seraskierat, defended by troops, and had then proceeded in the night to the Palace of the Sultan. They represented to His Majesty his incapacity for continuing the Government of the country, and the necessity of his retirement, and they requested him to follow them. His Majesty did so, without any resistance, and he was taken in a boat to the Seraglio, and placed under confinement there with his family. He showed great calmness and dignity, but no sympathy was displayed for him.

Shortly after his dethronement, and while under strict confinement, the ex-Sultan, Abdul Aziz, committed suicide. It was at first generally supposed that he had been secretly murdered; for suicide is a rare occurrence among Mussulmans, and is strictly forbidden by the laws of the Koran.

It was reported that an inquest was held on the late Sultan by nineteen medical men, among whom were Dr. Dickson, Physician to Her Majesty's Embassy; the doctors of the Austrian and French Embassy, and others of high standing, Turkish, Greek, and Armenian. They certified unanimously that the death was the result of suicide, and that the deceased Sultan had opened the veins of his arms with a pair of pointed scissors. Dr. Dickson said that neither he nor any of his colleagues entertained a doubt that the act was voluntary.

After the Sultan's deposition all arms and cutting instruments had been kept out of his reach; but on the 4th of June he asked for a pair of scissors to cut off his beard. A small pair was given him, and he then turned his attendants out of the room and locked the door. His Majesty was buried in the

mausoleum of his father, Sultan Mahmoud, with every mark of respect.*

The Sultan Murad V. was weak in mind and body, and was wholly incapacitated for governing in such an important crisis, when the very existence of the Empire was at stake. The throne was consequently declared vacant on the 31st of August, 1876, in conformity with the Fetvah given by His Highness the Sheikh-ul-Islam, and by virtue of the laws which govern the rights of sovereignty of the Empire.

His brother, Sultan Abdul Hamid II., heir-apparent to the Imperial throne, was proclaimed Sultan of Turkey on the 31st August.

A further tragedy, reported by Sir H. Elliot, occurred on the 15th June. While a Council of Ministers † was being held at the house of Midhat Pacha, Hussein Avni Pacha, the Minister of War, and Reschid Pacha, were shot dead, and the Minister of Marine was wounded by a Circassian, said to have been a former Aide-de-Camp of the late Sultan's son.

The murderer was seized, and though no details were given, it was supposed that the motive for the crime was an act of private revenge upon the Minister of War, and that Reschid Pacha was killed in endeavouring to defend his colleague.

The following was the account sent by the Grand Vizier to Musurus Pacha :—

A certain Hassan—a Circassian by birth, and who five years ago left the military school with the rank of lieutenant—was

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 4, p. 227.

† See Parliamentary Papers, No. 4, p 273.

appointed a captain, to be sent to the army of Bagdad. For certain reasons he was retained at Constantinople, and employed in various posts. When, latterly, he was appointed to the rank of Adjutant Major and to a post in the said army, Hassan advanced various reasons for deferring his departure, and was therefore imprisoned. Being released on the 15th June, with a view to his departure, he proceeded in the evening to the house of the Seraskier. On being informed that the latter was at a meeting of his colleagues at the residence of Midhat Pasha, the assassin proceeded thither. The sentries, believing him still to be an Aide-de-Camp, did not prevent his entrance into the Council Chamber. Hassan fired point blank at Hussein Avni Pacha with the revolver which he had in his pocket. While the rest endeavoured to seize him, Reschid Pacha, Ahmed Aga, a servant of Midhat Pacha, and a soldier shared the same fate. The Minister of Marine and another soldier were wounded. The murderer has been arrested.

It appears that the assassin killed seven persons and wounded eight others. When the soldiers arrived from a neighbouring guard-house they broke open the door of the room in which he had locked himself, and to which he had set fire; but before they could bayonet him he had killed and wounded several of them. He was degraded, and hanged on the following morning near the Seraskierat.

But the preceding tragic events were only the prelude to other misfortunes of a still greater gravity, and which caused throughout Europe a cry of horror and indignation against the Turkish rule.

For some time previously, symptoms of discontent and disaffection had manifested themselves in Bulgaria and the adjacent Balkans, and a serious outbreak was feared.

The Porte had, very injudiciously, employed as irregular troops in Bulgaria a number of Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians—a brutal and licentious soldiery, under no military command, who, armed by the Government authorities, paraded the country and became a terror to the Christian population.

As early as May 24th,* Sir H. Elliot made strong representations to the Porte of the evils resulting from the employment of these disorderly bands; but no attention appears to have been paid to them, the Porte throwing all responsibility on Abdul Kerim Pacha, who was entrusted with the sole direction of everything connected with Bulgaria.

Towards the end of June the cruelties and atrocities committed by the Turkish soldiery first became known by the European Press, and public attention in England was directed to them by the *Daily News*. At first they were disbelieved, and looked upon as grossly exaggerated for political objects; but when official agents were sent to ascertain the truth, it was found that the atrocities committed on a peaceful and defenceless population were not only not exaggerated, but that they surpassed in cruelty and inhumanity any possible conception of wanton barbarity. It was impossible to ascertain the number of those slain; it was estimated at from 18,000 to 30,000.† A thrill of horror seized Europe on learn-

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 4, p. 212.

† Mr. Walter Baring, a Secretary of the British Embassy, was sent by Sir H. Elliot to make an inquiry in regard to the reported Bulgarian atrocities. They were fully confirmed by him, and he estimated the number of victims at not less than 12,000.

ing these atrocities, and there was but one cry of indignation against the Porte—which had been duly forewarned—for employing in their service such a savage and brutal soldiery.

The failure of all diplomatic efforts to bring about a pacification between the Porte and the insurgents; the sad impression produced in Europe by the Bulgarian horrors; and the weakness and vacillation displayed by the Porte, in addition to the sympathy felt for their Bulgarian co-religionists, induced Servia and Montenegro, which during eleven months had been held back by Austria and Russia, to declare war against Turkey.

The spirit of discontent had been long rising; the cup was full—a drop would cause it to overflow. The Bulgarian atrocities constituted that drop. For months previously a deep sympathy for Servia was manifested in Russia, and more especially at Moscow and St. Petersburg. Volunteers were enlisted in great numbers; funds were largely subscribed by all classes. Offerings were publicly solicited, in every form and on every occasion—in the public thoroughfares, on steamboats, in the tram-cars. Ladies in the Red Cross costume appealed from house to house—and not in vain—for funds for the sick and wounded.

Russian officers—even of the Guards—took service in great numbers as volunteers for Servia. They were obliged previously to leave the Russian service, but were promised to be reinstated in their rank at a subsequent period. The religious enthusiasm for Servia rose to the highest pitch, and General Tchernaieff, having quitted

the Russian service, took the command of the Servian army.

The Russian law prohibits any Russian subject from taking service in a foreign State without the Imperial sanction, and the acceptance by General Tchernaieff of service in Servia caused great dissatisfaction to the Imperial Government.

General Tchernaieff addressed a letter to the *Russki-Mir* (of which newspaper he was the proprietor) explanatory of his acceptance of the command of the Servian volunteers. He referred to the organisation of committees for aiding the independence of the Bulgarians along the course of the Danube, from the Russian frontier to the Servian boundary, and to the vast preparations made in Bulgaria for an insurrection against the Porte. While passing from Bucharest to Belgrade, the General stated that he found preparations for war being advanced, and that the Servians, relying on Russia, had remained passive for eleven months, thus enabling the Turkish Government to concentrate along their extended frontier an army of 60,000 men.

He likewise referred to the hopes which the Bulgarians placed in their Russian brethren, adding that the feeling of the Servians towards Russia was much stronger.

He then explained the motives for his taking service in the Servian army, observing that had he refused, after his inspection of the Servian advanced position, his withdrawal would have been interpreted by the enemies of the Slavs as a conviction on his part of the fruitlessness of the contemplated struggle.

He stated that his conviction was entirely in a contrary sense, and that Servia could muster 125,000 well-armed troops, with 200 rifled cannon and 24,000 cavalry, in addition to being able to provide 100,000 armed men for the protection and defence of the country.

The General concluded with expressing his hopes that his countrymen would not condemn his taking service in the impending struggle for the emancipation of the Balkan Christians from the Turkish yoke.

I have given a short analysis of General Tchernaieff's letter as a palpable proof that the insurrection in the Balkan provinces against Turkey was fomented by Russian Slav committees on Russian soil, aided by the support of a Russian General; but the result of the campaign was the defeat of the Servian forces under his military command, and the road to Belgrade was open to the victors!

Immediately on the receipt at St. Petersburg of tidings of the Servian defeat in the battle of Djunis, the Russian Government presented the ultimatum to the Porte specified in a later page.

I may here state that the Imperial Government, in using all their efforts to the restraining of Servia and Montenegro previous to the declaration of war against Turkey, warned them that if they acted against the counsels of Russia they would do so at their own risk and peril, and could expect neither her assistance nor support.

On returning to his capital from Ems, the Emperor of Russia arranged a meeting with the Emperor of

Austria at Reichstadt. In a conversation which I had with Prince Gortschakoff on his return to St. Petersburg, on the 12th July, His Highness, in referring to the position of Austria and to the meeting of the two Emperors at Reichstadt, stated in very decided terms that a perfect agreement existed between the two Imperial Governments. His words were :—"*Nous sommes parfaitement convenus pour toutes les éventualités, mais ne me demandez pas davantage.*"

His Highness repeated the anxious desire of the Emperor for peace, and for a cordial agreement with England on Eastern affairs. Whenever he expressed himself with warmth, it was evident that it arose from a feeling that the loyal and pacific policy of the Emperor —which, he said, had borne the test of twenty-one years—was distrusted in England ; and he expressed his disappointment that Russia should be thought to be pacific in London, but warlike at Belgrade and Ragusa.

With reference to the Imperial meeting at Reichstadt, M. de Giers had previously informed me that it had gone off very satisfactorily, and that it had been mutually agreed to maintain the principle of non-intervention in the war between the Porte and Servia and Montenegro, and to concert with the other Great Powers whenever a favourable moment should appear for terminating the struggle.

There was something ominously misty in regard to Prince Gortschakoff's phrase, "*pour toutes les éventualités,*" and his wish not to be further questioned.

I had been privately informed that it was the wish

of Count Andrassy to occupy Bosnia, but that he would only take this measure with the concurrence of Russia. I had, therefore, no doubt that Prince Gortschakoff's mysterious phrase referred to this question. It was subsequently rumoured that the occupation of Bosnia by Austria was assented to by Russia, on condition of Austrian neutrality in the event of war between Russia and Turkey; but it was impossible to unravel the mystery, and it is not prudent in such matters to indulge in conjectures.

On the discomfiture of the Servian army, Prince Milan formally applied to the foreign Consuls at Belgrade for the good offices of the European Powers to obtain a suspension of hostilities. Prince Gortschakoff immediately instructed the Russian representatives at the Great Courts by telegraph to support the Servian appeal.

Prince Gortschakoff informed me that the national enthusiasm in favour of Servia was daily increasing, and that the position of the Imperial Government was becoming one of difficulty and embarrassment.

His Highness referred to a speech of the Emperor to his army on the termination of the autumn manœuvres, with a view to calm the excitement. His Majesty's words were as follows :—

"*L'honneur du pays m'est cher : jusqu'ici j'ai pu maintenir la paix, et je désire la conserver ; mais si l'honneur du pays serait atteint je saurais le défendre, et alors je compte sur vous.*"

Prince Gortschakoff spoke of the atrocities in Servia,

and said that so long as the Porte employed such elements of disorder as the Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks, no confidence could be placed in it. It was time that an end should be put to the effusion of blood, which was creating feelings of exasperation in all classes; and it was to be hoped that the appeal of Prince Milan would be promptly followed by a suspension of hostilities, to enable Europe to deliberate on a final pacification.

The proclamation of Prince Milan as King of Servia by the Servian army at this time was received with much surprise and disapproval on the part of the Emperor and of the Imperial Government. His Majesty wrote on the margin of the telegram announcing the intelligence, "*C'est une farce qu'on nous joue.*"

In consequence of the absence of Prince Gortschakoff in attendance on the Emperor at Livadia, and the delay caused thereby in communicating with the Imperial Government at a moment of such grave importance, Her Majesty's Government wished me to repair to the Crimea for personal communication with the Chancellor.

I accordingly called on M. de Giers, and requested him to inform Prince Gortschakoff of this wish of Her Majesty's Government. They had found it inconvenient to have no direct means of communication with His Highness; and that, if agreeable to the Emperor, I purposed to proceed to Yalta, so as to be within easy reach of His Highness.

On the following day M. de Giers called on me to say that he had received a telegram from Prince

Gortschakoff, who had taken the Emperor's orders, and was instructed to inform me that "I should be *le bien venu.*"

I accordingly left St. Petersburg that evening (October 23rd), accompanied by Mr. Edwin Egerton, and arrived at Yalta, via Moscow and Sevastopol, on the 27th.

Every facility for the journey was granted by the Imperial Government. A special carriage with a sleeping apartment was given us, and the use of the Imperial rooms at the stations for our daily meals. Nothing could exceed the civility and attention which we received from the Imperial authorities.

The preceding station on the railway to Sevastopol is Inkerman, and when announced by the guard it awoke in me a deep emotion in memory of many dear friends and relatives who had fallen in that frightful and sanguinary combat. "*Requiescant in pace.*"

From Sevastopol we drove to Yalta, crossing the plateau on which our army was encamped in that severe winter of 1854-55. The country up to Baidar was undulating, with some peasants' houses interspersed, roughly cultivated, and not over-populated. It was inhabited by a Tartar race, who appeared to be comfortably off; for there were no signs of poverty.

From Baidar—where there was an old archway built of stone, through which we drove—we descended gradually by a winding road overlooking the Black Sea to Yalta, passing by, on our approach to Yalta, the palace of Prince Woronzoff (called Aloupka), and that of

Orianda, the palace of the Grand Duke Constantine, where Prince Gortschakoff was then residing, and numerous picturesque villas. I know nothing more beautiful than the drive from Baidar to Yalta, and the climate in winter is very similar to that of Southern Italy.

Before reaching Yalta we passed the vineyards and grounds of Livadia, the residence of the Emperor—a lovely spot, with a picturesque and beautiful house, comfortably but simply furnished.

The hotel at Yalta was very commodious, the cuisine under a French cook excellent, and in comfort left nothing to be desired. It is much frequented by the Russian nobility in the spring and autumn for its enjoyable climate.

The town is very picturesque, and encircles the Bay. There is a small pier, or landing place, where the steamers touch, but the landing is difficult, and even dangerous, when a strong south wind is blowing from the Black Sea.

On the day after my arrival I had an interview at Orianda with Prince Gortschakoff, who received me very cordially. I inquired after the health of their Imperial Majesties and the Imperial family; and after some friendly remarks, the conversation turned to the grave aspect of affairs. The question of the armistice he considered as arranged, the Porte having yielded, on the advice of Sir H. Elliot, to the considerations which the Imperial Government had advanced in favour of the shorter term. Her Majesty's Government, I

observed, had no objection to the term of six weeks or two months if proposed by the Porte, but they were not able to take the initiative of a fresh proposal, after having expressed their approval of the original term of five months proposed by the Porte.

Prince Gortschakoff looked principally to the question of the "autonomy" of the three provinces, viz., Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Herzegovina.

He wished that, on the arrangement of the armistice, no time should be lost in assembling a Conference. He wished that the representatives of the six Powers should meet previous to the Conference, in order to develop and agree on the basis of the proposals submitted by Her Majesty's Government, and that when they were agreed they should then be submitted at a Conference, at which the Turkish representatives should assist. He said Russia must insist on such reforms, in regard to the status of the Christians in the three provinces, as would prove to be "real," and not mere "phrases," and that a "control," or a "guarantee," must be given by the Porte for their due execution.

I believe that the Sultan and his Government were anxious to meet the views of the European Powers, but they were under continual fear of popular excitement and religious fanaticism, which paralysed their action, and that the dangers from within exceeded, in their opinion, the dangers from without. The decision for the Porte was a very grave one. It was whether she would expire by her own hand or by that of an external foe.

My audience of the Emperor was deferred till the 2nd of November, the previous day being the anniversary of the death of the late Empress. Meeting Prince Gortschakoff I inquired whether he had received any satisfactory intelligence from Constantinople. He replied that he had had intelligence, but that he preferred that the Emperor should communicate it to me at my audience on the morrow.

On my return to the hotel I found a telegram from St. Petersburg, giving the official notification, published in that morning's *Journal de St. Petersbourg*, that General Ignatieff had been instructed to inform the Porte "that if, within two days, it did not agree to an unconditional armistice of six weeks or two months, and if it did not give immediate orders to arrest military operations, the Ambassador would leave Constantinople with all the members of the Embassy, and that diplomatic relations would be broken off."

This was evidently the intelligence which Prince Gortschakoff preferred should be communicated to me by the Emperor.

General Schweinitz, the German Ambassador, had arrived at Yalta on the previous evening direct from Berlin, and he informed me that the official answer to the Russian Ultimatum was expected the following day, and that hopes were entertained that the Porte would consent to the armistice.

On the following day I had my audience of the Emperor at Livadia, when His Majesty was pleased to receive me with his customary kindness and cordiality.

After some gracious inquiries after my family, His Majesty at once opened on the Eastern complications.

He stated that he had that morning received a telegram from Constantinople announcing the probable acceptance of the armistice; and he read to me another telegram reporting that orders had been already sent by the Porte to their commanders to suspend military operations.

This, His Majesty said, was very satisfactory.

On my observing on the sudden change which had taken place between the Sunday (when I had seen the Chancellor) and the following day, when the Ultimatum was despatched to General Ignatieff, His Majesty said that this had been caused by the intelligence he had received of the complete discomfiture of the Servian army, and his fears that it might be followed by similar atrocities to those which had occurred in Bulgaria.

His Majesty had decided on addressing an Ultimatum to the Porte, in order to prevent a further unnecessary effusion of blood, and His Majesty observed that no one was more astonished on its receipt than General Ignatieff himself.

His Majesty expressed very earnestly his wish that the European Conference should meet with the least delay, and that instructions should be immediately sent by the several Governments to enable the Ambassadors at Constantinople to deliberate at once on the necessary preliminaries of peace, taking as the basis the proposals which had been submitted by Lord Derby.

The Emperor then, with great calmness and lucidity,

entered on a retrospective view of the past negotiations. He stated that he had given every proof of his desire for peace, and that he had done everything in his power to aid in arriving at a pacific solution of the existing complications.

He had supported Lord Derby's previous demand for an armistice of six weeks, which was refused by the Porte, and was followed by a mere suspension of hostilities for ten days, which proved wholly illusory. His Majesty considered that this refusal by the Porte to a collective appeal of Europe was a *soufflet* given to the Powers. He had patiently submitted from a wish not to separate from the European concert.

Lord Derby then submitted the proposals to serve as a basis for peace. To these also His Majesty had assented, and they were equally agreed to by the other Powers. To these proposals the Porte had replied evasively; declining to convey its acceptance in the form of a Protocol, and notifying that a wholesale measure of reform was under consideration, which would be applied indiscriminately to the empire at large, and which even went beyond the demands of the Powers.

On this refusal Lord Derby had, simultaneously with a similar proposal by His Majesty, addressed to the Porte a demand for an armistice of not less than a month, for the purpose of enabling the Powers to deliberate on the conditions of peace. His Majesty had supported this demand, in conjunction with the other Powers, and to this the Porte had replied by

a counter-proposal offering an armistice of five months, which, under the circumstances and for the reasons given by his Government, could not be supported or recommended to the belligerent parties.

Thus, said His Majesty, the Porte, by a series of manœuvres, had rendered ineffectual all the attempts of collective Europe for arresting the war, and for securing a general pacification.

His Majesty then added that if Europe was willing to receive these repeated rebuffs from the Porte, he could no longer consider it as consistent either with the honour, the dignity, or the interests of Russia. He was anxious not to separate from the European concert, but the present state of things was intolerable, and could no longer be allowed to continue, and unless Europe was prepared to act with firmness and energy, he should be obliged to act alone.

His Majesty then referred more especially to his relations with England. He said that he regretted to see that there still existed in England an "inveterate" suspicion of Russian policy, and a continued fear of Russian aggression and conquest.

He had on several occasions given the most solemn assurances that he desired no conquest; that he aimed at no aggrandizement; and that he had not the smallest wish or intention to be possessed of Constantinople.

All that had been said and written about a Will of Peter the Great, and the aims of Catherine the Second, were simply illusions and phantoms. The document never existed in reality, and he considered that the

acquisition of Constantinople would be a misfortune for Russia. There was no question of such an acquisition, nor had it ever been entertained by his late father, who had given proof of it in 1828, when his victorious army was within four days' march of the Turkish capital.

His Majesty pledged his sacred word of honour, in the most earnest and solemn manner, that he had no intention of acquiring Constantinople, and that if necessity should oblige him to occupy a portion of Bulgaria, it would only be provisionally, and until peace and the safety of the Christian population were secured.

His Majesty here reverted to the proposal addressed to Her Majesty's Government for the occupation of Bosnia by Austria, of Bulgaria by Russia, and of a naval demonstration at Constantinople, where, he said, Her Majesty's Fleet would have been the dominant Power. This, His Majesty thought, ought to be a sufficient proof that Russia entertained no intention of occupying that capital.

His Majesty could not understand, when both countries had a common object—namely, the maintenance of peace and the amelioration of the condition of the Christians, and when he had given every proof that he had no desire for conquest or aggrandizement—why there should not be a perfect and cordial understanding between Russia and England—an understanding based on a policy of peace, which would be equally beneficial to their mutual interests, and to those of Europe at large.

"Intentions," said His Majesty, "are attributed to

Russia of a future conquest of India, and of the possession of Constantinople. Can anything be more absurd? With regard to the former, it is a perfect impossibility; and as regards the latter, I repeat again the most solemn assurances that I entertain neither the wish nor the intention."

His Majesty deeply deplored the distrust of his policy which was manifested in England, and the evil effects it produced. And he earnestly requested me to do my utmost to dispel this cloud of suspicion and distrust of Russia, and charged me to convey to Her Majesty's Government the solemn assurances he had repeated to me.

I assured the Emperor that Her Majesty's Government were perfectly cognisant of, and fully appreciated, His Majesty's pacific intentions. I observed that the proposed occupation of Turkish territory had worked a change in the public opinion of England, and had produced alarm.

I expressed a hope that the acceptance of the armistice would now enable the Powers to bring about a satisfactory pacification, and that it was of essential importance that the European concert should be maintained.

I observed that the question of autonomy appeared to me as likely to offer the chief difficulty, and that, as it more directly affected Austrian interests, care should be taken not to exceed those limits which could be accepted by Austria. I said that in Bosnia and Bulgaria there was a large Mussulman and Catholic

population, and mostly of the proprietary class, and their interests must be taken into account.

I then referred to the reported pretensions of Servia and Roumania to be erected into independent kingdoms. Such a measure, I observed, would be the first step towards a dissolution of the Turkish Empire in Europe. History, I said, recorded the existence in former times of a Kingdom of Bohemia, a Kingdom of Servia, and a Kingdom of Poland; they had all disappeared, and their dissolution had been chiefly caused by internal dissensions.

If the pretensions of Servia and Roumania should now be admitted, it would be the creation of so many small Polands, which very probably would drift into Republics, which would neither be for the peace nor security of the neighbouring States.

The Emperor said there was no question of establishing Kingdoms of Servia and Roumania, and it would be a folly to do so. The proclamation of Prince Milan as King of Servia had been the act of the army, which His Majesty thoroughly disapproved of, and in consequence His Majesty had advised Prince Milan not to visit the headquarters. He had, however, received a telegram from the Prince excusing himself for not obeying His Majesty's advice, on the grounds that duty to his country obliged him to go to his army under the present adverse circumstances.

A reference to the Russian volunteers in the Servian ranks induced me to observe that it had been greatly instrumental in producing the feverish excitement in

Russia. To this His Majesty replied that he had permitted the officers to go provided they left the Russian service, and that he had hoped by so doing to calm the agitation ("*de jeter de l'eau froide*" was His Majesty's expression). His Majesty added that a great many officers had fallen, and that the enthusiasm for the Servians had very much calmed down.

The Emperor then said that he would sum up the general observations he had made in the following points:—

(1) An armistice, such as he hoped had been accepted, was urgently needed.

(2) An immediate meeting of a Conference should be held, the principal object of which was to agree upon the introduction of such reforms in the three provinces as would safeguard the interests of the Christian populations, and give them such autonomy as might be necessary for that purpose.

(3) The Porte should give effective guarantees for the execution of these reforms.

His Majesty then took leave of me in the same cordial and gracious manner in which he had received me.

In speaking of the status of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire, the Emperor observed that by the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji, Russia had enjoyed the exclusive right of protecting their interests. By the treaty of Paris this exclusive right was abolished, and the protectorate of the Christians was committed generally to Europe. His Majesty stated that since

1856 Europe had not fulfilled this mission, and it was in consequence of her failure to do so that the present complications had arisen.

I had the honour of dining in the evening with their Majesties, and after dinner the Emperor informed me that he had received intelligence from Constantinople announcing the acceptance by the Porte of the armistice demanded by General Ignatieff. His Majesty observed that it was a proof of the successful result of a little firmness.

The foregoing is the gist of the despatch which I addressed to Lord Derby reporting my audience of the Emperor, which lasted over an hour, and which was of a most satisfactory nature. In speaking of his anxious desire for a friendly understanding with England, His Majesty spoke with feelings of deep emotion. He referred to his daughter, expressing the pleasure it had given him lately to see the Duke of Edinburgh at Livadia, and the comfort it had been to him to witness their happiness, and with great warmth of feeling said: "Is it likely that I should entertain views hostile to her adopted country, which might produce a rupture between the two countries?"

I thought it desirable, for my own responsibility and for future reference, to have an official confirmation of my report of this audience. Accordingly, before its transmission, I read my despatch to Prince Gortschakoff. His Highness said that it very correctly stated the views and opinions which His Majesty had told him (Prince Gortschakoff) that he had expressed to me; and

His Highness asked me to allow him to communicate it to His Majesty. I readily agreed to his request, and left a copy of my despatch in his hands for that purpose.

On the following day I had the honour to be invited to dine with their Majesties. The Emperor expressed to me the satisfaction with which he had read my despatch which I left with Prince Gortschakoff, reporting what had passed at my audience of His Majesty, observing that I had reported with great exactness the opinions he had expressed, and added that I had even reported them in the very words used by His Majesty.

The Emperor, in thanking me for having been the truthful exponent of his feelings and intentions, expressed his gratification that they had been received with the greatest satisfaction by Her Majesty's Government, as I had communicated that morning to Prince Gortschakoff, in conformity with a telegraphic instruction from Lord Derby.

The Imperial life in this lovely residence and incomparable climate was very simple. The grounds, abounding with rare exotic plants and flowers, were beautifully kept; the picturesque scenery, with a blue sky reflected in the waters of the Black Sea, and the balmy, soft air, rendered Livadia a paradise in comparison with the icy regions of the north.

Adjoining Livadia was the stately palace of Orianda, belonging to the Grand Duke Constantine, where Prince Gortschakoff with his counsellors, Baron Jomini and M. de Hamburger, were residing. It stood on a slight

eminence, with a commanding view over the Black Sea, and surrounded with a beautiful park. Further on the coast was a superb villa, "Aloupka," belonging to Prince Woronzoff—an enchanting spot with lovely gardens. I dined with the Prince and Princess on my way back to Sevastopol. I had known the Princess for some years, and was much gratified by the kind reception they gave me.

The Prince, who was known for his admiration of England, and who was most anxious for the maintenance of good relations between England and Russia, said that the present Eastern question was viewed by the whole Russian nation, from the highest to the lowest, as one of religion and humanity, and that in this double capacity had touched that sensitive chord which had vibrated through the whole nation.

This feeling in favour of the Christian Slavs he described as so powerful—so national in its origin and its aim—that the Emperor could not venture to oppose the current; and that if His Majesty, from his strong love of peace, should be induced to forego military action, the nation itself would go to the relief of their Christian co-religionists. No financial or other consideration would deter it from a course which it considered to be a religious duty. Nations, like individuals, when moved by passion could not be controlled by reason, and were impelled forward like a mighty torrent, heedless of obstruction, and striving only to gain their object, without any consideration of the cost at which it could be obtained.

This, he said, was the present state of public feeling in Russia. He likened it to the age of the Crusades, observing that the moment had come when the Slavonic race, amounting to one hundred millions, was determined to liberate their Christian brethren from the Mussulman yoke.

Previous to going to dine with their Majesties at Livadia I had, immediately on their receipt, communicated to Prince Gortschakoff the proposals of Her Majesty's Government as basis for deliberation of the Conference at Constantinople.

They were as follows :—

"(1) The independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

(2) A declaration that the Powers do not seek for territorial advantages, exclusive influence, or commercial concessions, as in the protocols of September 17th, 1840, and of August 3rd, 1860.

(3) Terms proposed to the Porte by Sir H. Elliot, in accordance with the Earl of Derby's instructions of September 21st last.

Should the Powers consent to this proposal of Her Majesty's Government, a special Ambassador will be at once appointed, with orders to go to Constantinople to take part in the proposed Conference."

After dinner the Emperor expressed to me his approval of the proposals, except in regard to "one word." His Majesty expressed a wish that the word "territorial," preceding the phrase "integrity of the Ottoman Empire" should be omitted.

Prince Gortschakoff explained to me that the Imperial Government could not accept that term, as it

would exclude the possibility of a provisional occupation, which, in the interest of the Ottoman Empire itself, he considered would still be necessary for the security of the Christian population and for the maintenance of peace and order during the introduction of the administrative reforms.

The Emperor and Empress and the Imperial Court left Livadia on the 7th November for Moscow, and arrived at St. Petersburg on the 13th November. Prince Gortschakoff was in attendance on His Majesty.

I left Yalta with Mr. Edwin Egerton on the 8th November, and reached St. Petersburg on the 12th November.

CHAPTER IX.

Conference Invited by Lord Derby at Constantinople—Lord Salisbury Appointed British Plenipotentiary with Sir H. Elliot—Speech of the Emperor at Moscow—Review of Troops by the Emperor at St. Petersburg—His Address to Them—Prince Gortschakoff's Despatch Announcing Mobilisation—His Answer in Regard to Reported Secret Russian Agent at Cabul—His Denial of any Hostile Intention against Merv—Question of Privateering Discussed by Russian Press—Russian Loan—Terms Agreed to by Six Powers to be Presented to the Porte—Formal Opening of Conference amid Salvos of Artillery Proclaiming New Turkish Constitution—Turkish Representatives Submit Counter-Proposals—Porte Determined not to Permit Foreign Interference—Rejects Proposals of Six Powers—All Endeavours of Lord Salisbury with Sultan and Grand Vizier Fruitless—Difficult Position of Sultan—Conference Broken Up—Lord Salisbury and Sir H. Elliot leave for England—Great Disappointment of Emperor and Prince Gortschakoff—London Protocol—General Ignatieff—Porte Rejects Protocol—Prince Gortschakoff's Answer "*Fiat Lux*"—The Emperor's Dog "Punch"—Prince Gortschakoff's Circular-Despatch Announcing War—Lord Derby's Reply—Manifesto of the Emperor.

IMMEDIATELY on the acceptance by the Porte of the Russian demand of an armistice, Lord Derby invited the Powers to a Conference at Constantinople to effect a pacification on the basis submitted by Lord Derby, and accepted by them.

The Powers, including the Porte, accepted the Conference on the terms proposed, and the Marquis of Salisbury, then Secretary of State for India, was appointed British Plenipotentiary, in conjunction with Sir Henry Elliot, the British Ambassador.

Lord Salisbury left England on the 20th of

November for Constantinople, visiting on his way the Courts of Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

On the journey of the Emperor from the Crimea to St. Petersburg an address was presented to the Emperor from the nobility and Municipal Council of Moscow, to which His Majesty replied as follows:—

I thank you for the sentiments you have been good enough to express to me in reference to the present state of political affairs. It is already known to you that Turkey has yielded to my demands for the immediate conclusion of an armistice, in order to put an end to the needless effusion of blood in Servia and Montenegro. . . . I know that all Russia most warmly sympathises with me in the sufferings of our brethren and co-religionists. The true interests of Russia are dearer to me than all, and I wish to spare Russian blood from being shed. I have, therefore, endeavoured, and shall continue to endeavour, to obtain an amelioration of the position of the Christians in the East by pacific means.

Negotiations will commence shortly at Constantinople between the Great Powers to bring about a peaceful arrangement. My ardent wish is for a peaceful agreement. Should we not obtain from the Porte such guarantees for carrying out the reforms we have a right to demand, I am firmly determined to act independently; and I am convinced that the whole of Russia will support me, should the honour of Russia require it, and that Moscow will give the example. May God help us to carry out our sacred mission.

The day before the Emperor's speech at Moscow, Lord Beaconsfield, in a speech at the Guildhall, had held rather bellicose language, inasmuch as he had dwelt on the capabilities of England to undertake war, and on her financial powers to continue it till the attainment of her object. I do not believe that

it was the intention of Lord Beaconsfield to sound the tocsin of war, or to hold any language of menace, but it was so interpreted, or rather, I should say, misinterpreted, by the foreign Press, and it was supposed that the Emperor's speech at Moscow had been a reply to it. But this was not really the case, for I ascertained that at the time that the Emperor addressed the Moscow deputation he had no cognisance of Lord Beaconsfield's speech. But so it is. In feverish times like those then existing, every word that falls from a Sovereign or a Minister is seized on by the Press, and is liable to the vicissitudes of the telegraph, or to misinterpretation by the public.

The Emperor, on his return to St. Petersburg, held a review of the Imperial Guards and of the adjacent garrisons. At the termination of it His Majesty addressed the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolaiewitch, his staff, and the officers of his Guards.

His Majesty, in referring to the mobilisation of a portion of his army, expressed a hope that it would not be necessary to mobilise his Guards. He expressed his thanks to the Grand Duke Nicholas for the efficient state of his Guards, and announced his appointment to command the active army, adding that his Imperial Highness carried with him the best wishes of all for his success.

On the day of Prince Gortschakoff's return he addressed a Circular-Despatch to the Russian representatives at the foreign Courts, announcing the mobilisation of a portion of the Russian army. It

stated that although the Emperor was firmly resolved to endeavour to obtain pacifically the purposes laid down by the agreement among the great Powers, His Majesty did not wish for war, and would do his utmost to avoid it; but he was resolved not to halt until the principles, recognised by Europe as humane and just, should be carried out.

At an interview I had with Prince Gortschakoff on the following day, in referring to the above Circular, he stated that the "mobilisation" did not imply war, and he expressed the sincere desire of the Imperial Government to maintain the European concert.

At this interview I mentioned the report of a projected Russian expedition to Merv. He denied that any such intention existed, and said that the Tekhé Turcomans had plundered another Turcoman tribe under the protectorate of Russia, and that a detachment of troops had been sent for the protection of the latter, and to keep open the communication between Khiva and Krasnovodsk.

I further referred, by instruction from Lord Derby, to a correspondence reported to be going on between General Kaufmann and the Ameer of Afghanistan through a secret agent at Cabul, which was not in conformity with the engagement taken by Russia that "she considered Afghanistan to be beyond the sphere of her political action."

He replied that there was no Russian agent at Cabul, and the letter of General Kaufmann to the

Ameer was only the usual complimentary letter on his return to his post.

But, added His Excellency, "*Quand nous avons en main une baleine, je ne puis pas m'occuper des petits poissons.*" A witty mode of answering an embarrassing question.

Many organs of the Russian Press were at this time suggesting the employment by Russia of privateers in the event of a war with England, and a society was formed at Moscow and St. Petersburg to raise subscriptions for the purchase of vessels in America, to be placed under the Russian naval flag.

An article appeared in the official *Journal de St. Petersbourg* by Professor Martin (Professor of International Law at the University of St. Petersburg), refuting the arguments of the Russian Press that it would be for the interests of Russia to re-establish privateering.

He first proved that the Declaration of 1856 abolishing privateering was not a component part of the Treaty of Paris, and that, consequently, it would not become invalid in the event of that Treaty becoming so by war.

In his opinion the Four Articles of the Declaration of Paris had nothing in common with the Treaty stipulating the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Paris is signed only by the Representatives of the seven Powers, while the Declaration had received the adhesion of forty-six foreign States, and may be considered as the basis of the maritime code of all nations.

Although, argued Professor Martin, the Treaty of Paris had undergone changes, the Declaration had remained intact, and had been respected during the wars of 1859, 1866, and 1870. He then proved that the abrogation of the Declaration of Paris would only be to the advantage of England, and consequently, from a practical and military point of view, that it would not be desirable.

Large subscriptions were received, and several vessels were purchased and enrolled in the lists of the "Imperial Navy," but not as "privateers."

A loan of 100 millions of roubles was issued by the Minister of Finance under the directions of the Emperor; but it was not a success, and was significative of impending war.

The Conference met early in December. It had been agreed among the Powers (a compromise on the question whether or not a Turkish representative should take part in the Conference) that the representatives of the six Powers should agree among themselves as to the proposals to be submitted to the Conference when formally opened, with the participation of a Turkish representative.

The terms agreed upon by the representatives of the six Powers, and finally submitted to the Porte, were as follows:—

(1) The establishment of administrative autonomy for Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria.

(2) The nomination of Christian Governors for the three provinces for five years to be subject to the approval of the Powers.

(3) Prohibition of employment of irregular troops and of colonisation by Circassians.

(4) Rectification of frontier of Montenegro.

(5) *Status quo* for Servia, with settlement of the boundary difficulties.

(6) Reforms of administration in the Christian provinces.

(7) Use of the local language in the tribunals and by the administration.

(8) General amnesty to Christians condemned for political reasons.

(9) Commission of Control. (Two Commissions of Control to be appointed by the representatives of the six Powers, to superintend the execution of the reforms and assist the local authorities in the different measures affecting order and public safety.)

(10) Formation of a militia and a gendarmerie of Christians and Mussulmans in proportion to the religious population. Concentration of Turkish troops within fortresses and towns.

(11) Execution of the reforms within three months, under an international Commission, at whose service would be placed a force of 6,000 gendarmes, to be enlisted in Belgium and Switzerland, for the maintenance of order and the security of the Christian population.

The foregoing were the minimum proposals agreed to by the Russian Ambassador, who read at the third meeting of the Conference a telegram from Prince Gortschakoff which stated that Russia had assented to them in order to come to an agreement with the other Powers, adding, "*J'ai fait abstraction de mes idées. J'ai accepte un minimum irréducible.*"*

* There is no doubt that the proposals of the Conference were not strictly in conformity with the Treaty of 1856; and the arguments in resisting them, as well as their refusal by the Porte, were apparently logical. By that treaty all interference in the internal affairs of Turkey

The formal opening of the Conference, under the Presidency of Savfet Pacha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, took place on the 23rd of December. Shortly after the meeting the Plenipotentiaries were suddenly startled by heavy salvos of artillery; and, considering the tragic events which had lately taken place in the Turkish capital, they were somewhat alarmed. It was explained to them that these salvos were in honour of the new Turkish Constitution, which had just been proclaimed, and had been received with every expression of satisfaction by the Mussulman and Christian populations.

This was a clever *mise en scène*, at a moment when united Europe was meeting in conference with the object of relieving Turkey from the dangers which menaced her, from within as well as from without.

The project emanated with Midhat Pacha, and was entirely his offspring. It was based on the principles of constitutional representative government. It was suddenly and hurriedly launched, for the purpose of dazzling

by foreign Powers was interdicted, and it gave to the Sultan the unshackled right of internal government. But, on the other hand, it must be stated that when the exclusive protectorate of the Christians in Turkey granted to Russia by the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji was abolished by the Treaty of Paris, this right was transferred to the European Powers, who, during the twenty years that had since elapsed, had done nothing to enforce on Turkey the fulfilment of her engagements. During these twenty years Turkey had done nothing to ameliorate the condition of her Christian subjects, which had even become worse than before, and was the origin of the insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Having herself thus infringed the Treaty of Paris, Turkey had no justifiable grounds for refusing the joint proposals of Europe on the plea of their infringing that Treaty. After the Bulgarian atrocities, it was evident that the British nation would support no Ministry which should propose to take up arms in favour of the right of Turkey to misgovern and oppress her Christian subjects.

and checkmating Europe, and, like a *feu d'artifice*, flashed for a moment and then disappeared.

The Turkish Plenipotentiaries did not enter on the proposals of the Powers, stating that they were not empowered even to discuss the principal and most essential points, and further, on the grounds that they had counter-proposals to present on the part of the Turkish Government.

Lord Salisbury, with great tact and consummate skill, did everything that was humanly possible with the Sultan and the Grand Vizier to warn the Turkish Government of the dangers which would result from a refusal on their part to listen to the voice of united Europe ; but his beneficent purposes were frustrated by the obstinate determination of the Porte to admit of no foreign interference in the internal administration of the Empire.

But, in extenuation of their blindness, it must be admitted that the position of the Sultan and his Government was extremely difficult as well as perilous. They had to reckon with the enthusiasm and excitement of a reckless and fanatic people, whose passions had been roused to a religious frenzy, and were under no control.

The Sultan had to choose between the alternatives of looking to foreign protection against his own subjects, or of acting with the public opinion of his fanatic people and, in reliance on its support, to appeal to arms. He was young and inexperienced in affairs, having only lately succeeded to the throne ; he had no counsellors in whom he could confide, for they were all new to him.

He hesitated as to assenting to the proposals of the Conference, and appeared to fear the effect of his acceptance of them on Turkish public opinion. He was impressed with a conviction that his empire would be exposed to less risk by a foreign war than by an internal insurrection. He was more influenced by fear of the fanaticism of his own subjects than by the pressure of the foreign Powers. He was surrounded by rival and ambitious intriguers for place and power, inexperienced in affairs, and guided by the influences of fatalism. He was, further, in fear of his life if he yielded to the demands of the Powers, and was consequently unable to exercise his free judgment and decision in the grave crisis affecting his person and his throne.

The proposals of the Conference, after undergoing some modifications, were submitted by Midhat Pacha to the Grand Council of the Empire, and were almost unanimously rejected by it; consequently there was no course left for the foreign representatives but to break up the Conference and leave Constantinople.

The result of the Conference was graphically expressed by Lord Salisbury at the last sitting, when he said "that the Porte had only given promises and had refused to grant guarantees."

Lord Salisbury and his staff left Constantinople on January 22nd, 1877, returning to England viâ Athens and Brindisi.

Sir Henry Elliot likewise left Constantinople, leaving Mr. Jocelyn as Chargé d'Affaires.

The Ambassadors of Austria, France, Russia, Germany, and Italy, accredited to the Porte, were also withdrawn, leaving Chargés d'Affaires with instructions to conduct the current business, but not to treat any political question. In short, the Porte was put in quarantine, or, to use a modern expression, was "boycotted."

The two principal points which were persistently combated by the Turkish representatives were—(1) The appointment of Christian Governors for the insurgent provinces, with the assent of the Powers (as in the case with the Lebanon); and (2) the International Commission to supervise the carrying into effect the promised reforms.

There was no doubt that the Emperor of Russia and his Government were anxious for a peaceful arrangement, and, in the existing financial position of Russia, for the avoidance of a war which would impose heavy sacrifices on the nation. But when a large portion of the army had been mobilised, and a great military demonstration had been made to obtain from the Ottoman Government a satisfactory amelioration of the condition of the Christian population in Turkey, it was difficult, not to say impossible, for the Emperor to demobilise his army without proving to his people that the object of the mobilisation had been attained.

The Emperor, in expressing his ardent desire for peace, was reported to have added, "*Je serai heureux si on peut trouver une garantie en dehors de l'occupation (de la Bulgarie).*"

Prince Gortschakoff was greatly disappointed at the

failure of the Conference, but he was not entirely without hopes that a reaction might take place at Constantinople, and that wiser counsels might finally prevail. He said to me that Russia would maintain an expectant attitude (*l'arme au bras*). She would not cross the frontier unless circumstances should oblige her to do so. She would calmly await the course which Europe would decide to take.

Prince Gortschakoff further expressed a readiness to take into consideration any reasonable proposals which the Porte might make, with a view to meet the resolutions of the Conference, and provided also that the initiative came from her. The immediate and important point was to prevent the renewal of hostilities against Servia and Montenegro, or to prolong the armistice. This was so far effected that a peace was concluded with Servia, but not with Montenegro. In the meantime the armistice had been prolonged to the 1st of March.

At an interview with Prince Gortschakoff, after he had received intelligence of the failure of the Conference, His Highness inquired whether I had any mark of a blow on my cheek? observing, that he at least had "*une tache rouge—car nous avons tous reçu un soufflet.*"

I replied that I had no sensation of the kind, nor could I view the refusal of the Porte in so serious a light. I observed that we had never intended to present an "ultimatum" to the Porte; the common object of the Conference was that of mediation between

the Porte and the belligerents, and also to submit to the Porte such proposals for reforms in the government of certain provinces of Turkey as would ensure due protection to the Christian populations, and prevent the recurrence of disorders which were a constant menace to the general tranquillity.

Prince Gortschakoff said that he was certainly of opinion that Europe had received an insult which she could not passively accept, and that she ought to defend her honour, and have recourse to coercive measures, but he declared that Russia would not separate from the European concert.

The first diplomatic step taken by Russia after the failure of the Constantinople Conference was a Circular-Despatch, dated January 19th, 1878, by Prince Gortschakoff to the European Courts which had been represented at that Conference. As it is a lengthy document, I will merely give a condensed analysis of it.

Prince Gortschakoff stated that the Imperial Government considered the Eastern question to be an European one, all exclusive and personal considerations having been disclaimed by all the Cabinets, whose object was to induce the Porte to govern her Christian subjects in a just and humane manner.

On the initiative of the British Cabinet, the several Governments agreed upon a basis and guarantees of pacification to be discussed at a Conference to be held at Constantinople. The six Powers, during the preliminary meetings of the Conference, arrived at a complete understanding, both as to the conditions of peace and as to the reforms to be introduced. The result was communicated to the Porte, and met with an obstinate refusal.

The Emperor, before determining on the course to be taken,

was desirous of knowing the intentions of the Cabinets, with whom Russia had till now endeavoured, and still desired, so far as might be possible, to proceed in common.

The refusal of the Turkish Government threatened both the dignity and tranquillity of Europe.

It was necessary for Russia to know what the Cabinets propose to do, with a view of meeting this refusal. The Russian Representatives were requested to seek information in this respect.

No immediate reply was given to this Circular, and Lord Derby was requested to defer his answer until some further explanations were given by the Imperial Government.

In the meantime General Ignatieff, who had been on friendly terms with Lord Salisbury during the Conference, and had been invited by him to Hatfield, was sent (though not officially) to Berlin, Vienna, Paris, and London, to ascertain what course the Governments intended to take under the existing circumstances, and to establish with them a common action to avert war.

There was an evident wish on the part of Prince Gortschakoff to avoid an isolated position for Russia, and the necessity of a single-handed contest with Turkey. He looked, therefore, to the maintenance of the European concert as the only means of extricating her from the advanced position in which she was placed. But after the public speeches of the Emperor in response to the excitement of his people, and after the mobilisation of a large portion of his army, it was difficult for him, however desirous of peace, to demobilise without having obtained some satisfactory result,

assuring an amelioration in the condition of the Christian populations of Turkey.

In order to maintain and record the understanding existing between the great Powers on Eastern affairs, and as a means of preserving the general peace, the Russian Ambassador in London was instructed to propose a Protocol for signature by the six Powers, of which the following is a short analysis:—

It affirmed afresh the common interest which the Powers took in the improvement of the condition of the Christian populations of Turkey, and on the reforms to be introduced into Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria.

It took cognisance of the peace with Servia. As regarded Montenegro, it considered the rectification of the frontiers to be desirable in the interest of a solid peace.

The Protocol further considered the arrangements concluded, or about to be concluded, between the Porte and the two Principalities, as a step towards the pacification which was the object of their wishes.

It invited the Porte to consolidate it by placing its armies on a peace footing, and by putting in hand with the least delay the reforms, the conditions of which were discussed at the Conference.

It recognised that the Porte had declared itself ready to realise an important portion of them.

The Powers proposed to watch carefully, by means of their representatives, the manner in which the promises of the Porte were carried into effect.

If their hopes should again be disappointed, they declared that such a state of things would be incompatible with their interests and those of Europe.

On the several Ambassadors meeting at the Foreign Office to sign the Protocol, Count Schouvaloff made the following declaration:—

If peace with Montenegro is concluded, and the Porte accepts the advice of Europe and shows itself ready to replace its forces on a peace footing, and seriously to undertake the reforms mentioned in the Protocol, let it send to St. Petersburg a special envoy to treat of disarmament, to which His Majesty the Emperor would also on his part consent. If massacres similar to those which have stained Bulgaria with blood take place, this would necessarily put a stop to the measures of demobilisation.

Lord Derby also made the following declaration :—

Inasmuch as it is solely in the interests of European peace that Her Britannic Majesty's Government have consented to sign the Protocol proposed by that of Russia, it is understood beforehand that, in the event of the object proposed not being attained —namely, reciprocal disarmament on the part of Russia and Turkey, and peace between them—the Protocol in question shall be treated as null and void.

Thus a door—and a wide door—was opened to the Porte to reconsider the gravity of her position, of which she might have profited by adopting a conciliatory course, and the more so as, since the failure of the Conference, a change of Ministry had taken place at Constantinople.

The Protocol was communicated to the Porte, and it refused to accept it. This was the closing act to the pacificatory endeavours of Russia conjointly with Europe, and all hopes of averting war were abandoned.

It is difficult to conceive on what grounds the Porte acted in thus resisting the counsels of united Europe. The Turkish Government must have been perfectly aware that there was no hope of their receiving extraneous aid. If the empire had been united in itself, and it

could have counted on the support of an united people, animated by feelings of loyalty to the Sovereign and of patriotism for the country, its course of action might have been intelligible; but with an insurrection in the provinces which it had been unable to master, with the northern provinces yearning for liberation from its rule, and with an empty exchequer, it is inconceivable, except on the grounds of a fanatic fatalism, that the Porte should have placed itself in opposition to united Europe—anxious to extricate it from its fatal position—and that it should have engaged in a war with a great Power in which it could not possibly hope for success. It had forgotten the experiences of the past; it had learnt no wisdom for the future. The Government was corrupt and extravagant; there was no vitality in it. It had neither a Mahmoud nor an Ali Pacha nor a Fuad Pacha to guide its counsels, and it plunged headlong, like Curtius, into an abyss.

I was instructed to ask Prince Gortschakoff whether he had any objection to the publication in the Blue-book to be presented to Parliament of a certain despatch of his on Eastern affairs.

Being unable to call on him, I made the inquiry by note, to which he sent me, in his own handwriting, the following laconic and classical reply, "*Fiat Lux!*" I may here relate another anecdote.

The Emperor had a favourite dog called "Milord," which never left him. We were dining at the palace, and it being a small party (there were only the Imperial Family and Court attendants), we retired after dinner to

the Empress's private apartments. I suddenly heard the Emperor calling "Milord!" and supposed that he was calling for me; but it was his dog that was wanted, to receive the biscuits which His Majesty was in the daily habit of bestowing on his favourite. I immediately hastened to His Majesty and learnt the explanation from the Emperor, who was highly amused by the incident.

At the time His Majesty was seated in an inner saloon (a sort of alcove), and placed near him was a small table, on which were the *Illustrated London News*, *Punch*, and other journals.

It was the number of *Punch* in which a cartoon represented the Sovereigns of Austria, Russia, and Germany at a whist table, the Emperor of Russia holding down his hand with a card. The Emperor put the paper in my hand, and said, "*Expliquez moi cela.*" I felt the difficulty of the explanation, and to collect my thoughts asked to be permitted to study it. After a short time I said—

"Oh, Sire, it is quite clear. The political European position is here represented by a whist party, and your Majesty is represented apparently as hesitating whether to continue the game."

It was a perplexing question, and I felt very much as Daniel may have felt when called upon to explain Nebuchadnezzar's dream!

In those days the Emperor could circulate freely, without danger from Nihilist conspiracies. He passed my house every day on foot with his daughter, followed by his sleigh, to the summer garden, without any

attendant; and it saddens me to think of the dastardly attack which cost him his life, and deprived the nation of a Sovereign devoted to his people, and who had done so much for their welfare and happiness.

I learnt from Prince Gortschakoff on the 11th of April that the Porte had rejected all the proposals of the six Powers—Protocol, declaration, and terms of peace with Montenegro—and His Highness said there was consequently no longer any motive for sending a special envoy to St. Petersburg. The negotiations were at an end, and no further pacificatory steps would be taken by Russia.

The Emperor, accompanied by the Cesarewich, and attended by General Ignatieff, left St. Petersburg for Kischeneff, to inspect the army of operations. A Circular-Despatch was addressed by Prince Gortschakoff on the 19th of April to the great Courts, in which, after stating that all efforts for a conciliatory agreement having failed, by the refusal of the Porte to accept the London Protocol, there remained no alternative but either to allow the state of things to continue which the Powers had declared incompatible with their interests and those of Europe, or else to seek to obtain by coercion what the unanimous efforts of the Cabinets had not succeeded in obtaining from the Porte by persuasion. "Our august master," said Prince Gortschakoff, "has resolved to undertake this work, which His Majesty had invited the great Powers to pursue in common with him.

"He has given his armies the order to cross the frontiers of Turkey."

The Russian Embassy and Consuls were ordered to leave Turkey, and passports were sent to the Turkish Embassy at St. Petersburg.

Lord Derby's reply to this Circular was given in a Despatch addressed to me, dated May 1st, 1877.

He refuted therein the conclusions of Prince Gortschakoff as justifying the war. He refers to the London Protocol, containing the intentions and declarations of the Powers, and states that the consent of the Porte to it was neither asked nor required. He observed that the Porte, while protesting against expressions in the Protocol, as implying an encroachment on the Sultan's sovereignty, again affirmed its intention of carrying into execution the reforms already promised. Nor did the answer of the Porte necessarily preclude the possibility of the conclusion of peace with Montenegro, or the arrangement of mutual disarmament. With patience and moderation on both sides these objects might have been obtained.

Nor could it be expected that Her Majesty's Government should agree in the conviction that the decision of the Emperor to undertake the task of coercion was in accordance with the sentiments and interests of Europe. They cannot believe that the entrance of Russian armies on Turkish soil would alleviate the difficulty, or improve the condition of the Christian populations throughout the Sultan's dominions.

But the course on which the Russian Government has entered involves graver considerations. It is in contravention of the Treaty of Paris, by which Russia, with the other Powers, engaged to respect the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In 1871 the Russian Plenipotentiary, with the other Powers, signed a declaration affirming it to be "an essential principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting parties by means of an amicable arrangement."

In taking action against Turkey on his own part, and

having recourse to arms without further consultation with his allies, the Emperor of Russia has separated himself from the European concert hitherto maintained, and has, at the same time, departed from the rule to which he himself had solemnly recorded his consent.

It is impossible to foresee the consequences of such an act. Her Majesty's Government would willingly have refrained from making any observations in regard to it; but as Prince Gortschakoff seems to assume, in a declaration addressed to all the Governments of Europe, that Russia is acting in the interests of Great Britain and that of the other Powers, they feel bound to state, in a manner equally formal and public, that the decision of the Russian Government is not one which can have their concurrence or approval.*

Thus, after all the months of conciliatory negotiations, the ruthless hand of war was resorted to for the arrangement of difficulties which might, with patience, have been pacifically brought about by the united efforts of Europe. It is easy to unsheath the sword, but it is difficult to foresee under what circumstances it may return to the scabbard. There are always hopeful visions at the commencement of a war, but the dangerous complications which may intervene are left out of reckoning. The fear was that the unfurling of the "Mantle of Mahomet," and of the "Garments of the Holy Serge," would inflame the religious spirit of both sides, and thus give rise to a fanaticism which neither party could control.

Prince Gortschakoff stated to me, on my referring to the possibility of an European mediation, that it was too late, as the Russian troops, if not already

* *See* Parliamentary Papers, No. 18, 1877.

in movement, were on the eve of marching. He considered the Turkish Circular, in answer to the Protocol, as a rebuff to Europe and as a declaration of war. With regard to an appeal to the eighth Article of the Treaty of Paris in 1856, he observed that it had been already exhausted by the Protocol of London, in which the continued efforts of Europe for peace were recorded, and which had been haughtily rejected by the Porte. In short, said His Highness, "the moment for action had come; the time for subterfuges and phraseology had passed."

Contemporaneously with the Circular-Despatch of Prince Gortschakoff, dated April 19th, to which I have referred, a manifesto of the Emperor to his army was published, which, after expressing his solicitude for the amelioration of the condition of the Christian populations of Turkey, and referring to the efforts he had made in concert with the European Powers to effect it, stated that he was forced, by the haughty obstinacy of the Porte, to have recourse to more decisive measures.

His Majesty, in referring to the declaration previously made by him of acting independently if necessary, considered that the moment had now arrived for that action, and, consequently, had ordered his army to cross the Turkish frontier.

In conformity with my instructions, I read to Prince Gortschakoff, and left with him, a copy of Lord Derby's reply (of which I have given an analysis) to his Circular-Despatch announcing the orders of

the Emperor to his army to cross the Turkish frontier.

When I had finished the reading of the Despatch, Prince Gortschakoff said that he was anxious to avoid a polemical discussion, which could lead to no good result, and it was not his intention, unless the Emperor should order otherwise, to make any rejoinder. His Highness made no further observation, and received the communication with his usual calmness and in no unfriendly mood.

At the request of the Turkish Government, Her Majesty's Government consented to take charge of Turkish subjects in Russia during the war. I was, therefore, instructed to undertake this charge, having previously obtained the assent of the Imperial Government. It was rather a responsible duty, particularly as no Turkish funds were provided for their assistance or repatriation.

CHAPTER X.

Correspondence between Lord Derby and Prince Gortschakoff in regard to British Interests during the War—Satisfactory Reply of Prince Gortschakoff—Departure of Emperor for Seat of War, and of Prince Gortschakoff for Bucharest—Invitation to a "Te Deum" in Commemoration of Battle of Navarino Declined—Military Operations—Guards ordered to Seat of War—Plevna—Russians Repulsed in Three Attacks—Prince of Roumania joins Russians with his Army—General Todleben Summoned—Fall of Plevna on December 10th—Russian Successes in Asia—Kars Taken—Erzeroum Invested—Servia Declares War against Turkey—The Porte asks, through Her Majesty's Government, for Peace—Emperor will entertain Proposals if addressed Direct by the Porte to Russian Commanders-in-Chief in Europe and Asia—Preliminaries and Armistice Signed end of January, 1878—War Ended, but Russian Army continues its March—British Fleet Ordered to Constantinople—Death of Grand Duke Serge—Correspondence with Baron Jomini.

On the declaration of war by the Imperial Government, and with the view of maintaining the good understanding between Great Britain and Russia during its continuance, Lord Derby addressed a letter to Count Schouvaloff, the Russian Ambassador (who was on the eve of leaving for St. Petersburg), in regard to considerations of importance affecting British interests in the East which might be endangered in the course of events during the war.

In this letter, dated May 6th, 1877, Lord Derby stated that he did not enter on the question of the justice or necessity of the war: he had already expressed the views of Her Majesty's Government with regard to it.

Further discussion (he said) would be unavailing, and they have lost no time in issuing a Proclamation of Neutrality. . . . Should the war unfortunately spread, interests may be imperilled which they are equally bound and determined to defend; and it was desirable to make it clear, so far as at the outset of the war it could be done, what the most prominent of those interests were.

Foremost is the necessity of keeping open, uninjured and uninterrupted, the Suez Canal. An attempt to blockade or otherwise interfere with the canal or its approaches would be regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a menace to India, and as a grave injury to the commerce of the world. On both these grounds any such step would be inconsistent with the maintenance by them of an attitude of passive neutrality.

The mercantile and financial interests of European nations are also so largely involved in Egypt that an attack on that country, or its occupation, even temporarily, for purposes of war, could scarcely be regarded with unconcern by neutral Powers—certainly not by England.

The vast importance of Constantinople, whether in a military, a political, or a commercial point of view, is too well understood to require explanation. It is, therefore, scarcely necessary to point out that Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to witness with indifference the passing into other hands than those of its present possessors of a capital holding so peculiar and commanding a position.

The existing arrangements, made under European sanction, which regulate the navigation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles appear to them wise and salutary, and there would be, in their judgment, serious objections to their alteration in any material particular.

Her Majesty's Government have thought it right thus frankly to indicate their views. The course of events might show that there were still other interests—as, for instance, on the Persian Gulf—which it would be their duty to protect; but they do not doubt that they will have sufficiently pointed out

the limits within which they hope that the war may be confined, or at all events within which they themselves would be prepared, so far as present circumstances allow of an opinion being formed, to maintain a policy of abstention and neutrality.

They feel confident that the Emperor of Russia will appreciate their desire to make their policy understood at the outset of the war, and thus to respond to the assurances given by His Imperial Majesty at Livadia, and published at your Excellency's request, where he pledged his word of honour that he had no intention of acquiring Constantinople, and that if necessity should oblige him to occupy a portion of Bulgaria, it would only be provisionally, and until the peace and safety of the Christian populations were assured.

Such were the British interests in the East (or, as Count Schouvaloff termed them to me, "the Breetish Torpedoes") which might be seriously affected by the course of events during the war, and which would influence the policy of Her Majesty's Government during that war.

At an interview with Prince Gortschakoff on the 21st of May I referred to the above letter of Lord Derby, which had been some days previously delivered to him by Count Schouvaloff. His Highness requested me to inform Lord Derby by telegraph that the Emperor fully appreciated the frankness of the explanations of the views of Her Majesty's Government therein contained (his words were: "*L'Empereur sait gré à Lord Derby pour la franchise avec laquelle, il a exposé les vues du Gouvernement de la Reine*"), and that the Imperial Government would evince the same frankness in the answer which was being prepared, and of which Count Schouvaloff would be the bearer. He added that Count

Schouvaloff would leave for London five or six days after the departure of the Emperor for the headquarters of his army in Roumania, which would be on the 2nd of June. I here observed that the delay in the receipt by Her Majesty's Government of the reply to Lord Derby's letter appeared to me somewhat long, inasmuch as important British interests were at stake. The Prince replied that Count Schouvaloff was now entirely occupied with bringing to a satisfactory issue the important questions referred to in Lord Derby's letter, adding: "*C'est le meilleur avocat que vous puissiez avoir.*"

The following is an analysis of the reply of Prince Gortschakoff to Lord Derby's letter, dated St. Petersburg, May $\frac{18}{30}$, 1877:—

Prince Gortschakoff stated that the Emperor had perused Lord Derby's letter with deep interest, and appreciated the frankness of its explanation; and he was instructed to reply to it with complete reciprocity, both on the points raised by Lord Derby and on those that affected interests which His Imperial Majesty was bound to protect.

The Imperial Cabinet would neither blockade, nor interrupt, nor in any way menace the navigation of the Suez Canal. They considered the canal as an international work, in which the commerce of the world was interested, and which should be kept free from any attack.

Egypt was a part of the Ottoman Empire, and its contingents figured in the Turkish army. Russia might, therefore, consider herself as at war with Egypt. Nevertheless, the Imperial Cabinet did not overlook either the European interests engaged in that country or those of England in particular. They would not bring Egypt within the radius of their military operations.

As far as concerned Constantinople, without being able to

prejudge the course or issue of the war, the Imperial Cabinet repeated that the acquisition of that capital was excluded from the views of His Majesty the Emperor. They recognised that, in any case, the future of Constantinople was a question of common interest, which could not be settled otherwise than by a general understanding, and that, if the possession of that city were to be put in question, it could not be allowed to belong to any of the European Powers.

As regards the Straits, although the two shores belonged to the same sovereign, they formed the only outlet of two seas in which all the world had interests. It was, therefore, important, in the interests of peace and of the general balance of power, that this question should be settled by a common agreement on equitable and efficiently guaranteed bases.

Lord Derby had alluded to other British interests which might be affected by the eventual extension of the war, such as the Persian Gulf and the route to India. The Imperial Cabinet declared that it would not extend the war beyond what was required for the clearly declared object for which His Majesty the Emperor was obliged to take up arms. They would respect the British interests mentioned by Lord Derby as long as England remained neutral.

They had a right to expect that the English Government would, on their side, in like manner take into fair consideration the particular interests which Russia had at stake in this war, and in view of which she had imposed such great sacrifices on herself.

These consisted in the absolute necessity of putting an end to the deplorable condition of the Christians under Turkish rule, and to the chronic state of disturbance provoked by it.

This state of things excited in Russia an agitation, caused by the Christian feeling so profound in the Russian people, and by the ties of faith and race which united them to a great part of the Christian population of Turkey. The Imperial Government was the more obliged to take account of this, since it reacted both on the internal and external situation of the empire.

At each of these crises the policy of Russia was suspected and accused, and her international relations, her commerce, her finances, and her credit were affected. His Majesty the Emperor could not leave Russia indefinitely exposed to these disastrous accidents, which checked her peaceful development and caused her incalculable injury.

The Imperial Cabinet endeavoured to attain the desired end, with the co-operation of the friendly and allied Powers.

Forced now to pursue it alone, our august master was resolved not to lay down his arms without having completely, surely, and effectually guaranteed it.

Count Schouvaloff was desired to lay these views before Lord Derby, stating to him that the Imperial Cabinet had a right to hope that the Government of Her Britannic Majesty would appreciate them with the same spirit of fairness that induced Russia to respect the interests of England, and that they would draw from them the same conclusion as that held by the Imperial Cabinet—namely, that there was nothing in the views which had been exchanged with reciprocal frankness between the two Governments which could not be reconciled so as to maintain their amicable relations and the peace of the East and of Europe.

The foregoing summary of the reply of Prince Gortschakoff to Lord Derby's letter, and the frank and conciliatory tone in which the views of the Imperial Cabinet were conveyed, were very satisfactory. There was one doubtful point which related to the navigation of the Dardanelles, and on which a divergence of views might exist between the two Governments; but even on this point Prince Gortschakoff stated "that this question should be settled by a common agreement on equitable and efficiently guaranteed bases."

To me it appears that the closing of the Dardanelles

to ships of war is one of dubious utility. It gives to the Black Sea the character of a *mare clausum*. It prevents the "egress" of Russian ships of war, but it also prevents the "ingress" of foreign ships of war, thus securing Russia against attack on the coasts of the Black Sea if engaged in war with a naval Power. The fortifications on both sides of the Straits should be razed, and the highway between the two seas should be open to the flags of all nations. A day will come when Constantinople will be a free port—the centre of commerce between the East and West.

The Emperor, accompanied by the Cesarewich and the Grand Duke Serge, left St. Petersburg on June 3rd for Ploesti, in Roumania, the temporary headquarters of the Russian army.

Prince Gortschakoff, accompanied by Baron Jomini, M. Hamburger, and a large staff of the Foreign Ministerial Department, left on the same day to take up his quarters at Bucharest, so as to be in the vicinity of the headquarters of the army. Prince Gortschakoff said that, although at his great age the fatigue would be very trying to him, he could not, under the present grave circumstances, hesitate in obeying the wishes of his sovereign.

I received on the 18th of October an invitation from Admiral Lessoffsky, Minister of Marine, to attend a "Te Deum" in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Navarino.

In recollection of a circular of the Earl of Clarendon in 1854, instructing Her Majesty's Embassies and

Legations to abstain from attending "Te Deums" or other religious services in honour of victories, unless under exceptional circumstances, I thought it my duty to excuse my attendance on that occasion, courteously informing the Admiral that my general instructions precluded me from attending. It was rather a curious incident that at the moment when Russia was at war with Turkey a naval victory over the Turkish fleet half a century earlier should be brought into recollection and celebrated with a "Te Deum."

As I have already said in these pages, it is not within my province nor within my competency to give the details of military operations. I will, therefore, only cursorily refer to military events and the political results arising from them.

No doubt could be entertained of the issue of the war, if localised. At the outbreak there were four Russian corps d'armée assembled on the Turkish frontier, and apart from the two corps constituting the "Army of the Black Sea," three more corps were called out to swell the field army in May.

The command-in-chief was vested in the Grand Duke Nicholas. One corps d'armée, under the command of General Zimmermann, was to operate on the left, crossing the Lower Danube at Braila and marching into the Dobrudscha. The main army, composed at first of four corps d'armée under the Grand Duke Nicholas, crossed the Danube at Simnitza on June 27th, and a large detachment, under General Gourko, was to cross the Balkans and operate beyond the mountains.

Two corps d'armée were temporarily left in Roumania as a reserve.

The passage of the Danube was but feebly opposed, and the Imperial armies slowly extended themselves over Northern Bulgaria between the Lom and the Osma. General Gourko advanced within a day's march of Adrianople, but had to recross the Balkans, and Nicopolis was taken by General Krüdener.

But the Russian tactics were very defective. The chiefs underrated their enemy, and their forces found themselves obliged to fall back on their supports. In their careless advance, without the necessary military precautions, they allowed Osman Pacha, with an army of some 45,000 men, to evade them and to occupy the heights and town of Plevna, between Nicopolis and Lovtacha, where he quickly entrenched himself strongly in a very formidable position.

The Russians recklessly attacked this position of Osman while it was yet weak, but were repulsed with severe loss. It was again attacked by the Russians on the 30th of July, when considerably strengthened, only to be again beaten back with great losses. The Shipka Pass was also the scene of a severe, long-continued struggle. The Turks in superior force, under Suleiman Pacha, attacked the Russian troops, under General Darozenski, and later under General Radetski, in greater strength. The losses on both sides were very large, but after a prolonged and severe contest the Russians finally maintained their possession of the pass.

Large reinforcements were called up to the Russian

army, and the Guards at St. Petersburg were ordered to the seat of war; but, as the situation was imminently critical, the Emperor had to seek immediate aid from Roumania before renewing the attack against Plevna. This was granted by Prince Charles of Roumania, who reached Plevna with his army in time to save the Russian position. A third attack was made on Plevna by the Russian and Roumanian troops, which lasted from the 5th to the 11th of September, ending in the capture, after a desperate struggle, of the Grivitza Redoubt. General Skobeleff also took one of the Turkish positions, but was unable to produce any effect on the Turkish central fortress. The Russian loss was very heavy. On the close of the five days' fighting the Russians were repulsed everywhere except at Grivitza, which they continued to hold.

At St. Petersburg these three defeats of the Russians caused a great outcry against the Russian military administration, the chief blame being attributed to the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Commander-in-Chief.

In this emergency General Todleben, whose military genius had been so notably exemplified at Sevastopol, was sent for. He at first represented the difficulty of abandoning his military post at St. Petersburg, but on a pressing requisition from the Emperor he obeyed his Sovereign's command. He had been somewhat annoyed at receiving no offer of a command in the active army under the Grand Duke Nicholas, and the public were also surprised at his being passed over—a slight which, it

was said, was owing to some private or personal motives on the part of the Grand Duke.

The fact was that Plevna had never been completely invested, and thus Osman Pacha had been able to receive reinforcements and provisions. Todleben immediately closed the gap in the investment, and determined to reduce the entrenched camp by a regular siege. His plan completely succeeded; and on the 10th of December, after a last desperate effort to cut through, Osman Pacha surrendered, having for five months held his position against the combined forces of the Russian Empire.

The army under Suleiman Pacha was completely routed and dispersed on the 17th of January, and on the 20th of January Adrianople was reached and occupied by the Russians. The march to Constantinople was now open to them, and no means of resistance remained on the part of the Porte.

In Asia also the Turkish armies, after their first successes, had been repulsed, and the Russians, having captured Kars, were besieging Erzeroum, the outworks of which were in their hands.

Servia—having an eye to the participation of future benefits on the conclusion of peace—now declared war against Turkey, and Montenegro had during the war been successful in gaining possession of fresh territory. In short, the Porte was at last convinced that the continuation of the struggle was hopeless, and if continued would inevitably lead to the ruin and dissolution of the empire. After failing to invoke the mediation of the Powers the

Sultan requested Her Majesty's Government to use their good offices with the Emperor for peace. The Czar expressed his readiness to entertain peace overtures if direct proposals were made by the Porte to the Commanders-in-Chief in Europe and Asia. On the 14th of January Turkish Commissioners were despatched with instructions to negotiate the preliminaries of peace and to ask for an armistice.

There was some delay, as the Grand Duke, who was at Kezanlik, requested the Commissioners to accompany him to Adrianople, where the armistice was only agreed to at the close of January, when the preliminaries of peace were signed. The war was thus virtually over, but the Russians continued their march till they were within thirty miles of Constantinople, which they were entitled to do.

This caused great alarm in England, for it was felt that a Russian occupation of Constantinople by a victorious army—which it might be difficult to restrain, notwithstanding the assurances of the Emperor—would lead to serious consequences. Under these circumstances Her Majesty's Government ordered the British fleet, under Sir Phipps Hornby, to Constantinople for the protection of British subjects, and Parliament voted by a large majority six millions sterling for armaments.

The anti-English feeling at St. Petersburg became intense, and my position was not one of "velvet"; but I was careful not to allow a word of menace, which could give offence or cause irritation, to drop. I was left to the exercise of my own judgment in regard to any

opinion I might express. I cautiously said to my intimate friends—in the way of friendship, and not of menace (knowing that it would be repeated at headquarters)—"*N'allez pas à Constantinople—c'est la guerre.*" I was told afterwards that the Grand Duke Nicholas was greatly disappointed at receiving stringent orders from the Emperor not to enter Constantinople, so that my warning was not without effect; but I believe that the Emperor and Prince Gortschakoff were fully convinced that had the Russians entered Constantinople there would have been a frightful carnage, the result of which would have led to the ruin and dissolution of the Turkish Empire in Europe, which, Prince Gortschakoff often told me, was not desired by the Imperial Government, and, should it occur, would be a serious embarrassment to them.

The Duke Serge, of Leuchtenburg, third son of the Grand Duchess Marie Nicolaievna, daughter of the Emperor Nicholas, was shot on the 24th of October in a reconnaissance on the Lom, and within sight of the Grand Duke Vladimir, on whose staff he was serving. He was a fine, promising officer, and was extremely popular in the army and in all ranks of society, and his early death caused a general gloom at St. Petersburg.

As then acting-doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, I addressed a note to M. de Giers in their name, requesting His Excellency to submit our respectful condolence to the Emperor and Empress of Russia on the death of the Grand Duke on the field of battle. The mortal

remains were conveyed to St. Petersburg, and were deposited with great solemnity in the Imperial vault of the Cathedral of SS. Peter and Paul, in the fortress, on the 5th of November.

The ceremony was attended by the Empress, the Cesarevna, and all the members of the Imperial family then at St. Petersburg, as also by the Foreign Ambassadors and Ministers.

Towards the close of September, 1877, I received a letter of considerable interest from Baron Jomini, the Chief Counsellor in the Imperial Foreign Office, the personal friend and right hand of Prince Gortschakoff. He was extremely clever, very agreeable, with pleasing manners, and the most able writer on Prince Gortschakoff's staff. I had been on intimate terms with him, and thoroughly appreciated his agreeable society.

He was of Swiss extraction and the son of General Jomini, who in early life had entered the Russian service, and was a distinguished officer. He was the author of a work of high European repute on military strategy.

Baron Jomini's letter was addressed to me from Bucharest, where he was in attendance on Prince Gortschakoff at the commencement of the war, and his letter was written on the 20th of September, under the influence of the serious defeats of the Russian army before Plevna, which held out against it till the following December. This will account, in some measure, for the bitterness of some of his observations. The Russian troops fought valiantly, and were bravely led by their officers. Their misfortunes were mainly due

to the want of strategic capacity of the Commander-in-Chief and his advisers on his personal staff.

The following are copies of my correspondence with Baron Jomini, which will interest my readers :—

Copie de la Lettre addressée par Son Excellence le Baron Jomini à Lord A. Loftus.

BUCAREST, 20 *Sept.*, 1877.

MONSIEUR L'AMBASSADEUR,—Ma femme m'a transmis les bonnes paroles dont vous l'avez chargée pour moi, et j'y ai été très sensible. Je dois toutefois repousser certains reproches que vous me faites, et que je ne voudrais pas laisser subsister dans votre esprit. D'abord, celui d'avoir voulu écarter l'Angleterre de la question d'Orient en nous concertant avec nos deux voisins. J'avoue que je ne comprends pas qu'une pareille idée ait pû entrer un instant dans l'esprit de vos Ministres, et qu'une grande et puissante nation comme l'Angleterre puisse se laisser aller à d'aussi puériles susceptibilités. Il faudrait nous supposer une dose d'inintelligence exceptionelle pour croire que nous ayons songé à régler sans l'Angleterre une question qui, par l'histoire, la

Translation of Letter from His Excellency Baron Jomini to Lord A. Loftus.

BUCHAREST, 20*th September*, 1877.

MONSIEUR L'AMBASSADEUR,—My wife has transmitted to me the kind words with which you charged her for me, and for which I am very grateful. I must, however, regret certain reproaches that you make me, and which I should not wish to exist in your mind. First, that of having wished to eliminate England from the Eastern question by concerting with our two neighbours. I own I do not understand how such an idea could have entered the minds of your Ministers for one instant, and how a great and powerful nation like England could have allowed itself to entertain such puerile susceptibilities. It supposes us to suffer from an exceptional lack of intelligence to believe that we dreamt of settling without England a question which, by history, geography, and the interests involved, is so evidently European, and consequently also English. On the contrary, in

géographie, et les intérêts engagés, est évidemment Européenne et par conséquent aussi Anglaise. Tout au contraire, en prenant le chemin de Vienne avant d'arriver à Londres, nous avons cru donner un témoignage de notre déférence pour l'Angleterre, et de notre désir de nous mettre d'accord avec elle.

En effet, l'Autriche a toujours été l'alliée de l'Angleterre dans la question d'Orient, et les intérêts Autrichiens ont toujours été pris en considération à Londres, tandis qu'ils ont toujours été une pierre d'achoppement entre l'Europe et la Russie. Par conséquent, nous avons pensé que si nous trouvions un terrain d'entente entre l'Autriche et nous, ce serait le meilleur chemin pour arriver à un accord général. Car il était bien évident que du moment où l'Autriche et la Russie s'entendraient entre elles, on ne pouvait rien supposer de contraire aux intérêts généraux de l'Europe. Toute arrière pensée exclusive de l'une ou l'autre de ces deux Puissances devant nécessairement rencontrer l'opposition de l'autre.

Ce terrain d'accord a été cherché sincèrement et laborieusement; il a été trouvé, et nous ne doutions pas un moment que l'Angleterre s'y placerait avec empressement.

taking the road to Vienna before arriving in London, we thought of giving proof of our deference to England, and of our desire to act in accord with her.

In fact, Austria has always been the ally of England in the Eastern question, and the interests of Austria have always been taken into consideration in London, whilst they have always been a stumbling-block between Europe and Russia. Consequently, we thought if we should find a basis of agreement between Austria and us, it would be the best way to attain a general agreement; for it was very evident that, from the moment when Austria and Russia came to an agreement between themselves, one could not imagine anything contrary to the general interests of Europe. Any exclusive *arrière pensée* on the part of one or other of these two Powers would necessarily encounter the opposition of the other.

This basis of understanding was sought for sincerely and laboriously; it was found, and we doubted not for a moment that England would eagerly join in it.

Now you know what took place. All the efforts for a common understanding failed because of your opposition; yet, nevertheless, the part which had been assigned to you was important enough, when the Chancellor

Or vous savez ce qui est advenu. Tous les efforts d'entente commune ont échoué devant votre opposition, et cependant la part qui vous était faite était assez belle puisqu'à Berlin, le Prince Chancelier avait proposé comme mésure d'exécution, des démonstrations navales où le premier rôle devait nécessairement revenir à l'Angleterre.

Il n'est guère possible aujourd'hui de douter que cette marche suivie avec union et fermeté n'aurait atteint le but et prévenu cette effroyable lutte. Vous ne l'avez pas voulu. Un de vos Ministres a prononcé une parole terrible—une parole qui le marquera d'une tache indélébile au jour du jugement suprème, comme la goutte du sang d'Abel au front de Cain. Il a dit, "Il faut une saignée." La saignée a eu lieu, elle est assez abondante pour satisfaire les plus avides! Que tout ce sang retombe sur ceux qui l'ont fait verser!

Je comprends que vous déploriez ces horreurs. Vous pouvez croire que nous qui en souffrons le plus, nous en souhaitons ardemment la fin. Mais je crains qu'en appréciant nos pertes, vous ne vous fassiez, comme tous vos compatriotes, une fausse idée du peuple Russe.

proposed at Berlin some naval demonstrations as a measure of execution, of which the chief part would necessarily devolve upon England.

It is hardly possible to doubt to-day that this plan, followed with union and firmness, would have attained its aim and prevented this frightful contest. But you were not willing. One of your Ministers pronounced a terrible word—a word which will mark him with an indelible stain on the day of Supreme Judgment, as the drop of Abel's blood on the forehead of Cain. He said, "There must be a bleeding." That bleeding has taken place, and it has been copious enough to satisfy the most rapacious! May all that blood recoil on those who caused it to be shed!

I can understand that you deplore these horrors. You may well believe that we, who suffer the most, ardently wish for their end. But I fear that in appreciating our losses you are, like all your countrymen, entertaining a false idea of the Russian people.

Certainly, we own that we have badly managed this war; we were ill-prepared for it, it was badly conceived and badly conducted. But we need not blush at this. It proves once more that Russia is not bellicose, nor is her Emperor either.

Certes, nous reconnaissons que nous avons mal fait cette guerre; nous y étions mal préparés, et elle a été mal conçue et mal menée.

Mais nous n'en avons pas à en rougir. Cela prouve une fois de plus que la Russie n'est pas belliqueuse et son Empereur non plus. En bonne logique l'Europe devrait en conclure à l'absurdité des vues ambitieuses et conquérantes qu'on nous attribue complaisamment. Un peuple qui a de pareilles visées fait comme la Prusse; il se prépare en silence, accumule des forces inconnues, attend son heure—fût-ce pendant cinquante ans—et le moment venu, écrase et brise tout.

On peut bien voir que nous avons fait juste le contraire. Nous nous laissons guider par le sentiment plus que par le calcul. C'est vrai, et peut-être est-ce un défaut au point de vue pratique; mais j'ose dire que c'est plûtot honorable.

Cette guerre a été une guerre de sentiment plus que de raison. Mais ces entraînements qui en pratique peuvent être une cause d'infériorité, sont moralement une force invincible. Ils reposent sur des convictions profondes qui donnent la résignation aux revers, comme un effet de la volonté divine—une patience à toute épreuve et une persévérance qui finit par

Logically speaking, Europe ought to infer from it the absurdity of those ambitious and conquering designs which are complacently attributed to us. A people that has such aims acts as Prussia has done; it prepares itself in silence, accumulates unknown forces, awaits its hour—be it even for fifty years—and, when the moment comes, crushes and annihilates everything.

It is easy to be seen that we have acted exactly to the contrary. We have permitted ourselves to be guided by sentiment more than by calculation. It is true, and perhaps it is a fault from a practical point of view; but I should say it is rather honourable.

This war has been a war of sentiment more than of reason. But these impulses, which practically may be a cause of inferiority, are morally an invincible power. They rest on deep convictions, which give resignation under defeat, as an influence of the Divine will—a consummate patience and a perseverance which ends in triumphant success. The whole history of Russia lies in these defects and these qualities, and she will remain true to them even in this terrible crisis. Permit me to tell you that if in England a more correct idea had been formed, you would from the commencement have been less prompt in suspecting us of ambitious views,

triompher de tout. Toute l'Histoire de la Russie est dans ces défauts et dans ces qualités. Elle y restera fidèle dans cette crise terrible. Permettez-moi de vous dire que si chez vous on s'en rendait mieux compte on aurait été, au début, moins prompt à nous soupçonner de vues ambitieuses, on serait aujourd'hui moins enclin à escompter nos revers et à s'en réjouir au point de vue des fameux intérêts Anglais.

Bien plus, on se serait peut-être fait une autre idée de ces fameux intérêts Anglais; on les aurait placés moins dans le soutien immoral et inhumain de l'infame régime Turc, que dans l'appui à donner à cette bonne et pacifique nation Russe de laquelle l'Empereur Nicolas a pû dire, en communiquant à son fils l'exposé de ses vingt-cinq ans de règne: "J'ai travaillé à te léguer une Russie forte et prospère pour son bien et pour le mal de personne."

Vous qui avez appris à nous connaître, milord, travaillez à faire pénétrer ces idées chez vous, et vous aurez rendu service aux deux pays, et j'ose le dire, à l'humanité dont tous deux font partie.

Veuillez me mettre au pieds de Madame et conservez moi votre amitié.

(Signed) N. JOMINI.

and you would now be less inclined to take account of our defeats and to rejoice in them as regards the famous "British interests."

Nay more, one might, perhaps, have formed a different idea of these famous British interests. One might have regarded them as pivoting less on the immoral and inhuman maintenance of that infamous Turkish administration than on the support to be given to that good and pacific Russian nation of which the Emperor Nicholas could say, in communicating to his son the account of his twenty-five years of reign, "I have laboured in order to be able to bequeath to you a powerful and prosperous Russia, for its own benefit and to the injury of no one."

You who have learnt to know us, my Lord, endeavour to let these ideas penetrate into the minds of your people, and you will have rendered a service to both countries, and, I venture to say, to humanity, of which both form part.

Etc. Etc. Etc.

(Signed) N. JOMINI.

This was a letter which I could not leave unanswered, and I accordingly addressed a letter to him in reply in a conciliatory tone, with the same frankness with which he had addressed me, in refutation of his arguments and his logic. The following is a copy. It was written in French, and not translated from English; but I have thought it right for my readers to give an English translation of both.

BRITISH EMBASSY, ST. PETERSBURG,
le 3 *Novembre*, 1877.

MON CHER BARON,—Votre aimable lettre (moins les reproches) m'a fait un véritable plaisir, la regardant comme une preuve de votre amitié, à laquelle j'attache un haut prix. Je dois, d'abords, désabuser votre esprit des reproches que vous me faites. Au lieu de vous accuser de vouloir écarter l'Angleterre de la question d'Orient j'ai toujours soutenu le contraire, car je savais qu'en 1875 c'était l'Empereur spécialement qui a désiré le concert Européen. Si le Mémorandum de Berlin a été rédigé sans le concours des autres Puissances, ce n'était pas certainement sur l'initiative de

Copy of Reply to Baron Jomini.

BRITISH EMBASSY, ST. PETERSBURG,
November 3, 1877.

MON CHER BARON,—Your amiable letter (minus the reproaches) afforded me a true pleasure, regarding it as a proof of your friendship, to which I attach a high value. I must, firstly, undeceive your mind as to the reproaches that you make to me. Instead of accusing you of wishing to eliminate England from the Eastern question, I have always maintained the contrary, as I knew that in 1875 it was the Emperor especially who desired the European concert. If the Memorandum of Berlin was drawn up without the concurrence of the other Powers, it was certainly not on the initiative of your Chancellor. You are in error in attributing the rejection of the Memorandum to puerile susceptibilities on the part of England. The fact is that the document was vague in its idea and impracticable in its

votre Prince Chancelier. Vous êtes en erreur en attribuant le rejet de ce Mémorandum à "des susceptibilités puériles de l'Angleterre." Le fait est que ce document était vague dans ses idées et peu pratique quant à leur exécution. Il faisait aussi entrevoir l'éventualité d'une coercition à laquelle nous étions opposés par des motifs de justice et d'une sage politique. Je ne partage point votre opinion que cette marche suivie avec union et fermeté aurait prévenu cette effroyable lutte. Elle aurait eu pour unique résultat de nous rendre solidaire avec vous, votre accomplice dans une guerre que nous désapprouvons et que nous déplorons. Il se peut que vous vous laissez guider en Russie plutôt par le sentiment que par le calcul; mais ne blamez pas ceux qui agissent avec plus de raison et de réflexion. Je reconnais les belles et nobles qualités que vous réclamez pour la nation Russe; mais ne cherchez pas à mettre la responsabilité de cette guerre sur les épaules d'autrui. Elle appartient uniquement à la Russie; c'est elle qui s'est séparée du concert Européen—c'est elle seule de toutes les Puissances qui a voulu recourir aux armes pour un but qui aurait été atteint par les voies pacifiques.

execution. The eventuality of a coercion was also foreseen, to which we were opposed by motives of justice and a wise policy. I do not partake of your opinion that that plan, followed with union and firmness, would have prevented this dreadful contest. Its sole result would have been to render us bound to you—your accomplice in a war which we disapprove and deplore. It may be that you in Russia allow yourselves to be guided rather by sentiment than by calculation; but do not blame those who act with more reason and reflection. I recognise the good and noble qualities which you claim for the Russian nation; but do not try to put the responsibility of this war upon the shoulders of others. It belongs exclusively to Russia. It is she who has separated herself from the European concert. It is she alone of all the Powers who chose to resort to arms for an aim which would have been attained by pacific means.

You will recollect the remark I addressed to the Chancellor in your presence—"that we were all embarked in the same boat; that he was in very good company, and ought not to separate himself from us."

The apocryphal observation which you quote of one of our Ministers, and which you denounce with a "biblical" ardour, was not at all the expres-

Vous vous rappelez l'observation que j'ai adressée au Chancelier dans votre présence, " que nous étions tous embarqués dans le même bateau ; qu'il était en très bonne compagnie et ne devait pas se séparer de nous."

La prétendue parole que vous citez d'un de nos Ministres, et que vous dénoncez avec une ardeur " biblique," n'était point l'expression d'un vœu, mais d'un profond regret de voir échouer par ceux qui voulaient et qui poussaient à la guerre—tout son espoir, tous ses efforts pour le maintien de la paix.

Maintenant, cher Baron, je finis avec ma défense contre vos reproches. Le passé est irrévocable, abordons le présent et l'avenir. Il est temps que cette effroyable effusion de sang cesse, avec les souffrances et les misères qui en résultent. L'humanité —le devoir de l'homme—le bien-être de tous, le demandent.

Une crise est à la porte dont le résultat, je ne doute pas, sera de nature à satisfaire à toutes les exigences de l'honneur militaire, et qui devrait par conséquent fournir une occasion propice pour mettre fin à une guerre, dont la durée pourrait exposer l'Europe à des dangers incalculables. Je suis convaincu que l'Empereur, dont la disposition pacifique est parfaitement

sion of a wish, but of a profound regret to see all his hopes—all his efforts for the maintenance of peace—frustrated by those who desired and urged war.

Now, my dear Baron, I terminate my defence against your reproaches. The past is irrevocable. Let us enter on the present and the future. It is time that this frightful effusion of blood should cease, with the sufferings and miseries which result from it. Humanity—the duty of man—the welfare of all demand it. A crisis is at hand, the result of which, I doubt not, will be of such a nature as to satisfy all the exigencies of military honour, and which consequently ought to afford a propitious opportunity to terminate a war, the duration of which might expose Europe to incalculable danger. I am convinced that the Emperor, whose pacific disposition is perfectly acknowledged, demands nothing better, and that His Majesty, who never wished for this war, will be glad to be able to terminate it with honour to his country. The absence of ambitious views on the part of Russia, as you say, ought greatly to facilitate the work of peace, for everyone is interested in aiding her efforts to attain it.

The interest which I take in Russia and my devotion to your Emperor make me hope that this dreadful contest is approaching its end, and that

reconnue, ne demande pas mieux, et que sa Majesté qui n'a jamais voulu cette guerre sera heureuse de pouvoir la terminer avec honneur pour son pays. L'absence de vues ambitieuses de la part de la Russie, comme vous le dites, doit grandement faciliter l'œuvre de la paix, car tout le monde a un intérêt à la seconder dans ses efforts pour y parvenir.

L'intérêt que je porte à la Russie et mon dévouement pour votre Empereur me fait espérer que cette effroyable lutte touche à sa fin, et que le retour de l'Empereur ici sera prochainement accompli, pour la joie et la consolation de ses sujets. Vous connaissez bien mes dispositions pacifiques et bienveillantes pour la Russie, et mon désir continuel d'affermir les bons rapports entre les deux pays. Ce quelles ont été, elles le sont encore aujourd'hui.

Je termine cette longue lettre avec une prophétie—chose rare, et peut-être peu correcte pour un diplomate—c'est la suivante : Quand la paix sera faite sur une base satisfaisante pour l'Europe, la Russie verra à une époque non bien éloignée que l'Angleterre est le meilleur, le plus sûr, et le plus utile de ses amis et de ses alliés.

Ma femme me charge de ses bons souvenirs pour vous. Agréez, cher Baron, les miens avec l'assurance de mon amitié sincere.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

the return of the Emperor here will shortly be accomplished, to the joy and consolation of his subjects. You know well my pacific and friendly disposition towards Russia, and my constant desire to strengthen the good relations between the two countries. What they have ever been, they are still the same to-day.

I terminate this long letter with a prophecy—a rare thing, and perhaps incorrect, for a diplomatist. It is the following : When peace has been made upon a basis satisfactory to Europe, Russia will see, at an epoch not far distant, that England is the best, the most trustworthy, and the most useful of her friends and allies.

My wife charges me with her kind remembrances to you. Accept, my dear Baron, mine, with the assurance of my sincere friendship.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

CHAPTER XI.

Return of Emperor—Imperial Rescript—Interview with Prince Gortschakoff—Telegram from Sultan to Emperor—His Majesty's Reply—Continued Advance of Russian Army—Order to Admiral to proceed with Fleet to Constantinople—Lord Derby's Resignation: but Withdrawn on Counter-Orders to Admiral—Lord Derby finally Resigns in March: is Succeeded by Lord Salisbury—His Circular Despatch to British Embassies, and Prince Gortschakoff's Reply—Basis of Peace and an Armistice Signed at Adrianople—Subsequently Converted into Treaty of San Stefano—Divergence between England and Russia in regard to free Discussion of Treaty in Congress—Critical State of Affairs—Great Uneasiness at St. Petersburg—My Suggestion to M. de Giers Adopted—Instructions to Count Schouvaloff to propose Confidential Negotiations with Lord Salisbury—A Basis of Arrangement Agreed to: Approved by Emperor with some Reserves—Congress Convoked for June 13th—Appeal of Greece—Dissatisfaction of Roumania—Court held by their Majesties—The Emperor's Observations to Me—His Remarks to Roumanian Agent—Visit of Shah of Persia—Prince Labanoff—Chakir Pacha—Treaty of Berlin—Anglo-Turkish Convention.

After the fall of Plevna the Emperor returned on the 22nd of December to St. Petersburg, attended by Prince Gortschakoff. A congratulatory address was presented to His Majesty by the nobles of St. Petersburg on his return from the seat of war. An Imperial Rescript was issued by the Emperor, conferring the Grand Cross of St. George on the Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander-in-Chief; the Second Class of the same Order on the Cesarewich; also the Second Class on General Todleben, General Nepokoichitzki, and General Miliutine, Minister of War; and a gold sword in diamonds on the

Grand Duke Vladimir. The title of Count was conferred on General Ignatieff, Senior, President of the Council of Ministers; and his son, General Ignatieff, Junior, previously Ambassador at Constantinople, was created a member of the Council of the Empire.

I had an interview with Prince Gortschakoff on the 25th, and after congratulating His Highness on his return, which was the object of my visit, I said that I had no communication to make, as I had received no official information bearing on the war or peace.

Prince Gortschakoff observed that the moment was one of considerable importance. He said that he could not understand the cause of the feverish alarm and agitation in England. "We have," said His Highness, "been frank and straightforward with England. At the commencement of the war we were told of British interests—well, when they were submitted in form, we gave the most explicit assurances that these interests should be duly respected, and they were considered as satisfactory to your Government. There was the Isthmus of Suez; the road to India; the possession of Constantinople. What could we do more? We could not beforehand state that we shall not cross the Balkans —that we may not be under the necessity of advancing to Constantinople (although we have no wish to do so) —in order to force our enemy to sue for peace. But we have given solemn assurances that we have no intention of keeping possession of Constantinople, and we have pledged ourselves to respect any British interests which may be supposed to be endangered. Now," continued

His Highness, "what are those British interests which all of a sudden are springing up and producing this alarm? Name them to us, and we shall then know what is their nature, their value, and how they can best be safeguarded."

I replied to His Highness that every country must be the judge of its own interests, and that their safeguard and protection could not be confided to other hands. It could not be denied that the passage of the Balkans by a colossal Russian army constituted a danger which threatened the existence of the Turkish Empire in Europe, and it was therefore incontestably the duty of England, in view of such a contingency, to be prepared for the protection of her interests, but that I could not see that the performance of this duty intimated any intention of hostility, or even bore the character of an inimical act towards Russia.

Prince Gortschakoff refuted the idea that the existence of the Turkish Empire in Europe would be threatened by the advance of a Russian army across the Balkans, and added that, should it so happen, it was England, and England alone, that would be the cause of it.

"If," said His Highness, "you should determine to occupy Gallipoli, or any other point, and to send your fleet into the Bosphorus, you will be encouraging Turkey to prolong her resistance, and you will be thereby participating in her hostility to Russia."

To this I could not agree, and I again repeated that in my opinion the measures which might be necessary for the protection of our interests did not in any

way imply hostility to Russia, but could only be considered of a precautionary and defensive nature.

I observed to His Highness that I could not understand why such vehement invectives were launched against England by the Russian Press, whilst during the whole course of the war our attitude had differed in no respect from that of Austria and Germany.

Prince Gortschakoff replied that he could not admit that we had maintained the same attitude as Austria and Germany. The two Imperial Governments had acted, and were acting, in perfect accord and in harmony with that of Russia. He stated that the policy of the Austrian Cabinet had been consistent throughout, and that he placed entire confidence both in Austria and in Germany. As regarded France, His Highness observed that her attention had been absorbed by internal affairs, and could not therefore be directed to external questions, but he had received very satisfactory assurances from the new Minister for Foreign Affairs. England, therefore, he said, was quite isolated.

I replied to His Highness that it was not the first time that England had taken her own line of policy, and that she was sufficiently great and powerful to defend her own interests alone.

Prince Gortschakoff said that he had always supported a pacific solution of the Eastern question. "I have always," said His Highness, "admired and respected England, and I have always wished to maintain amicable relations with her; but I can never 'prostrate' myself before her (*mais me prosterner devant elle—jamais!*)."

This conversation was conducted in a very friendly and conciliatory tone.

Notwithstanding the signature of the armistice and the preliminaries of peace, signed at Adrianople on January 31st, 1878, the Russian armies continued their march on Constantinople.

I was informed that the Sultan had sent in January a telegram to the Emperor Alexander, deploring the miseries of the war, and expressing an earnest desire for its termination. It likewise announced the mission of two Plenipotentiaries to the Imperial headquarters to negotiate an armistice and the conditions of peace, and expressed a hope that the Emperor of Russia would order an immediate suspension of military operations along the whole line during the negotiations.

To this the Emperor replied that he fully participated in the Sultan's regrets for the war, and in the wishes for its termination. His Majesty stated that the Grand Duke Nicholas had full instructions to negotiate an armistice and the conditions of peace, but that His Majesty could not consent to a suspension of military operations during the negotiations.

The continued advance of the Russian army to Constantinople, the uncertainty as to future events at Constantinople, and the protection required for British subjects and property in that capital, should Turkish fanaticism endanger the lives of the former, induced the British Government to order Admiral Hornby to proceed with the fleet to Constantinople.

This decision, which was disapproved by Lord Derby,

led to his resignation, but on counter-instructions to the Admiral he withdrew it. He was satisfied with the assurances given by the Emperor and Prince Gortschakoff that even if an occupation became necessary, it would not be permanent, but merely provisional; and his fear had been that the sending of the fleet to Constantinople might provoke the very act which it was desired to avoid.

But early in March, when it became known that the Russians were on the eve of occupying Tchataldja, within a few miles of Constantinople, when a vote of six millions had been passed by the House of Commons for military armaments, when the Reserves had been called out and Indian troops ordered to Malta, and the British fleet had been sent to the Sea of Marmora, Lord Derby, not being in unison with the policy of Lord Beaconsfield, finally retired on March 28th from the Ministry, and was succeeded at the Foreign Office by the Marquis of Salisbury.

Within a few days of his accession to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs Lord Salisbury issued a Circular Despatch* to Her Majesty's Embassies abroad for communication to the several Governments. It was a marvellous epitome of the whole question, couched in the most conciliatory tone, but proving in logical and forcible terms that any treaty between Russia and the

* Prince Gortschakoff, when I had read this to him, observed merely, "*Si j'étais sur le gril de St. Laurent je ne saurais rien y comprendre.*" As I finished the perusal of the Despatch he appeared to me very much as if he *were* "*sur le gril de St. Laurent*"!

Porte affecting the treaties of 1856 and 1871 must be an European treaty, and would not be valid without the assent of the Powers who were parties to those treaties.

It is too lengthy a document for me to insert here, but I have given the full text in the Appendix, together with the reply of Prince Gortschakoff. These two documents give the whole question at issue between Her Majesty's Government and that of Russia.

The bases of peace between Russia and Turkey were signed at Adrianople, and were communicated to the Earl of Derby at the end of January, 1878, by Count Schouvaloff. They were as follows:—

1. Bulgaria, within the limits of Bulgarian nationality to be an autonomous tributary State, with a National Christian Government, a native militia, and no Turkish troops to be within the Principality, except at some points to be determined.

2. Independence of Montenegro, with increase of territory, equivalent to the military *status quo*, the frontier to be decided hereafter.

3. Independence of Roumania, with sufficient territorial indemnity.

4. Independence of Servia.

5. Autonomous administration, sufficiently guaranteed, to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

6. Similar reforms for the other Christian provinces of Turkey in Europe.

7. Indemnity to Russia for the expenses of the war; in a pecuniary, territorial, or other form to be decided hereafter.

8. Ulterior understanding for safeguarding the rights and interests of Russia in the Straits.

These bases being accepted by Turkey, a Convention and an Armistice were signed at Adrianople on the 31st of January, and Plenipotentiaries were appointed to develop them into preliminaries of peace.

These bases were subsequently converted into the preliminary Treaty of Peace signed at San Stefano $\frac{\text{February 19}}{\text{March 3}}$, and the ratifications were exchanged at St. Petersburg on the $\frac{5}{17}$th of March.

As I have before mentioned, the proposal for a Congress to meet at Berlin had been accepted by all the Powers. But the participation of England in the Congress had been made by Lord Derby dependent on the admission by Russia that all questions dealt with in the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey should be considered as subject to be discussed in the Congress, and that no alteration in the condition of things previously established by treaty should be acknowledged as valid until it had received the assent of the Powers.

On the 16th of March, in a letter to Count Schouvaloff, Lord Derby clearly stated that Her Majesty's Government must distinctly understand, before they can enter into Congress, that every Article in the Treaty between Russia and Turkey will be placed before the Congress, not necessarily for acceptance, but in order that it may be considered what Articles require acceptance or concurrence by the several Powers, and what do not.

Prince Gortschakoff's reply, dated the 19th of March,

was somewhat ambiguous. He stated through Count Schouvaloff "that the Treaty of Peace concluded between Russia and Turkey—the only one which exists, for we have no secret arrangement—will be communicated to the Government of the Queen in its entirety, and long before the assembling of the Congress.

"The Government of the Queen, in like manner as the other Great Powers, reserve to themselves at the Congress their 'full liberty of appreciation and action.'

"This same liberty, which she does not dispute to others, Russia claims for herself. Now, it would be to restrict this liberty if, alone among all the Powers, Russia contracted a preliminary arrangement."

In a subsequent letter to Count Schouvaloff, Prince Gortschakoff elucidated the misty phrase "liberty of appreciation and action," by defining the meaning of the term as "leaving to other Powers the liberty of raising such questions at the Congress as they may think fit to discuss, and reserves to itself the liberty of accepting or not accepting the discussion of these questions."*

Lord Salisbury, in his Circular Despatch of April 1st, fully concurred in the views of Lord Derby with regard to the conditions for the participation of England in the Congress. The final phrase of that document states, "That Her Majesty's Government would willingly have entered a Congress in which the stipulations of the treaty could have been examined as a whole, in their relation to existing treaties, to the acknowledged rights of Great

* See Appendix.

Britain and other Powers, and to the beneficent ends which the united action of Europe has always been directed to secure. But neither the interests which Her Majesty's Government are specially bound to guard, nor the well-being of the regions with which the treaty deals, would be consulted by the assembling of a Congress whose deliberations were to be restricted by such reservations as those which have been laid down by Prince Gortschakoff in his most recent communication."

In consequence of this polemic and the divergence of views between the British and Russian Governments, the meeting of the Congress remained in abeyance, and there daily appeared less chance of its ever assembling. This unfortunate uncertainty retarded likewise the negotiations undertaken by Prince Bismarck for the mutual withdrawal of the fleet and armies from the vicinity of the Turkish capital, and kept public opinion in a state of feverish excitement. It was generally felt that we were drifting into war, as in 1853—a war which was repugnant to the wishes of both Governments and of both nations.

Great uneasiness was felt by the commercial world at St. Petersburg, and especially by the English merchants, on the critical relations between England and Russia. We had arrived at a deadlock. There was no possibility of retroceding on the part of either: there were no appearances of advancing towards the Congress. I felt this acutely.

In this hopeless state of affairs an idea struck me which, if accepted on both sides, might help us mutually

out of the serious difficulty in which both Governments were placed. It was evident to me that if England and Russia could come to an amicable understanding before the meeting of the Congress, the avenue to it would be relieved of all obstacles.

I was aware that at a Council held at the Palace some days previous to my interview with M. de Giers a very pacific and conciliatory tone had prevailed. A great wish had been evinced on the part of the Emperor that peace should be maintained, and that all difficulties in regard to the meeting of the Congress should be arranged.

A fortuitous opportunity offered itself to me for giving effect to my idea.

On calling at the Imperial Foreign Office on May 2nd I met General Ignatieff in the waiting-room, M. de Giers being then engaged with Prince Gortschakoff, who was indisposed.

I had some conversation with General Ignatieff, who deplored the unsatisfactory state of affairs, and the *impasse* at which they had arrived.

I observed to him that the difficulty of the meeting of the Congress had arisen from a divergence of views between the English and Russian Governments. I said, "Could not this divergence be obviated by a confidential exchange of opinions between Lord Salisbury and Count Schouvaloff, of such a nature as to remove all further difficulties in regard to the meeting of the Congress? Surely," I observed, "when both parties are animated by a desire for peace, it could be attained by the means I suggested?"

In the middle of our conversation M. de Giers joined us, and was rather surprised to find me in conversation with General Ignatieff. On learning the topic of our conversation, and the nature of my suggestion, he invited us both to enter his room, and to continue it there. I there suggested to M. de Giers that he should send a telegraphic message to Count Schouvaloff, instructing him to propose a confidential understanding with Lord Salisbury in regard to the Treaty of San Stefano, with a view to facilitating the meeting of the Congress.

M. de Giers entirely approved this idea, and said that he had seen the Emperor that morning, and knowing His Majesty's views, and his desire for peace, he felt confident that the suggestion would be approved by him. He stated that a telegraphic instruction would be sent to Count Schouvaloff that evening in the sense I had indicated, and he requested me to address a telegram to Lord Salisbury in a similar sense to apprise him of the fact.

He thought the Treaty of San Stefano might be confidentially discussed in London by Lord Salisbury and Count Schouvaloff, and he confidently hoped that by these means a direct understanding might be come to between the two Governments of a nature to ensure the meeting of the European Congress.

M. de Giers remarked to me that it might interfere with the negotiations which Prince Bismarck had undertaken for the mutual withdrawal of the fleet and armies before Constantinople, but I replied that they also had

come to a standstill, and that by a thorough understanding being arrived at between England and Russia they would be greatly facilitated.

It was a mere suggestion from me, acting on my own responsibility, from an anxious desire to relieve the two Governments from a very critical and delicate position, and to aid in the removal of the difficulties to the meeting of the Congress. Happily, it succeeded perfectly. Thanks to the admirable skill and ability of Lord Salisbury, and the laudable spirit of conciliation evinced by Count Schouvaloff (their confidential negotiations were conducted, I may mention, with great secrecy), the basis of an understanding was agreed upon.

When a satisfactory basis of agreement had been found, Count Schouvaloff went in person to St. Petersburg to submit it to the Emperor, and to obtain its acceptance. After being discussed at several Councils presided over by the Emperor, His Majesty, animated by a sincere wish for peace, and desirous of avoiding any rupture with England—for the situation was most critical—agreed generally, with some reservations, to the basis submitted by Count Schouvaloff. It is to the extreme tact and spirit of conciliation evinced by Lord Salisbury, in conjunction with the ability and adroitness of Count Schouvaloff, that the credit is due of having, at this important and critical moment, prevented a rupture between the two countries, and, by facilitating the meeting of the Congress, of having preserved the peace of Europe.

Count Schouvaloff, before leaving for London, expressed to me his best hopes that all difficulties would be removed, and that the Congress would meet without loss of time. He considered that its prompt meeting was indispensable to calm the existing tension of Europe, and he said that on his passage through Berlin he should urge this on Prince Bismarck, who was charged with the assembling of the Congress. Shortly after Count Schouvaloff's arrival in London the questions at issue were satisfactorily arranged with Lord Salisbury, and the Congress was convoked for the 13th of June.

Thus the entry of England into the Congress was brought about, and through the Congress the peace of Europe was preserved. It was a striking proof of how often from a trivial accidental circumstance the most important results are obtained.

When a Congress on the Treaty of San Stefano was agreed to by the Great Powers, the Greek Government made an appeal to be represented in it. On mentioning to Prince Gortschakoff this appeal, which had been supported by England, he observed that as the Congress was to be exclusively composed of the Signatory Powers of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, the Greek Government had no claim to be admitted as an integrant part (*partie intégrante*) of the Congress, and that the admission of Greece would raise a similar claim on the part of other small States interested in Eastern affairs, to be represented in the Congress.

There would be no objection to Greece, as well as

other States, sending delegates to the Congress for the purpose of giving information, or of being consulted in regard to questions affecting their interests (or, as Prince Gortschakoff humorously termed it, "*à titre de dictionnaires*"), but they could not, in his opinion, be admitted as component parts of the Congress. I was rather amused by the Prince representing the small States in the light of *dictionnaires*.

His Highness then mentioned that a telegram in that morning's *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*, dated March 13th, from Athens, stated that Her Majesty's Government had undertaken to represent the interests of Greece in the Congress.

Prince Gortschakoff finally remarked that Greece, being connected by personal ties with England and Russia, they had both an equal interest in her welfare, and it was therefore from no unfriendly feelings towards Greece, but on principle alone, that he could not agree to her admission to the Congress.

On the 4th of May Field-Marshal the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolaiewitch arrived at St. Petersburg from San Stefano. He was received with military honours by the Emperor and the Imperial Family.

Great dissatisfaction was evinced in Roumania in regard to the proposed retrocession of that portion of Bessarabia to Russia which the latter had lost by the Treaty of 1856, in exchange for the Dobrudscha and the Kilia channel of the Danube, and the fortress of Widdin.

The Russian proposal was discussed in secret

sittings of both the Roumanian Chambers, and unanimously rejected.

The Roumanian Minister, Prince Ghika, was instructed to communicate this decision of the Chambers to Prince Gortschakoff, with the following motives which the Chambers had assigned for this decision—namely, (1) "That the Roumanian Government were not empowered to give up a portion of territory which had been given to them by the Congress of Paris; and (2) that it would be a violation of the Convention entered into between Russia and Roumania previous to the war, by which Russia guaranteed to Roumania the integrity of her territory."

The retrocession of this territory, however insignificant in itself, and possessing but slight strategic value for Russia, was for the Emperor a question of sentiment, and His Majesty was very indignant at the opposition raised against it by the Roumanian Chambers.

A Court was held by their Imperial Majesties to receive felicitations on the birthday of the Cesarewich, which was attended by the foreign representatives and the members of the Diplomatic Body.

The Emperor, after shaking hands with me, observed that it appeared to him that Her Majesty's Government had not sufficiently taken account (*n'ont pas suffisamment tenu compte*) of my report of the audience of His Majesty at Livadia, and he expressed his regret at the distrust which existed in England in regard to Russia.

His Majesty said that it had always been his wish,

and it was his anxious desire, to maintain the most friendly relations with England, and he would deeply regret any possible rupture of them.

His Majesty expressed his hope that the Congress would offer the means of a satisfactory arrangement. It was his ardent desire.

I had no opportunity of replying to His Majesty's first observation, and merely remarked that the gravity of the questions at issue, the high reputation of the statesmen who would take part in the Congress, and the pacific disposition of all the Powers therein represented, ought to be a guarantee for the success of their deliberations.

"*Espérons-le,*" observed His Majesty.

The Emperor observed to the Greek Chargé d'Affaires that he hoped the agitation in Greece would calm down, and that nothing would occur to cause fresh complications.

To Prince Ghika, the Roumanian agent, the Emperor said, in a severe tone:—"*Je voudrais bien que la Roumanie se souvienne des services immenses que la Russie lui a rendus et du sang qu'elle a versé pour elle. Il me semble qu'elle l'a oublié trop facilement.*"

I have reason to believe that the wish for the retrocession of the Bessarabian territory to Russia originated entirely with the Emperor, and was dictated by a filial feeling of piety towards his father.

The retrocession to Russia was eventually confirmed by the Treaty of Berlin, and the Dobrudscha was given in exchange to Roumania. Complimentary and

apologetic messages were sent to the Emperor, of which the Prince of Battenberg was the bearer, which softened the asperities which the late incidents had produced on the Imperial mind.

I may here observe that the fears then entertained that the influence of Russia in the liberated Balkan Principalities would largely predominate have not, after an experience of some sixteen years, been realised, and Roumania, in the present instance, was the first to evince her spirit of free and national independence. Gratitude for past favours is not inherent in nations, and not always met with in individuals.

Early in May the Shah of Persia notified his wish to visit St. Petersburg on his way to Paris, stating that he could not traverse any portion of the Emperor's dominions without paying his respects to His Majesty, yet maintaining a strict incognito. Although it was an inconvenient moment, His Majesty could not refuse, and the Shah was informed that apartments would be prepared for him in the Imperial Palaces at Tiflis, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Warsaw. Special trains were also provided for him at Imperial cost.

The Shah arrived at St. Petersburg on the 23rd of May. The Emperor received him at the station with the members of the Imperial family. A banquet was given in his honour at the Palace and by the Cesarewich, and several representations were given at the various theatres. His Majesty left for Berlin on the 30th.

Prince Labanoff-Rostopchin, Assistant Minister of

the Interior, was appointed Ambassador at Constantinople, and Chakir Pacha, who had distinguished himself in the late war, was appointed Ambassador at St. Petersburg. He was clever, agreeable, conciliatory, and with good manners, and was conversant with the French language. No better selection could have been made, and he became very popular.

The Congress met at Berlin on the 13th of June. England was represented by the Earl of Beaconsfield, Prime Minister, the Marquis of Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Lord Odo Russell, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. Russia was represented by Prince Gortschakoff, Chancellor of the Empire, Count Schouvaloff, Russian Ambassador in London, and M. d'Oubril, Russian Ambassador at Berlin.

It is not my intention to enter into the details of the Treaty of Berlin, nor do I wish to weary my readers with an account of the discussions in the Congress. But I may cursorily allude to those points which were most distasteful to the British Plenipotentiaries—viz., the annexation of Batoum, and the surrender of Kars and other fortresses in Armenia, as also the extended Bulgaria, as proposed in the Treaty of San Stefano. The dangers, however, foreshadowed of a further possible extension of Russian aggrandisement in Asia were provided for by a Convention between England and Turkey, signed on the 4th of June, by which Great Britain undertook, in case of any further encroachment on the part of Russia on the Turkish territory in Asia, to defend it by force of arms. The Sultan engaged, on

the other hand, to grant the reforms required for the protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte in Asia, and gave up Cyprus to England at an annual charge, it being also stipulated that should Russia retrocede, to Turkey, Kars and her other conquests in Armenia, Cyprus should be given back to Turkey. The Treaty of Berlin was signed on the 13th of July. It created Servia, Roumania, and Montenegro independent States. Bulgaria was created an autonomous and tributary Principality, under the Suzerainty of the Sultan, with a Christian Government and National Militia.

The Prince of Bulgaria was to be freely elected by the population, and confirmed by the Sultan; no member of the reigning dynasties of the Great Powers to be elected.

The portion of Bulgaria south of the Balkans called Eastern Roumelia, to remain subject to the political and military rule of the Sultan, with administrative autonomy, and a Christian Governor to be nominated with the assent of the Powers for five years.

Bosnia and Herzegovina to be occupied by and under the administration of Austria.

Accession of territory to Montenegro and the seaport of Antivari on the Adriatic.

Accession of territory to Servia.

Roumania restored to the Emperor of Russia the territory in Bessarabia she lost in 1856, and received in exchange the Dobrudscha.

In Asia cession by the Porte of Ardahan, Kars, and Batoum, which latter the Emperor of Russia declared

his intention of constituting a free port. Bayazid was restored to Turkey.

Should the Porte and Greece be unable to agree upon the rectification of frontier suggested in the 13th Protocol of the Congress of Berlin, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, reserved to themselves to offer their mediation to the two parties to facilitate negotiations.

The foregoing were the principal points of the Treaty of Berlin, and it will be seen that they fairly met the objections of the British Government to the Treaty of San Stefano.

Bulgaria was confined to the river frontier of the Danube, and no longer extended to the Ægean, nor was she to possess any harbour on the Archipelago.

Bulgaria, which, as originally proposed by the San Stefano Treaty, had been given a large amount of sea-board on the Black and the Ægean Seas, leaving to the Sultan but a small strip of territory around Constantinople, was divided into two provinces, "Bulgaria" and "Eastern Roumelia."

Bourgas, an important sea-port on the Black Sea, was restored to Turkey.

Although since the Treaty of Berlin the governments of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia have been fused, Russian influence has failed to obtain the upper hand, and in none of the Danubian provinces has a greater feeling of national independence and aversion towards the domination of Russia been evinced than has been the case in Bulgaria.

CHAPTER XII.

Return of Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury to London—Order of the Garter Conferred on Them—Observations on the Constitution of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia—Departure of Emperor for Livadia—Leave of Absence Granted to Me—Visit to and Conversation with Prince Gortschakoff—Mission of General Stolietoff to Cabul—Observations Thereon to Prince Gortschakoff—Proposal of Shere Ali to Visit St. Petersburg Declined by Emperor—Pacific State of Central Asia—Death of Emir of Kashgar—Succession of his Son—Kashgar Reconquered by Chinese—Return on December 4th of Emperor—His Toast at Fête of St. George—Interview with Prince Gortschakoff—Death of Grand Duchess of Hesse—Circumstances of Russian Mission to Afghanistan—Internal State of Russia—My Appointment as Governor of New South Wales—Succeeded by Lord Dufferin—Presentation of Letters of Recall—Audiences of the Empress and Members of the Imperial Family—Sorrowful Parting with Prince Gortschakoff—Departure for London.

The treaty between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey, for the settlement of affairs in the East, was signed at Berlin on July 13th, 1878, and this peaceful result was received in Europe with joyful acclamation, removing from the public mind a weight of care and anxiety which had long oppressed it. Nor was it less favourably received in Russia, which, although victorious in arms, had suffered severely from the miseries and losses produced by the war.

Immediately on the termination of the Congress of Berlin, Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury returned to London, the fortunate bearers of "peace with honour."

The Order of the Garter was conferred on Lords

Beaconsfield and Salisbury, in recognition of the services they had rendered to their country, and no members of that illustrious order had more eminently deserved it. Other distinctions were conferred on the members of their respective suites.

At the time of the Congress of Berlin it was not sufficiently known, or, rather, experience had not proved, as the past sixteen years have now proved, that in creating into independent States the provinces liberated from Ottoman rule, it was desirable to give them that independence and internal efficient force which would enable them to resist any attempt of Russia to exercise a predominating influence, and to draw them within her political sphere. In their formation it was also advisable to take into consideration their separate nationalities, and to unite them into one corporate body, and under one head. This was not done as regarded Bulgaria, for it was evident, when it was decided to separate Eastern Roumelia from Bulgaria, and to form it into a separate autonomous tributary State under the suzerainty of the Sultan, that on the first opportunity the Bulgarians of Roumelia would join their co-brethren in Bulgaria, and thus form one State. There is no doubt that their ultimate union was foreshadowed to the English Plenipotentiaries, but the first object was to break up the colossal Bulgaria of the San Stefano Treaty, which swallowed up the greater portion of Turkey in Europe, and commanded a large sea-board on the Black and Ægean Seas.

This the English Plenipotentiaries succeeded in

doing, and although Eastern Roumelia has since the Congress been united to Bulgaria, the Principality is far smaller than was provided for by the Treaty of San Stefano.

After the close of the Congress, there was a lull in the political world; the Emperor went to Livadia, and he was attended by M. de Giers. The Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, I may say, was bodily transferred to Livadia.

Being anxious to recruit my health after many months' residence at St. Petersburg, I was granted leave to repair to Marienbad. I accordingly left St. Petersburg on the 27th of July, having previously presented Mr. Plunkett, Secretary of Embassy, as Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires during my absence.

On my return passage through Baden-Baden I had the pleasure of meeting Prince Gortschakoff, who was then residing there. His Highness appeared to be in good health, although complaining of rheumatic gout. He said that he had represented to the Emperor that he required rest from the cares of office, and that he had given orders that no affairs should be referred to him. He had arranged that M. de Giers should accompany the Emperor, and that the business of the Foreign Office should be conducted from Livadia; but, added the Prince, "*S'il y aurait une grande bataille diplomatique*," he should be immediately at his post.

On my referring to the mission of General Stolietoff to Cabul, the Prince used the same terms as used by M. de Giers in his note to Mr. Plunkett (his professed ignorance of passing events was therefore more "feigned"

than real), stating that the mission to Cabul was purely one of courtesy, and of a provisional character, observing that the Emperor could never forego his right of sending complimentary missions to any foreign Sovereign or neighbouring Princes. "Do not forget," said His Highness, "that the Emperor is an independent Sovereign, ruler over 80 millions of subjects." I replied that I was quite aware of this fact, as also that my Gracious Sovereign the Queen was ruler over more than 200 millions of subjects. "Yes," said His Highness, "but they are dispersed and scattered: the Russian Empire is one and united."

In regard to Afghanistan, I was returning from a short excursion to Italy, and was accordingly without any official knowledge as to past or passing events, but I could not help observing in respect of a mission to Cabul to which he had referred, that it was not in conformity with the engagement which Russia had taken with England, adding that it was the more incomprehensible to me, inasmuch as on a late occasion, and before leaving St. Petersburg, M. de Giers had expressly denied to me that there had been, or was, any intention of sending a mission to Cabul.

Prince Gortschakoff merely repeated what he had previously stated, that the mission was one of courtesy, adding that, probably, M. de Giers, at the moment he gave me the assurance, had not himself been informed of it.

Prince Gortschakoff further observed that it was true that military measures in the direction of Afghanistan

had been devised when war between England and Russia appeared to be imminent, but that those measures had been countermanded and the troops recalled. The Prince then explicitly stated that the Imperial Government would maintain their engagements with England in regard to Afghanistan; that they had no wish to interfere in the affairs of that kingdom; and that the Ameer of Afghanistan, in the event of war, would receive no assistance, either in arms or money, from Russia.

Prince Gortschakoff was very conciliatory in his language, and he appeared to me to entertain no fear that the question of Afghanistan would create any disturbance in the relations between England and Russia.

The ex-Ameer Shere Ali proposed visiting St. Petersburg, but the Emperor strongly objected to his visit. Shere Ali was at the time in a very critical state of health, suffering from an incurable disease, of which he shortly after died. After his death, and on the conclusion of the Afghan War, Abdul Rahman, who on the accession of Shere Ali had been exiled, and had lived many years at Tashkent, and who was a near descendant of Dost Mahommed, was placed on the throne by the British Government, and is still the ruler of that kingdom.

In the Khanates of Central Asia, now annexed to Russia, there was peace and tranquillity. Yakoub Beg, the ruler of Kashgar—or, as he was called, the Atiligh Gazee—had died, and was succeeded by his son. He

was devoid of the energy and military capacity of his father, and when the Chinese army arrived, which had been on its march for three years, they reoccupied their former territory in force and with great slaughter. A large number of the Djungarians took refuge in the Russian province of Khokand (or Fergana), and their extradition was firmly refused by the Russian Government, regarding them as political refugees, and knowing that they would be consigned to immediate death.

The health of the Empress gave cause for some anxiety, although the Duchess of Edinburgh, whose arrival gave comfort and joy to their Majesties, did not appear to be alarmed about her.

On the assembling of the Congress of Berlin, the feeling of animosity against England, fostered by the Press, greatly subsided; the influence of the war party momentarily ceased, and the Panslavist party, although still influential at Moscow, and active in propagating its Slavist tendencies, was greatly on the wane at St. Petersburg, and had completely lost the influence it had exercised in the regions of the Court.

It was reported to me that Prince Gortschakoff, before leaving for Berlin, had made the following remark: "There is," said the Prince, "one word which shall not pass my lips—that word is 'Slav'—the only term I shall use will be that of Christian."

The Emperor, attended by M. de Giers, acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, returned to St. Petersburg from Livadia on December 4th. The annual banquet given by His Majesty in honour of the fête

of St. George took place on the 8th of December. The first toast proposed by His Majesty was that of "The health of the Emperor of Germany," as the oldest Knight of St. George and the best appreciator of the glories of the Russian armies.

At an interview I had with Prince Gortschakoff towards the end of December I found His Highness cheerful and in good health.

I had a desultory conversation on the general aspect of affairs, when he expressed himself in very conciliatory and pacific terms.

In the course of conversation he observed that he entirely concurred in a phrase used by Lord Beaconsfield—"*La pusillanimité n'est pas la sagesse*," to which he said he wished to add, "*La modération c'est la force.*" On taking leave I observed, in regard to the foregoing sagacious maxims, that I might also add, "*Que le temps des promesses était passé et que celui des faits était arrivé.*"

On the 18th of December I received a telegram announcing the sad intelligence of the death of the Grand Duchess of Hesse, Princess Alice of Great Britain. It was a painful loss to the Queen and Royal Family, and added a fresh weight of sorrow to that which had previously clouded Her Majesty's domestic happiness. I requested Lord Salisbury, on the part of Lady Augustus and Her Majesty's Embassy, to lay at the foot of the throne, with our respectful duty, the expressions of our sincere sympathy and condolence in the severe affliction with which Her Majesty and the Royal Family had been

visited by the loss of a princess of such distinguished merit, and so universally beloved.

I must here again mention an incident which had occurred at the period preceding the Berlin Congress. I refer to the Russian mission under General Stolietoff to Cabul. The first instructions to General Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, to send a mission to Afghanistan, were on the 25th of April, 1878. Arms and ammunition were supplied to Shere Ali, with whom we were then on the eve of war. There were two convoys of arms, the first of which accompanied General Stolietoff on his visit to Cabul, as a present to Shere Ali. The two transports consisted (as I was told) of 1,400 muskets (*krenké*), with a large supply of ammunition.

I also learnt that some staff officers had been sent by the Imperial Government to make strategical observations and maps of the country.

The Governor of Turkestan holds at his disposal a large amount of military stores at Tashkent and Samarcand. He is invested with full powers, both in his civil and military capacity, and consequently may have supplied the Ameer with arms, cannon, and ammunition, without the previous sanction, possibly without even the knowledge, of the Central Government.

In an article of a semi-official character in the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*, towards the end of December, 1878, it was avowed that eventual orders relating to the sending of a mission to Cabul had been sent to General Kaufmann in the month of April; and there can be no

doubt that, in expectation then of a war with England, a diversion was intended against India.

The act of sending a mission was a violation by Russia of her engagement with England, "that Russia considered Afghanistan as beyond the sphere of her political action."

In February, 1879, intelligence reached me of a reported Afghan mission to Tashkent, and on inquiring of M. de Giers as to the truth of this report, His Excellency said that Shere Ali, after abandoning his intention of visiting St. Petersburg, had decided to send four notables of his Court to Tashkent, to confer with General Kaufmann for the purpose (as M. de Giers supposed, for he had no certain knowledge of the fact) of making known to the Imperial Government, through General Kaufmann, the circumstances of his position.

M. de Giers said that Shere Ali had been already informed that no mediation (with England) could be undertaken by Russia in his behalf, and that General Kaufmann had been instructed in regard to his reception of the Afghan mission, and to any proposal which they might submit.

M. de Giers did not mention the exact nature of these instructions, but observed that General Kaufmann was ordered to get rid of them courteously (*de les renvoyer poliment*).

Immediately after the Congress of Berlin the mission was recalled, the troops that had been in formation were demobilised, and affairs resumed their former pacific attitude. In relating the foregoing facts I

consider that it is an episode which I could not pass over in silence.

The winter at St. Petersburg was very tranquil. The losses occasioned by the war cast a gloom over society. The delicate state of the Empress's health prevented, also, the usually brilliant fêtes at the Imperial Court. There was a complete lull in the political world, and although there were some questions of difference among the Powers in regard to the carrying-out of the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, they were of no historical importance. Peace was the ardent wish of all countries, and the sufferings of the late war made it the more ardently wished for by all classes in Russia.

But internal symptoms of discontent and of uneasiness were showing themselves both at Moscow and St. Petersburg—the growth of poisonous seeds sown by the "Nihilist" societies, a mere fraction of the people, although of a literary and intelligent class. This discontent, in some measure, arose from poverty; from the absorption of a large number of the population by the army, and the consequent want of hands for agricultural labour; from mal-administration in the various subordinate departments of the State; from the corruption and peculation which pervaded all classes; and from a general want felt of more freedom from Government restraint.

The students of the universities of St. Petersburg and Kharkoff had made tumultuous demonstrations—I will not say of disloyalty, but of grievances against the oppressive system of the university authorities.

Instead of instituting inquiry into the nature of these grievances, and introducing the necessary reforms if substantiated, numbers of the students were arrested and imprisoned, and the universities were closed.

The trial of Vera Sassoulitch for her attempted assassination of General Trépoff, the head of the police, notwithstanding the most incontestable proofs of her guilt, was a failure; and the murderers of his successor, General Messentzoff, in the streets in open daylight, were never discovered, nor had the police at that time obtained any clue to the workings of the secret societies which continued to send threatening anonymous letters to the civil and military authorities, and to issue, in a printed form, secret proclamations of an inflammatory character.

The consequence was that there existed a general feeling of uneasiness and insecurity, and that a system of terrorism weakened the influence and action of the authorities.

I have no doubt that my readers will not be sorry that I have reached the termination of these longsome and diversified "Diplomatic Reminiscences," extending over a period of forty years, and embracing within their scope the most eventful period of modern times. They give a general outline of the political history of Europe, and of the policy of the Governments of the Great Powers during that period. Of course there are many omissions which might have thrown light in dark places, but whilst it has been my object throughout my narrative to give a strictly truthful account of the events

recorded, I have striven carefully to avoid any expression which could give offence or give rise to controversy.

I had been at this time Ambassador at St. Petersburg for eight years, a longer period than any previous representative of the Queen, and during that time had treated very difficult and thorny questions. It was a mixed period of sunshine and cloud. I had some time previously expressed to Lord Salisbury the wish for a change to a more genial climate, and for duties of a less arduous nature. Accordingly, at the opening of the New Year, I received a letter from Lord Salisbury, stating that he was charged by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, to offer me the post of Governor of New South Wales. I was gratified by the kind terms in which the offer was made by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, and my past services alluded to by Lord Salisbury, and I at once telegraphed my acceptance of the post. It was a novel occupation for me, the novelty had a charm in it, and it was also a novel interest which captivated me, as I felt that it was an introduction into a new world, under the Southern Cross, where our enterprising Anglo-Saxon race was laying the foundations of a "Greater Britain," and where my duties, although responsible, would be infinitely less arduous than those I had been performing.

Lord Salisbury kindly and gracefully accompanied his notification with the following recognition, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, of the faithful discharge of my duties while Ambassador at St. Petersburg. He wrote—"In parting with you from the branch of

the public service with which I am temporarily connected, it is my pleasant duty to express to you the cordial thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the heartiness and fidelity with which you have discharged very delicate functions in arduous times."

The Marquis (then Earl) of Dufferin was appointed my successor at the Court of Russia, and with Lady Dufferin arrived at St. Petersburg in the beginning of March. No better selection could have been made, both as regarded the great ability and experience of Lord Dufferin, and the social and graceful charm of Lady Dufferin. They had both won golden opinions in Canada, where Lord Dufferin had been for some years Viceroy and Governor-General, and both were imbued with the same desire to please and to be pleased. The laurels he has since gained, by his able administration of India, has placed him in the front rank of the most able statesmen of the age.

After presentation to the Emperor of the Queen's letters, notifying my recall, I had an audience of the Empress and of the members of the Imperial Family, by whom I was most graciously received; and lastly, I took leave of Prince Gortschakoff, who expressed himself in cordial terms of appreciation of the conciliatory spirit which I had invariably evinced during our official relations.

It was to me a sorrowful leave-taking of the aged and distinguished Chancellor and statesman, Prince Gortschakoff, after twenty years of friendship, for I felt that it was the last time I should set eyes on

that bright and intelligent countenance, or listen to his brilliant wit and conversation.

I recollect his being much gratified once by a remark of mine when talking of Talleyrand, Metternich, Nesselrode, and other great statesmen. I observed to him, *qu'il était le dernier de cette race de géants de cette époque.*

I also took leave, with great regret, of M. de Giers, the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whom I had transacted official business for some years. During that time, M. de Giers had ever evinced a conciliatory and friendly spirit. He was possessed of remarkable sagacity, a pleasing manner, and a frank sincerity which won my admiration. It has given me pleasure to learn from time to time the success which has attended his able administration of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, from a conviction that there is no statesman in Russia more capable, more patriotic, or more devoted to his Sovereign and his country.

At a dinner given by the Austrian representative to General Le Flo, the French Ambassador, and myself, on leaving, our respective healths were proposed with much kindly feeling. The General, being a Frenchman, responded in glowing terms. I had not been in any way prepared for this honour, but the expression of my thanks appeared to make an impression on my French colleague, who, in allusion to it, observed to the company, "*Il parait qu'on parle le français mieux sur la Tamise que sur la Seine.*" This graceful acknowledgment relieved my fears and pleased me.

I took leave of my many kind and hospitable friends

at St. Petersburg with the consolatory hope that we might meet again in some part of Europe, although not on the banks of the Neva.

I cannot close these reminiscences of Russia without expressing my respectful and fervent good wishes for the health and happiness of their Imperial Majesties—so beloved by the nation, so devoted to the welfare and prosperity of their subjects. Their domestic life presents a noble example to all classes, and should instil into the hearts of their subjects the same illustrious virtues which distinguish them.

To the staff of my Embassy and my co-labourers I beg to offer my sincere thanks for the zealous and efficient performance of their duties and for the valuable assistance they afforded me. Amongst them I may specially mention Sir C. Ford, now Ambassador at Rome; Sir G. Bonham, Secretary of Embassy at Madrid; Sir Francis Plunkett, Minister at Brussels; Mr. Edwin Egerton, Minister at Athens; Mr. C. Scott, Minister at Copenhagen; Mr. Condie Stephen, Chargé d'Affaires at Coburg, and Mr. Victor Drummond, Chargé d'Affaires at Munich. I also received valuable assistance from Mr. Thomas Michell, now Consul-General at Christiania, from his perfect knowledge of the Russian language.

We left St. Petersburg early in March, 1879, for England *viâ* Warsaw and Vienna.

Before taking leave of my readers, I must claim from them an indulgent criticism of this work. They will, I trust, bear in mind that in the high positions I

had filled, I have had to exercise a certain tact and discretion in its compilation, and to engage in no controversial questions which could produce ill-will, or personal or international irritation. To prevent its being ponderous and wearying, I have avoided entering into details, confining my narrative to the incidents recorded and to their results, and in doing so it has been my wish to maintain the interest of the work and not to overburthen the patience of my readers.

APPENDIX.

The Governor-General of India in Council to the Duke of Argyll.

Simla, May 20th, 1870.

1. My Lord Duke,—Since the receipt of your despatch of the 26th November, Mr. Forsyth has returned to India, and we have had much satisfaction in learning from him personally the friendly assurances given by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, and by the Ministers of State, in respect of the policy of the Russian Government in Central Asia.

2. In the inclosures of your despatch of the 6th August, 1869, we were informed that, at an interview with Mr. Forsyth at Baden Baden, Prince Gortchakow "dilated with pleasure on the happy relations existing between Her Majesty's present Government and that of Russia, and expressed great satisfaction on hearing that the non-aggressive policy which had marked Sir J. Lawrence's viceroyalty was not likely to be departed from by Lord Mayo;" that he stated that "Russia had no intention of interfering with Herat, Cabul," etc.; that "if Shere Ali confined himself within his own dominions, he need fear no molestation from Russia;" and that "it was the determination of the Russian Government that there should be no quarrel between the two countries regarding the Asiatic boundaries."

3. In the conversation with Lord Clarendon at Heidelberg on 3rd September, of which we were informed in Mr. Kaye's letter of the 17th September, 1869, Prince Gortchakow assured his Lordship "that we had no cause for apprehension" (of a difference between the two Governments in regard to Central

Asia) "as the Emperor considered, and he entirely shared His Majesty's opinion, that extension of territory was extension of weakness, and that Russia had no intention of going further south;" that the determination of the British Government (of which Lord Clarendon informed him) to restrain Shere Ali from aggression on his neighbours "was quite sufficient and most satisfactory, and that he should have great pleasure in forthwith reporting it to the Emperor."

4. These assurances have been repeated to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who, in his despatch to Lord Clarendon of 2nd November, quotes the language of Prince Gortschakoff, which we extract in the margin.* We learn also from Mr. Forsyth and from his letters, of which copies were transmitted to us with your despatch of 26th November, that General Miliutine, the Russian Minister of War, and M. Stremooukoff, Director of the Asiatic Department of the Russian Foreign Office, "concurred in opinion that we should accept as Afghanistan all the provinces which Shere Ali now holds; that beyond this limit he should not exercise any influence or interference; that the good offices of England should be exerted to restrain him from all thought of aggression; and that similarly Russia should exercise all her influence to restrain Bokhara from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory;" that His Majesty the Emperor himself remarked, "that there was no intention of extending the Russian dominions;" and assented to the remark of Mr. Forsyth, "that whilst on our side every effort would be made to induce Shere Ali to keep within his present dominions, we hoped that Bokhara would be restrained from aggression."

5. We learn with pleasure from the inclosures of your despatch of the 4th March, that the Russian Government have expressed

* "Pray, therefore," he added, "tell Lord Clarendon that, as both Governments are free from all *arrière-pensées*, ambitious views or unfriendly feelings towards each other, the more fully and frankly all questions connected with Central Asia are discussed between them the more effectually will the mist be blown away, which, through the misrepresentations of over-zealous subordinate agents, may at any time hang over them."

their adherence to the above assurances, and that M. Stremooukoff describes the policy sketched in our despatch dated 7th December last, the substance of which was communicated to him by Sir A. Buchanan, as coinciding exactly with that which the Russian Government desire, and which they are endeavouring to establish.

6. We have great satisfaction in finding that the policy of Russia, thus frankly described, coincides so entirely with that laid down by us at Umballa, which was sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government, and to which we since consistently adhered; and we feel assured that so long as this policy is acted on by the two great Governments, who may be said to divide political influence in Central Asia, the peace and prosperity of those vast and important regions will be permanently secured.

7. M. Stremooukoff has suggested, with a view to the further development of this peaceful policy, that measures should be taken by the British Government and by Russia to ascertain the limits of the territories which acknowledged the sovereignty of Dost Mahomed, and are at present under the Government of Shere Ali Khan, in order that the frontier between those territories and the neighbouring States of Central Asia should be as nearly as possible defined.

8. In our telegram of 11th June, 1869, we have informed your Grace that, if the Ameer should show any disposition to extend his boundaries beyond the limits held by Dost Mahomed, we should remonstrate with him at once. The possessions of the present Ameer on the north and north-west appear to coincide almost exactly with those held by his father; and the limits of Dost Mahomed's kingdom may therefore be generally taken as the boundary which should divide the kingdom of Afghanistan from the other States of Central Asia to the north and north-west.

9. We do not think it necessary to enter on any elaborate review of the rule of Dost Mahomed. The extent of his conquests in Afghan-Turkestan is, we believe, not disputed. Save during very short and exceptional periods, the Oxus has been the recognised boundary between Bokhara and Afghanistan;

and in the negotiations between Dost Mahomed and the Ameer of Bokhara in 1859, the latter declared that, if the Afghans would refrain from interference with the Turkomans north of the Oxus, the Bokhara authorities would raise no claim regarding Badakshan, Maimana, and other States south of that river. Practically, the Oxus was the limit of the conquests of Dost Mahomed in the north, from the district of Balkh on the west to the extreme east of Badakshan. The right of the Ameer to Balkh is recognised in the 1st Article of the Treaty concluded with Dost Mahomed on 26th January, 1857. Its western boundary is the province of Kerki, which terminates near the ford of Khojah Saleh; and Kerki and Charjui are admitted by Ameer Shere Ali to be Bokharian provinces and to march with his own provinces of Herat (including Maimana) and Balkh.

10. From the western boundary of Balkh to the eastern limits of Badakshan, the entire country between the Oxus and the Hindu Koosh, fell under the conquest of Dost Mahomed. In various campaigns between 1850 and 1855, Khulm, Maimana, Andkhoi, Shibergam, and Siripool were all conquered. Kunduz was annexed in 1859; Badakshan submitted the same year; and before his death in the trenches at Herat, on the 9th of June, 1863, the Dost had consolidated his power in all these territories. Practically, these form the Turkestan provinces now in the possession of Ameer Shere Ali Khan.

11. The north-western boundary of what, in our opinion, ought to be considered Shere Ali's dominions, runs in a south-westerly direction from a point on the Oxus between Khojah Saleh and Kerki, skirting and including the provinces of Balkh, Maimana with its dependencies of Andkhoi, etc., and Herat with its dependencies between the Murghab and the Herizrood. The northern boundary is the Oxus from the same point between Kerki and Khojah Saleh eastward to Punjab and Wakkan, and thereafter the stream which passes Wakkan up to the point where the range of the Hindu Koosh meets the southern angle of the Pamir Steppe.

12. In countries which have never been scientifically surveyed, and the boundaries of which have been liable to more or less fluctuation, it may be difficult to describe existing boundaries with perfect accuracy. But we are satisfied that the description above given of the northern and north-western boundaries of Afghanistan, is sufficiently correct for all practical purposes; and we feel assured that the inquiries which General Kaufmann has been instructed to make, will not fail to establish the fact that these boundaries are consistent with present circumstances, and with the rights which the Ameer inherited from his father. We rely, therefore, with confidence on the pledges which the Russian Government have given, that they will use all legitimate means to save these territories from menace and attack on the part of the neighbouring States and Chiefs subject to Russian influence.

We have, etc.,

(Signed) MAYO.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
H. M. DURAND.
J. STRACHEY.
R. TEMPLE.
J. F. STEPHEN.
B. H. ELLIS.

[*Extract.*]

Prince Gortchakow to Count Brunnow.

(Translation.) *St. Petersburg, November* $\frac{1}{13}$, 1871.

Your Excellency has been kept well informed of all the conversations that have passed between the Imperial Cabinet and Her Britannic Majesty's Government upon the subject of the affairs of Central Asia.

You are aware that, in consequence of the explanations

exchanged between us and Mr. Forsyth, it had been agreed in principle—

1. That the territory in the actual possession, at the present moment, of Shere Ali Khan should be considered to constitute the limits of Afghanistan.

2. That beyond these limits the Ameer should make no attempt to exercise any influence or interference, and that the English Government should do all in their power to restrain him from any attempts at aggression.

3. That, for their part, the Imperial Government should use all their influence to prevent any attack by the Emir of Bokhara upon Afghan territory.

These principles had been unreservedly accepted both by the Cabinet of London and the Governor-General of India.

In May, 1870, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador had communicated to us a despatch from Lord Mayo, which, while fully accepting those principles, drew from them conclusions which seemed to us to lose sight, in most material points, of the spirit of the original agreement.

I enclose copy of this paper, by which your Excellency will perceive the important character of the modification introduced by Lord Mayo.

Section 4 of his despatch records the principle which has been laid down with respect to the recognised limits of Afghan territory, that is to say, of all the provinces in the actual possession of Shere Ali.

Section 6 expresses the satisfaction with which he sees Russian policy so completely in harmony with that of the Governor-General of India, as approved by the British Government.

In Section 7 he fully accepts the proposal that, in furtherance of this policy of peace, the Russian and British Governments should take measures to ascertain the limits of the territories which acknowledged the sovereignty of Dost Mahomed Khan, and are in the actual possession of Shere Ali Khan.

In Section 8 he refers to a telegram announcing that the

Indian Government will address remonstrances to Shere Ali Khan in case of his showing any disposition whatever to extend his possessions beyond the boundary line held by Dost Mahomed Khan. He adds, that to the north and north-west the possessions of the present Ameer almost exactly coincide with those of his father; and the conclusion he draws is, that consequently the boundaries of the kingdom of Dost Mahomed Khan may, on the whole, be accepted as the boundaries which are to separate the kingdom of Afghanistan on the north and north-east from the other States of Central Asia.

Thus, in one and the same despatch, starting from the present *uti possidetis* of Shere Ali Khan, we are led by an imperceptible gradation to the adoption, as the natural boundary line of Afghanistan, of the limits of the territory occupied by Dost Mahomed Khan. This important distinction is the measure of the difference between our views and those of Lord Mayo. We took no notice of it in our official answer to the despatch of the Governor-General of India, for several reasons.

In the first place, all the data we have to rely on respecting those regions are very vague and uncertain. The little native testimony that there is, is unworthy of credence. The maps are problematic, hypothetical, and often contradictory. No country offers less resource to the inquirer into its historical and geographical conditions, past or present.

In the second place, it had been agreed that General Kaufmann, whose position in contact with those countries enabled him to throw much light upon these questions, should be commissioned to collect all the information possible respecting their political situation. We are now waiting for the result of the instructions we gave him.

Lastly, it is the belief of the Imperial Cabinet—a belief that we trust is shared by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty—that it is no question in this case of settling things for the moment, but of insuring that the sound principles as to which the two Governments are so happily in accordance should be put into practice, and eventually so developed as to make

them the basis of a staple and permanent policy, such as may be a guarantee for the security of their respective interests and relations, as well as for the peace and prosperity of the countries which lie between their respective frontiers.

Such being our views, we consider that the essential thing was not to precipitate matters at the risk of compromising the result, by basing it on incomplete and conjectural data, which might lead eventually to differences of interpretation. We were, on the contrary, of opinion that after once laying down the general principles, the most important point was to make a most careful study of the ground to which they were to be applied, so as to avoid all danger of future misunderstanding, and thus give sound practical effect to the sincere and loyal intentions of the two Governments.

Sir A. Buchanan having, however, at the moment that he was leaving Russia, reverted in a pressing manner to the subject, we are unwilling to delay any longer in making the Government of Her Britannic Majesty acquainted with our views on a question which is one of equal interest to both Governments.

(Signed) GORTCHAKOW.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

Foreign Office, October 17th, 1872.

MY LORD,—Her Majesty's Government have not yet received from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg communication of the Report which General Kaufmann was long since instructed to draw up on the countries south of the Oxus which are claimed by the Ruler of Afghanistan as his hereditary possessions.

Her Majesty's Government have awaited this communication in full confidence that impartial inquiries instituted by that distinguished officer would confirm the views they themselves take of this matter, and so enable the two Governments to come

to a prompt and definitive decision on the question that has been so long in discussion between them.

But as the expected communication has not reached them, and as they consider it of importance, both for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in Central Asia and for removing all causes of misunderstanding between the Imperial Government and themselves, I will no longer delay making known through your Excellency to the Imperial Government the conclusion at which Her Majesty's Government have arrived after carefully weighing all the evidence before them.

In the opinion, then, of Her Majesty's Government the right of the Ameer of Cabul (Shere Ali) to the possession of the territories up to the Oxus as far down as Khoja Saleh is fully established, and they believe, and have so stated to him through the Indian Government, that he would have a right to defend these territories if invaded. On the other hand, Her Majesty's authorities in India have declared their determination to remonstrate strongly with the Ameer should he evince any disposition to overstep these limits of his kingdom.

Hitherto the Ameer has proved most amenable to the advice offered to him by the Indian Government, and has cordially accepted the peaceful policy which they have recommended him to adopt, because the Indian Government have been able to accompany their advice with an assurance that the territorial integrity of Afghanistan would in like manner be respected by those Powers beyond his frontiers which are amenable to the influence of Russia. The policy thus happily inaugurated has produced the most beneficial results in the establishment of peace in the countries where it has long been unknown.

Her Majesty's Government believe that it is now in the power of the Russian Government, by an explicit recognition of the right of the Ameer of Cabul to these territories which he now claims, which Bokhara herself admits to be his, and which all evidence as yet produced shows to be in his actual and effectual possession, to assist the British Government in perpetuating, as far as it is in human power to do so, the peace

and prosperity of those regions, and in removing for ever by such means all cause of uneasiness and jealousy between England and Russia in regard to their respective policies in Asia.

For your Excellency's more complete information I state the territories and boundaries which Her Majesty's Government consider as fully belonging to the Ameer of Cabul, viz.:—

(1.) Badakshan, with its dependent district of Wakhan from the Sarikal (Woods Lake) on the east to the junction of the Kokcha River with the Oxus (or Penjah), forming the northern boundary of this Afghan province throughout its entire extent.

(2.) Afghan-Turkestan, comprising the districts of Kunduz, Khulm, and Balkh, the northern boundary of which would be the line of the Oxus from the junction of the Kokcha River to the post of the Khoja Saleh, inclusive, on the high road from Bokhara to Balkh. Nothing to be claimed by the Afghan Ameer on the left bank of the Oxus below Khoja Saleh.

(3.) The internal districts of Aksha, Seripool, Maimenat, Shibberjan, and Andkoi, the latter of which would be the extreme Afghan frontier possession to the north-west, the desert beyond belonging to independent tribes of Turcomans.

(4.) The western Afghan frontier between the dependencies of Herat and those of the Persian province of Khorassan is well known and need not here be defined.

Your Excellency will give a copy of this despatch to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am, etc.,

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Prince Gortchakow to His Excellency Count Brunnow.

(Translation.) *St. Petersburg, December 7th,* 1872.

M. LE COMTE,—Your Excellency has already received copy of Lord Granville's despatch of the 17th October, which was

communicated to us by Lord A. Loftus, by order of his Government.

It refers to the affairs of Central Asia.

Before answering it, it becomes necessary for me to recapitulate the different phases of the negotiations between us and the English Cabinet upon this question.

The two Governments were equally desirous to forestall any cause of disagreement between them in that part of Asia. Both wished to establish such a state of things as would secure peace in those countries, and consolidate the relations of friendship and good understanding between the two Governments.

They had consequently come to an agreement that it was expedient to have a certain "intermediary" zone, for the purpose of preserving their respective possessions from immediate contact.

Afghanistan seemed well fitted to supply what was needed; and it was consequently agreed that the two Governments should use all their influence with their neighbouring States towards preventing any collision or encroachment one side or the other of this "intermediary" zone.

All that remained, in order to make the agreement between the two Cabinets as complete in fact as it was already in principle, was to trace the exact limits of the zone.

It was here that a doubtful point arose.

The founder of the Afghan State, Dost Mahomed Khan, had left behind him a state of confusion which did not allow of the territorial extension which Afghanistan had acquired at certain moments of his reign being accepted as a basis.

It was consequently agreed that no territories should be taken into account, but such as having formerly recognised the authority of Dost Mahomed were still in the actual possession of Shere Ali Khan.

It thus became necessary to ascertain, with all possible accuracy, what were the territories in his actual possession.

For this purpose it was requisite to have positive local data, which neither Government possessed, with reference to these distant and imperfectly-known countries.

It was agreed that the Governor-General of Turkestan should be instructed to take advantage of his residence in the proximity of, and his relations with, the neighbouring Khanates, to collect all the information necessary to throw light upon the question, and to enable the two Governments to come to a practical decision with the facts before them.

Such was the point, M. le Comte, as your excellency will recollect, at which our negotiations with the English Cabinet had arrived.

In conformity with this decision, M. l'Aide-de-camp Général de Kaufmann had taken every possible measure towards carrying out this preliminary investigation. Owing, moreover, to difficulties arising out of the distances involved, the excessively complicated nature of the points to be elucidated, the absence of genuine sources of information, and the impossibility of a direct inquiry, he was unable to accomplish his task as speedily as we, no less than the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, would have desired. Hence the delay pointed out in Lord Granville's despatch.

We have, however, already drawn attention to the fact that the cause of the delay is to be found in the serious attention which the Imperial Cabinet devoted to this affair. It would have been easy to rest content with hastily collected notions, which later would have given rise to misunderstandings. We preferred to study the question conscientiously, since it was one of giving a solid and durable basis to the political organisation of Central Asia, and to the good and friendly relations, present as well as future, which the two Governments aimed at establishing between them on that basis.

At the beginning of last October, the Imperial Ministry was able to announce to Lord A. Loftus and to your Excellency that the Councillor of State Struve, to whom these inquiries had been intrusted, had at last just arrived at St. Petersburg, and that, as soon as the materials he had collected had been put into shape the result would be communicated to the Cabinet in London. It was whilst this work was going on that Lord

Granville's despatch was communicated to us, informing us of the opinion which Her Britannic Majesty's Government has thought fit to form upon the points under discussion.

The Imperial Cabinet, having in view the spirit of the agreement arrived at in principle between the two Governments, none the less thinks it its duty to transmit to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty the particulars collected on the spot by order of the Governor-General of Turkestan, and to lay before them most frankly the conclusions which, in its opinion, are their natural consequences.

These particulars and conclusions are contained in the letter, copy of which is enclosed, which M. l'Aide-de-camp Général de Kaufmann has just addressed to me, and in the Memorandum which forms its inclosure.

I will sum them up :—

The question to be settled had two sides :—

1. To ascertain the real state of possession at this moment, so far as it is possible to prove it in those countries.

2. Starting from this *status quo* as a basis, to seek for a line of demarcation, to be traced, which will best answer the object of the present negotiations ; that is, to remove as far as possible all cause of conflict or mutual encroachments between the neighbouring Khanates, and consequently assure, as far as can be done, the state of peace which henceforward the two Governments should respectively use all their influence to cause to be respected.

Looking at the question from these two points of view, its study led to the following conclusions :—

1. That to the north, the Amou Daria, forms, in fact, the proper frontier of Afghanistan, from its confluence with the Kouktcha, as far as the point of Khodja Saleh.

So far our data confirm the opinion of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, and the frontier in question seems the more reasonable, that it can give rise to no disputes on the part of the inhabitants of the banks of the Amou Daria.

2. To the north-east, the data we have collected give the

confluence of that river with the Kouktcha as the limit of the districts over which Shere Ali Khan exercises actual undisputed sovereignty. Beyond that limit, and especially with regard to Badakshan and Wakhan, it has been impossible to find any traces of such a sovereignty; on the contrary, all our information upon the subject goes to prove that these districts should be regarded as independent. In the communication from Her Britannic Majesty's Government, which was made to us in November last, it is seen that, according to the testimony of Major Montgomery, the Ameer of Cabul has "considerable authority" in Badakshan, and that the Afghans have "assisted Mahmood Shah to upset the Emir or Chief of this country, Jehandar Shah." But these facts themselves seem to point rather to the real independence of Badakshan than to its absolute subjection to the Ameer of Cabul. The information collected by M. Struve, and contained in his Memorandum, supports this conclusion. Mention is made, it is true, of interference by the Afghan Ameer in the internal disputes of Badakshan, and of attempts on his part to get his assistance paid for by a kind of tribute; but nowhere are the signs to be found which, in Asia, accompany the exercise of the rights of sovereignty; for instance, the presence in the country of Afghan officers, and of officials to collect the taxes. The Chiefs of Badakshan looked upon themselves, and were looked upon by their neighbours, as independent Chiefs.

It follows that, from these facts, at the most it may be granted that the Ameer of Cabul has on various occasions attempted to bring Badakshan under his dominion, that he has several times profited by internal discord to exercise over the country considerable control, based on his position as a neighbour and the superiority of his forces; but that it is impossible to deduce from them the existence of a real and uncontested sovereign power.

As to Wakhan, that country seems to have remained up to the present moment even more outside the circle of the direct action of the Chiefs of Afghanistan.

3. We have next to inquire whether or not, in this state of things, and in view of our common object—that is, the establishment in those regions of a permanent peace guaranteed by both Governments—it is well to recognise the rights claimed by the Ameer of Cabul over Badakshan and Wakhan, and to comprise these two countries within the territorial limits of Afghanistan. Such is not the opinion of M. l'Aide-de-camp Général Kaufmann, and the Imperial Cabinet arrives at the same conclusions.

In the present state of things there is no dispute between Badakshan and her neighbours. Bokhara puts forward no claim to that country. The two States are, besides, too weak, too absorbed in their own affairs, to wish to quarrel. England and Russia would consequently have nothing to do but to maintain this state of peace as well between these Khanates as between Afghanistan and Badakshan; and this task would not seem beyond their power. Far otherwise would it be the day that the Ameer of Cabul should extend his authority over Badakshan and Wakhan. He would find himself in immediate contact with Kashgar, Kokand, and Bokhara, from which he is now separated by those two countries. From that moment it would be far more difficult to avoid contests due either to his ambition and consciousness of power, or to the jealousy of his neighbours. This would give a most precarious basis to the peace which it is sought to establish in those countries, and compromise the two Governments who would be called upon to guarantee it. This arrangement would consequently seem to us to go directly counter to the object which they have in common. It would appear to us much more in keeping with that object to allow the present state of things to continue. Badakshan and Wakhan would thus form a barrier interposed between the Northern and Southern States of Central Asia, and this barrier, strengthened by the combined action which England and Russia are able to bring to bear upon such of those States as are accessible to their influence, would effectually prevent any dangerous contact, and would in our opinion secure, as far as anything could do so, the peace of those countries.

4. As for the boundaries to be recognised as those of Afghanistan on the north-west, starting from Khodja Saleh, the information we have received equally throws doubts upon the *de facto* possession by the Ameer of Cabul of the towns of Aktchi, Seripool, Meimané, Chibirgan, and Andkhoi, which it is a question of comprising within the acknowledged boundaries of Afghanistan.

These districts, however, being divided from Bokhara by deserts, would not, if annexed to the Afghan territory, offer the same dangers of contact that we have pointed out on the north-east; and their annexation would not, consequently, be open to the same objections.

If the Government of Her Britannic Majesty adheres to its opinion of the expediency of comprising these places in the limits of the Afghan territory, we will not insist upon the principle from which we started, namely, that no districts should be acknowledged as part of Afghanistan but such as had been under the rule of Dost Mohamed Khan, and were, at this moment, in actual subjection to Shere Ali Khan. In deference to the wish of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, the Imperial Cabinet would be disposed, as far as this portion of the boundary is concerned, to accept the line laid down in Lord Granville's despatch. Such, M. le Comte, are briefly the conclusions which we think the materials in our hands justify us in forming.

Be so good as to lay them before the Chief Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty. Our intention, in communicating them to his Excellency, is not only to fulfil our promise. We believe that, in attempting the rational solution of a question which interests the two Governments equally, we are best carrying out the purpose which has animated both ever since their first friendly interchange of ideas.

Receive, etc.,

(Signed) GORTCHAKOW.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

Foreign Office, January 8, 1873.

My Lord,—Having received information from your Excellency and from Count Brunnow that Count Schouvaloff, a statesman enjoying the full confidence of the Emperor of Russia, had left St. Petersburg for London at the desire of His Imperial Majesty, I had the pleasure of receiving His Excellency on the 8th inst.

He confirmed the fact that it was by the Emperor's desire that he had sought a personal interview with me. It had caused great surprise to His Imperial Majesty to learn from various sources that a certain amount of excitement and susceptibility had been caused in the public mind of this country on account of questions connected with Central Asia.

The Emperor knew of no questions in Central Asia which could affect the good understanding between the two countries. It was true that no agreement has been come to as to some of the details of the arrangement concluded by Lord Clarendon and Prince Gortchakow on the basis of Mr. Forsyth's recommendations as to the boundaries of Afghanistan; but the question ought not to be a cause to ruffle the good relations between the two countries. His Imperial Majesty had agreed to almost everything that we had asked. There remained only the point regarding the provinces of Badakshan and Wakhan. There might be arguments used respectively by the Departments of each Government, but the Emperor was of opinion that such a question should not be a cause of difference between the two countries, and His Imperial Majesty was determined that it should not be so. He was the more inclined to carry out this determination in consequence of His Majesty's belief in the conciliatory policy of Her Majesty's Government.

Count Schouvaloff added, on his own part, that he had every reason to believe, if it were desired by Her Majesty's Government, the agreement might be arrived at at a very early period.

With regard to the expedition to Khiva, it was true that it

was decided upon for next spring. To give an idea of its character it was sufficient to say that it would consist of four and a half battalions. Its object was to punish acts of brigandage, to recover fifty Russian prisoners, and to teach the Khan that such conduct on his part could not be continued with the impunity in which the moderation of Russia had led him to believe. Not only was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the conditions imposed should be such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged occupancy of Khiva. Count Schouvaloff repeated the surprise which the Emperor, entertaining such sentiments, felt at the uneasiness which it was said existed in England on the subject, and he gave me most decided assurance that I might give positive assurances to Parliament on this matter.

With regard to the uneasiness which might exist in England on the subject of Central Asia, I could not deny the fact to Count Schouvaloff; the people of this country were decidedly in favour of peace, but a great jealousy existed as to anything which really affected our honour and interest; that they were particularly alive to anything affecting India; that the progress of Russia in Asia had been considerable, and sometimes as it would appear, like England in India and France in Algeria, more so than was desired by the Central Governments; that the Clarendon and Gortchakow arrangement, apparently agreeable to both Governments, had met with great delay as to its final settlement; that it was with the object of coming to a settlement satisfactory to both countries, and in a friendly and conciliatory spirit, that I had addressed to your Excellency the despatch of the 17th October.

The only point of difference which now remained, as Count Schouvaloff had pointed out, concerned Badakshan and Wakhan. In our opinion, historical facts proved that these countries were under the domination of the Sovereign of Cabul, and we have acknowledged as much in public documents; that, with regard to the expedition to Khiva, Count Schouvaloff was aware that

Lord Northbrook had given the strongest advice to the Khan to comply with the reasonable demands of the Emperor, and if the expedition were undertaken and carried out with the object and within the limits described by Count Schouvaloff, it would meet with no remonstrance from Her Majesty's Government, but it would undoubtedly excite public attention, and make the settlement of the boundary of Afghanistan more important for the object which both Governments had in view, viz., peace in Central Asia, and good relations between the two countries.

As to coming to a decision at an early date, it appeared to me desirable, inasmuch as it would bear a different aspect if arrived at in the spirit with which both Governments were actuated, and not complicated by possible discussions raised in the British Parliament.

I concluded by telling Count Schouvaloff that I knew the confidence which was placed in him by the Emperor, and that I felt sure that my colleagues would agree with me in appreciating his visit to England, as a gratifying proof of the eminently conciliatory and friendly spirit with which the Emperor desired to settle without delay the question at issue.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Prince Gortchakow to His Excellency Count Brunnow.

(Translation.) *St. Petersburg, January* $\frac{19}{31}$, 1873.

M. LE COMTE,—Lord Augustus Loftus has communicated to me the reply of Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State to our despatch on Central Asia of the 19th of December.

I enclose a copy of this document.

We see with satisfaction that the English Cabinet continues to pursue in those parts the same object as ourselves, that of ensuring to them peace, and, as far as possible, tranquillity.

The divergence which existed in our views was with regard to the frontiers assigned to the dominions of Shere Ali.

The English Cabinet includes within them Badakshan and Wakhan, which, according to our views, enjoyed a certain independence. Considering the difficulty experienced in establishing the facts in all their details in those distant parts, considering the greater facilities which the British Government possesses for collecting precise data, and, above all, considering our wish not to give to this question of detail greater importance than is due to it, we do not refuse to accept the line of boundary laid down by England.

We are the more inclined to this act of courtesy as the English Government engages to use all her influence with Shere Ali, in order to induce him to maintain a peaceful attitude, as well as to insist on his giving up all measures of aggression or further conquest. This influence is indisputable. It is based not only on the material and moral ascendency of England, but also on the subsidies for which Shere Ali is indebted to her. Such being the case, we see in this assurance a real guarantee for the maintenance of peace.

Your Excellency will have the goodness to make this declaration to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, and to give him a copy of this despatch.

We are convinced that Lord Granville will perceive in it a fresh proof of the value which our august Master attaches to the maintenance and consolidation of the most friendly relations with the Government of Her Majesty Queen Victoria.

Receive, etc.,

(Signed) GORTCHAKOW.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

Foreign Office, January 7th, 1874.

MY LORD,—Her Majesty's Government have received from Mr. Doria, in his despatch of the 20th ultimo, a translation of the Treaty of Peace concluded between General Kaufmann and

the Khan of Khiva, as published in the "Messager Officiel" of $\frac{\text{November 30}}{\text{December 12}}$.

By Article I. the Khan of Khiva acknowledges himself to be the humble servant of the Emperor of Russia, and renounces the right of maintaining diplomatic relations, or of entering into Commercial or other Treaties with the neighbouring Rulers and Khans; and he further engages not to undertake military operations against them without the knowledge and permission of the Russian authorities in Central Asia. By subsequent provisions the whole of the territory belonging to Khiva on the right bank of the Oxus, together with the delta of that river from the point where the most westerly branch leaves the main stream, are ceded to Russia, who is also to have the exclusive control of the navigation of the Oxus, and the right of establishing, on the left bank of the river, factories, wharves, and the necessary buildings for the formation of commercial depôts in such localities as may be selected by the Russian authorities for the purpose. An indemnity of 2,200,000 roubles is, moreover, exacted from the Khan, the payment of which is extended over nineteen years, *i.e.*, till November, 1892.

It also appears that a fort is in course of construction on the right bank of the Oxus, near Shourakhan, and about thirty miles distant from the town of Khiva, due east, to receive a Russian garrison.

Her Majesty's Government see no practical advantage in examining too minutely how far these arrangements are in strict accordance with the assurances given to me in January last by Count Schouvaloff as to the intentions with which the expedition against Khiva was undertaken. They are not disposed to share in the exaggerated apprehensions which have at times been expressed in this country as to the danger to British rule in India which may arise from the extension of Russian influence in Central Asia.

At the same time each step of that progress renders it more desirable that a clear and frank understanding should continue to exist between the two countries as to the relative position of

British and Russian interests in Asia, and it is with that object that Her Majesty's Government think it right on the present occasion to review the communications which have passed on the subject, and the positions of affairs as they stand in respect of the future. In doing so they are fulfilling the wish expressed by Prince Gortchakow, in conversation with Sir A. Buchanan, on the 2nd of November, 1869, when he begged that Lord Clarendon might be told that "as both Governments are free from all *arrière-pensées*, ambitious views, or unfriendly feelings towards each other, the more fully and frankly all questions connected with Central Asia are discussed between them, the more effectually will the 'mists' be blown away which, through the misrepresentations of over-zealous subordinate agents, may at any time hang over them."

In the spring of 1860 Lord Clarendon, in several conversations with Baron Brunnow, drew attention to the rapid progress of the Russian troops in Central Asia, and made a proposal for the "recognition of some territory as neutral between the possessions of England and Russia, which should be the limit of those possessions, and which should be scrupulously respected by both Powers."

Prince Gortchakow, to whom Baron Brunnow had communicated Lord Clarendon's suggestions, replied that "the idea of maintaining between the possessions of the two Empires in Asia a zone to preserve them from any contact" had always been shared by the Emperor, and he authorised Baron Brunnow to "repeat to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State the positive assurance that His Imperial Majesty looks upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence. No intervention or interference whatever, opposed to the independence of that State, enters into his intentions."

Lord Clarendon answered, after expressing the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the friendly feelings which had prompted Prince Gortchakow's communication, that the Secretary of State for India, having consulted those members of his

Council who were well acquainted with the countries in question, had arrived at a decided opinion that Afghanistan would not fulfil those conditions of a neutral territory that it was the object of the two Governments to establish, and that it was therefore thought advisable to propose that the Upper Oxus should be the boundary line which neither Power should permit its forces to cross.

To this proposal, however, Prince Gortchakow objected, in a conversation which took place between him and Lord Clarendon at Heidelberg in the autumn of 1869, on the ground that a portion of country south of the Oxus was claimed by the Ameer of Bokhara, and that this might lead to differences between the Russian and English Governments. Further communications followed during the visit of Mr. Forsyth to St. Petersburg, and these resulted in an understanding, the summary of which is thus stated by Prince Gortchakow in his despatch to Count Brunnow of the 1st November, 1871 :—

1. That the territory in the actual possession at the present moment of Shere Ali Khan should be considered to constitute the limits of Afghanistan.

2. That beyond these limits the Ameer should make no attempt to exercise any influence or interference, and that the English Government should do all in their power to restrain him from any attempts at aggression.

3. That, for their part, the Imperial Government should use all their influence to prevent any attack by the Ameer of Bokhara upon Afghan territory.

Prince Gortchakow further stated, in a conversation which he had with Sir A. Buchanan on the 1st November, 1869, that he felt assured that the advice of Russia to the Khan of Khokand to live in peace with his neighbours would be followed; and, with regard to Kashgaria, or Yarkand, he authorised the Indian Government to assure the Atalik Ghazee, who had recently established a Government in that country, "that Russia had no hostile intentions towards him, or any desire to make conquests in his territories."

Some delay not unnaturally occurred in the settlement of the boundary of Afghanistan, for it required an investigation into the condition of countries little known either to the British or to the Russian authorities. Ultimately, there was a difference of opinion between the two Governments upon the question whether Badakshan and Wakhan did or did not form part of the provinces held by the Ameer. Her Majesty's Government gladly take this opportunity of again acknowledging the friendly and conciliatory spirit shown by the Imperial Government in the acceptance by them of the views advanced on the part of Great Britain, as the frontier line of Afghanistan at these and other points.

Those views were stated, as you are aware, in my despatch to your Excellency of October 17, 1872, and the assent of the Imperial Government to the definition of the Afghan frontier as therein laid down, will be found in Prince Gortchakow's despatches to Baron Brunnow, of December 7, 1872, and January 19, 1873.

Such was the agreement arrived at between the two countries. On their part, Her Majesty's Government may fairly claim that it has been faithfully executed to the full extent of their power. The influence of the Government of India has been successfully exercised to dissuade the Ameer of Afghanistan from interference in the affairs of Bokhara, and from any attempt at encroachment on the territories beyond his frontier; and their action in this respect has been acknowledged by the Russian Government. Advice of a similarly pacific character has been given by the Indian Government to the Ruler of Yarkand, and they have declined to exercise any interference in the affairs of Bokhara and Khiva, when appealed to, more than once, by Envoys from those countries.

Her Majesty's Government bear willing testimony to the fact that the action of the Russian Government on various occasions has been in accordance with the same policy, as, for instance, in the efforts made by them to discourage any aggression by the Khan of Bokhara on the territories of Afghanistan,

and in the refusal of General Kaufmann to give any countenance to the designs of Abdul Rahman Khan, nephew of the Ameer of Afghanistan, upon the tranquillity of that country.

The Indian Government have repeated, and will continue to repeat, as opportunity may offer, advice in the same sense as that which they have hitherto given to the Ameer of Afghanistan, but it is not unnatural that that ruler should feel and express some uneasiness at the rapid advance of Russian power towards his frontier. His apprehensions have been more especially roused by the reported intention to send a Russian expedition to capture Merve and reduce the Turkoman tribes of those parts, and he has applied to the Government of India for advice on the subject.

Rumours of such an expedition, to be undertaken in the ensuing spring, have reached Her Majesty's Government from various quarters. The plan has been recommended, as you are aware, by some of the most influential organs of the Russian press. The Turkoman tribes themselves state that they have received formal warning of such an intention from the Russian authorities, and are reported to have invoked the protection of Persia. It may, indeed, be true that such an expedition is as yet discountenanced and disavowed by the Government at St. Petersburg, but past experience shows that it would be unwise to look upon the project as being, therefore, entirely out of the question. Circumstances may occur, as they have more than once occurred before, to force the Russian Government into a course to which they are on principle opposed. The difficulties of a Power like Russia, in dealing with wild tribes on its frontier, such as those in the deserts bordering on Khiva, are well described in Prince Gortchakow's Circular of the 21st of November, 1864. As soon as one territory is subdued, and the populations immediately bordering on it are reduced, more or less, to subjection, fresh aggressions are committed by more distant tribes. Fresh expeditions against these become necessary; and to give to these expeditions any lasting effect, fresh annexations and occupations are required. At the time of that Circular,

and in order to obviate the inconveniences thus set forth, the determination was announced to adopt for the Russian possessions in Central Asia a final line of frontier, stretching from Lake Isyk Kul to the Syr Daria, and embracing the town of Tchemkend, which was to be fortified for the purpose. But in practice it was found impossible to adhere to this line. Expeditions against Bokhara had soon afterwards to be undertaken. Taschkend, Khojend, Jeezakh, and Samarkand were successively occupied.

Speaking to Lord Clarendon in September, 1869, Prince Gortchakow stated that "the Emperor considered, and he entirely shared His Majesty's opinion, that extension of territory was extension of weakness, and that Russia had no intention of going further south." As a proof of this determination, he added that it was the intention of the Emperor not to retain Samarkand. Difficulties, however, interfered with the restoration of Samarkand to the Ameer of Bokhara: First, in regard to the payment of the indemnity due by that country to Russia, and later as to the protection of Russian interests which had grown up among the population, and as to the guarantees to be obtained against misconduct on the part of its future rulers; and although Sir A. Buchanan reported in July, 1870, that Prince Orloff had been authorised by the Emperor to confirm the assurances given by Prince Gortchakow in the preceding year, still eventually, as was confessed by Prince Gortchakow himself in February last, the Imperial Government found, after an occupation of four years' duration, and in view of the advantages which it had conferred on the population of the city, that they could not with credit to themselves, nor in justice to the inhabitants, restore Samarkand to the Government of Bokhara, and on these grounds Russia has retained possession of it.

It is unnecessary to retrace the series of circumstances which, in spite of the reluctance of the Russian Government, led to the recent expedition against Khiva.

In the face of these events it would be unwise not to contemplate the possibility that considerations of self-defence, or

the necessity of punishing acts of plunder and hostility, may eventually give occasion for a Russian expedition against the Turkoman tribes.

Those tribes have now applied to the Ameer of Cabul for advice as to the attitude which they should assume towards the Russians, and he, in his turn, has consulted the Government of India as to the reply which he should make. He has at the same time expressed his apprehensions that the result of a Russian expedition against Merve will be to drive the Turkomans to take refuge in the province of Badghees in Herat. This, the Ameer fears, will lay him open to a demand from the Russian authorities, that he shall either prevent the Turkomans from committing aggressions, or permit the Russian forces to enter the territories of Afghanistan for the purpose of punishing the hostile tribes. An incident of this kind occurred, as you are aware, not long ago on the Persian frontier, and led to a correspondence between the Russian and Persian Governments.

The advice given by the Government of India has been in conformity with the policy hitherto pursued. The Ameer has been warned that he should avoid taking any course which would make him responsible for lawless or hostile proceedings on the part of the Turkoman tribes. The Viceroy of India has at the same time endeavoured to reassure him as to the safety of his territories from any aggression or attack on the part of Russia.

In face of the agreement which exists between the two countries, it is unnecessary for Her Majesty's Government to make any profession of their conviction that Afghanistan is perfectly secure from any hostile designs on the part of Russia. They think it best, however, to bring the fears entertained by the Ameer to the knowledge of the Russian Government, and to express their earnest hope that the question of any further expedition against the Turkoman tribes may be carefully considered, in conjunction with the results which the Ameer of Cabul apprehends may ensue from it. They think it right to state candidly and at once that the independence of Afghanistan is

regarded by them as a matter of great importance to the welfare and security of British India, and to the tranquillity of Asia. Should the Turkoman tribes be driven into the neighbourhood of Herat, now or hereafter, in consequence of any military operations effected by Russian power, the Ameer might labour under a double hardship: First, in the disturbance of his dominions; secondly, if he were held responsible for controlling tribes of that wild race and restraining them from incursions upon the country from which Russia had expelled them. On the one hand, it does not appear how he could justly be held responsible in such circumstances, and, if he were so held, he would have a strong claim to consideration on the part of all such as rightly appreciate his position; on the other hand, questions might thus be raised which it was the object of the engagement entered into between Great Britain and Russia to obviate, and which it cannot be the interest of either country to revive.

You will read this despatch to Prince Gortchakow, and give him a copy of it.

I am, etc.,

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Prince Gortchakow to His Excellency Count Brunnow.

(Translation.) *St. Petersburg, January* 21, 1874.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Excellency copy of a despatch from Lord Granville which Lord A. Loftus has been instructed to communicate to us.

I have expressed to the British Ambassador the entire satisfaction which we feel at the just view taken by Her Majesty's Government with regard to the questions which we are called upon to treat together in Asia.

In my opinion the understanding is complete. It rests not only upon the loyalty of the two Governments, but upon mutual political advantages which are palpably evident. So long as they shall be animated by a spirit of mutual good-will and conciliation, no political misunderstanding is to be apprehended between them.

For our part, we remain constantly faithful to the programme traced by mutual agreement, as resulted from my interviews with Lord Clarendon and as developed and defined by the communications between the two Cabinets.

I have repeated to Lord A. Loftus the positive assurance that the Imperial Cabinet continues to consider Afghanistan as entirely beyond its sphere of action.

If on either side the two Governments exercise their ascendency over the States placed within the range of their natural influence, in order to deter them from all aggression, there is reason to hope that no violent collision will occur to disturb the repose of Central Asia and interfere with the work of civilisation, which it is the duty and the interest of the two great Empires to bring to a favourable issue.

As far as we are concerned, it is in this sense that we act towards the Khanats which lie upon our borders. We have a full assurance that the Government of India will act in the same manner with regard to the Emir of Cabul, and we have no doubt that it possesses the means of making itself listened to.

As regards the eventual danger pointed out to us by Lord Granville, and to which Shere Ali appears already to have called the attention of the Government of India, namely, that nomade tribes of Turkomans driven off by our troops may return to seek assistance or refuge on the territory of Herat, and may bring about a conflict between us and Afghanistan, I have told Lord A. Loftus that we had no intention of undertaking an expedition against the Turkomans; it depended entirely on them to live on good terms with us, and even to derive profit from our proximity and from the outlets which we are endeavouring to make for peaceful commerce; but if these turbulent tribes

were to take to attacking or plundering us, we should be compelled to punish them. This is a necessity which Her Majesty's Government know from their own experience, and which no Government in contact with wild populations can avoid. We are in any case the first to wish that this punishment, if it becomes necessary, should be inflicted as near as possible to our own frontier. Lord A. Loftus has received the same assurances them the mouth of our august Master, and has doubtless reported from to his Government.

I added that, although the eventuality pointed out by Shere Ali is scarcely probable, the Emir of Cabul can assist in removing the possibility of it by making the Turkomans understand clearly beforehand, that if they provoke rigorous measures by acts of depredation against us, they cannot count upon any assistance or protection from him.

The Indian Government is certainly in a position to give him this advice in a form which will insure its effectiveness.

Be good enough to communicate these observations to Lord Granville, and to repeat to his Excellency our conviction that the two Governments have an equal interest in not allowing their good relations to be disturbed by the intrigues of Asiatic Khans, and that so long as they both act together with a feeling of mutual confidence and goodwill, the tranquillity of Central Asia will be sufficiently guaranteed against all eventualities.

(Signed) GORTCHAKOW.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

Foreign Office, May 19, 1876.

MY LORD,—Her Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the Memorandum of which a copy was enclosed in your despatch of the 13th instant, containing the

proposals of the Governments of Austria, Germany, and Russia for the pacification of the Herzegovina and Bosnia.

These proposals had been agreed upon by Count Andrassy, Prince Bismarck, and Prince Gortchakow at a meeting at Berlin, and your Excellency was requested to communicate them to Her Majesty's Government with the hope that Her Majesty's Government would accede to them and express their opinion at once upon the telegraphic summary furnished by your Excellency.

I informed your Excellency on the 15th instant that it would be necessary for me to consult my colleagues, and that I could not give any reply until after the proposals of the three Governments had been considered by the Cabinet.

I have now to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government regret to find themselves unable to co-operate in the policy which the three Governments have invited them to pursue. Her Majesty's Government appreciate the advantage of concerted action by the Powers in all that relates to the questions arising out of the insurrection, but they cannot consent to join in proposals which they do not conscientiously believe likely to effect the pacification which all the Powers desire to see attained.

The proposals contained in the Memorandum are directed to pressing upon the Porte the establishment of an armistice for two months, with a view to direct negotiations between the Porte and the delegates of the insurgents on the basis of the wishes which the latter have expressed, and which have been thought fit to serve as points of departure for discussion.

In the first place, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that they would not be justified in insisting upon the Porte consenting to an armistice without knowing whether the military situation admitted of its being established without prejudice to the Turkish Government, and without rendering necessary the exercise of greater efforts on the renewal of the campaign, and a consequent prolongation of the struggle. Moreover, the faithful observance of the armistice by both sides would have to be secured, since the Porte could not well be called upon to suspend operations against the insurgents while the insurrection

was receiving support from Servia and Montenegro, and the insurgents strengthening their position and recruiting their forces and obtaining arms and supplies. The mere fact of the insurrection remaining unsuppressed would be likely to give it additional vitality, and the result of an armistice might, therefore, be to lead to a rejection of any demands which the Porte might fairly be expected to concede, and thus hinder rather than advance the prospects of pacification.

At the same time Her Majesty's Government would not advise the Porte against acceding to an armistice should the Turkish Government consider that the political and military position admitted of it, and its result would be likely to be beneficial, although in view of the objections which I have mentioned, and others of a similar character which will readily occur to your Excellency, Her Majesty's Government do not feel justified in recommending it to the Porte, still less in insisting upon its acceptance.

In my despatch of the 15th instant I have informed your Excellency of some of the objections which I stated to Count Münster had occurred to me in regard to the five points which were proposed as a basis for negotiation between the Porte and the insurgents ; a further consideration of the proposals has not led to any modification of the opinion I then expressed.

Her Majesty's Government doubt whether the Porte has the means of providing for the reconstruction of the houses and churches of the insurgents or of finding subsistence for the returning refugees. If Her Majesty's Government are rightly informed, the cost would be very heavy, and the Porte has not the requisite funds at its disposal.

The distribution of relief by such a Commission as is contemplated would be little better than a system of indiscriminate almsgiving. It would probably be beyond the power of the Porte to adopt, and if adopted, would prove utterly demoralising to any country.

Her Majesty's Government do not mean to say that the Porte would not be wise in affording any practicable facilities

and inducements for the return of the population who have quitted, or been driven from, their homes owing to the insurrection, but they do not consider that they can urge upon the Porte to undertake engagements the observance of which would be beyond its power.

The concentration of the Turkish troops in certain places would be delivering up the whole country to anarchy, particularly when the insurgents are to retain their arms.

The "Consular supervision" would reduce the authority of the Sultan to nullity; and, without force to support it, supervision would be impossible.

Even if there were any prospects of the Porte being willing and able to come to an arrangement with the insurgents on the basis proposed, which Her Majesty's Government scarcely believe possible, the intimation with which the Memorandum closes would render any such negotiation almost certainly abortive, for it could not be supposed that the insurgents would accept any terms of pacification from the Porte in face of the declaration that if the insurrection continued after the armistice the Powers would intervene further.

Regarded in this light the proposal of an armistice seems to Her Majesty's Government to be illusory.

There is another point not referred to in your Excellency's telegraphic summary, but to which it is necessary for me to advert, viz., the proposal in the third paragraph of the Memorandum that the Powers should agree upon the measures to be taken by their respective naval forces for the safety of foreigners and of the Christian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire at Salonica and other places where it might be threatened.

Her Majesty's Government have already desired that Her Majesty's ship *Swiftsure* should proceed to Salonica, and that Admiral Drummond, with three other vessels of war, should go to Besika Bay, where he will be in ready communication with Her Majesty's Embassy, and an additional vessel of small size has been placed in attendance at Constantinople at Sir H. Elliot's request.

They have heard that other Powers have reinforced their squadrons in Turkish waters, and that there is a considerable naval force assembled at Salonica.

Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that the measures thus taken will have had a good effect in affording confidence to the subjects of Great Britain and other Powers at Salonica and elsewhere; and they will readily give instructions to Admiral Drummond and the captains of Her Majesty's ships under his orders, to give any protection and assistance which may be necessary for the preservation of the lives and properties of foreign subjects should they unhappily be in immediate danger, either in concert with the commanding officers of the ships of the other Powers, or, in the absence of any such ships, on their own responsibility. Her Majesty's Government do not, however, at present apprehend any necessity for such measures, and they are of opinion that care should be taken that the naval forces of foreign Powers are not employed in any manner contrary to the Treaty rights of the Porte or subversive of the Sultan's authority.

Your Excellency is authorised to read this despatch to Prince Bismarck, and to leave a copy with his Excellency, should he desire it.

I am, etc.,

(Signed) DERBY.

CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE AFFAIRS OF TURKEY.

Despatch Addressed by the Marquis of Salisbury to Her Majesty's Embassies.

Foreign Office, April 1, 1878.

(MY LORD, SIR),—I have received the Queen's commands to request your Excellency to explain to the Government to which you are accredited the course which Her Majesty's Government

have thought it their duty to pursue in reference to the Preliminaries of Peace concluded between the Ottoman and Russian Governments, and to the European Congress which it has been proposed to hold for the examination of that Treaty.

On the 14th January, in view of the reports which had reached Her Majesty's Government as to the negotiations for peace which were about to be opened between the Russian Government and the Porte, and in order to avoid any possible misconception, Her Majesty's Government instructed Lord A. Loftus to state to Prince Gortchakow that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, any Treaty concluded between the Government of Russia and the Porte affecting the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 must be an European Treaty, and would not be valid without the assent of the Powers who were parties to those Treaties.

On the 25th January the Russian Government replied by the assurance that they did not intend to settle by themselves ("*isolément*") European questions having reference to the peace which is to be made ("*se rattachant à la paix*").

Her Majesty's Government, having learnt that the Bases of Peace had been arranged between the Turkish and Russian Delegates at Kyzanlik, instructed Lord A. Loftus, on the 29th January, to state to the Russian Government that Her Majesty's Government, while recognising any arrangements made by the Russian and Turkish Delegates at Kyzanlik for the conclusion of an armistice and for the settlement of Bases of Peace as binding between the two belligerents, declared that, in so far as those arrangements were calculated to modify European Treaties and to affect general and British interests, Her Majesty's Government were unable to recognise in them any validity unless they were made the subject of a formal agreement among the parties to the Treaty of Paris.

On the 30th January Lord A. Loftus communicated this declaration to Prince Gortchakow, and his Highness replied that to effect an armistice certain Bases of Peace were necessary, but they were only to be considered as Preliminaries and not

definitive as regarded Europe; and stated categorically that questions bearing on European interests would be concerted with European Powers, and that he had given Her Majesty's Government clear and positive assurances to this effect.

On the 4th February the Austrian Ambassador communicated a telegram inviting Her Majesty's Government to a Conference at Vienna, and Her Majesty's Government at once accepted the proposal.

On the 5th February his Excellency addressed a formal invitation to Lord Derby, stating that:—

"L'Autriche-Hongrie, en sa qualité de Puissance Signataire des actes internationaux qui ont eu pour objet de régler le système politique en Orient, a toujours réservé, en présence de la guerre actuelle, sa part d'influence sur le règlement définitif des conditions de la paix future.

"Le Gouvernement Impérial de la Russie, auquel nous avons fait part de ce point de vue, l'a pleinement apprécié.

"Aujourd'hui que des Préliminaires de Paix viennent d'être signés entre la Russie et la Turquie le moment nous semble venu d'établir l'accord de l'Europe sur les modifications qu'il deviendrait nécessaire d'apporter aux Traités susmentionnés.

"Le mode le plus apte à amener cette entente nous paraît être la réunion d'une Conférence des Puissances Signataires du Traité de Paris de 1856 et du Protocole de Londres de 1871."

On the 9th instant the Austrian Government proposed that instead of the Conference at Baden-Baden as previously contemplated, a Congress should be assembled at Berlin. Her Majesty's Government replied that they had no objection to this change, but that they considered "that it would be desirable to have it understood in the first place that all questions dealt with in the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey should be considered as subject to be discussed in the Congress; and that no alteration in the condition of things previously established by Treaty should be acknowledged as valid until it has received the assent of the Powers."

On the 12th March Count Beust was told that Her Majesty's

Government must be perfectly clear on the points mentioned in the letter to him of the 9th instant before they could definitively agree to go into Congress.

On the 13th, Her Majesty's Government explained further the first condition :—

"That they must distinctly understand before they can enter into Congress that every Article in the Treaty between Russia and Turkey will be placed before the Congress, not necessarily for acceptance, but in order that it may be considered what Articles require acceptance or concurrence by the several Powers, and what do not."

On the 14th, the Russian Ambassador communicated the following telegram from Prince Gortchakow :—

"Toutes les Grandes Puissances savent déjà que le texte complet du Traité Préliminaire de Paix avec la Porte leur sera communiqué dès que les ratifications auront été échangées, ce qui ne saurait tarder. Il sera simultanément publié ici. Nous n'avons rien à cacher."

On the 17th, Lord A. Loftus reported that he had received the following Memorandum from Prince Gortchakow :—

"In reply to communication made by Lord A. Loftus of the despatch by which Lord Derby has replied to the proposal of Count Beust relating to the meeting of the Congress at Berlin, I have the honour to repeat the assurance which Count Schouvaloff has been already charged to give to Her Majesty's Government, viz., that the Preliminary Treaty of Peace concluded between Russia and Turkey shall be textually communicated to the Great Powers before the meeting of the Congress, and that in the Congress itself each Power will have the full liberty of its appreciations and of its action."

In a despatch received on the 18th, Lord A. Loftus stated that Prince Gortchakow had said to him that of course he could not impose silence on any member of the Congress, but he could only accept a discussion on those portions of the Treaty which affected European interests.

Lord Derby having asked Count Schouvaloff for a reply

from Prince Gortchakow, His Excellency informed him on the 19th that he was "charged to represent to Her Majesty's Government that the Treaty of Peace concluded between Russia and Turkey—the only one which existed, for there was no secret engagement—would be communicated to the Government of the Queen in its entirety, and long before ('*bien avant*') the assembling of the Congress. The Government of the Queen, in like manner as the other Great Powers, reserved to themselves at the Congress their full liberty of appreciation and action. This same liberty, which she did not dispute to others, Russia claimed for herself. Now, it would be to restrict her, if, alone among all the Powers, Russia contracted a preliminary engagement."

On the 21st, Lord Derby replied that Her Majesty's Government could not recede from the position already clearly defined by them, that they must distinctly understand, before they could enter into Congress, that every Article in the Treaty between Russia and Turkey would be placed before the Congress, not necessarily for acceptance, but in order that it might be considered what Articles required acceptance or concurrence by the other Powers, and what did not.

Her Majesty's Government were unable to accept the view now put forward by Prince Gortchakow, that the freedom of opinion and action in Congress of Russia, more than of any other Power, would be restricted by this preliminary understanding.

Her Majesty's Government therefore desire to ask whether the Government of Russia were willing that the communication of the Treaty *en entier* to the various Powers should be treated as a placing of the Treaty before the Congress, in order that the whole Treaty, in its relation to existing Treaties, might be examined and considered by the Congress.

On the 26th, Count Schouvaloff wrote to Lord Derby that the Imperial Cabinet deemed it its duty to adhere to the declaration which he was ordered to make to the Government of the Queen, and which was stated in the letter which he had the honour to address to him, dated the 19th March.

As different interpretations had been given to the "liberty of appreciation and action" which Russia thought it right to reserve to herself at the Congress, the Imperial Cabinet defined the meaning of the term in the following manner:—

"It leaves to the other Powers the liberty of raising such questions at the Congress as they might think it fit to discuss, and reserves to itself the liberty of accepting or not accepting the discussion of these questions."

Her Majesty's Government deeply regret the decision which the Russian Government have thus announced.

How far the stipulations of the Treaty of San Stefano would commend themselves as expedient to the judgment of the European Powers, it is not at present possible to decide; but even if a considerable portion of them were such as were likely to be approved, the reservation of a right, at discretion, to refuse to accept a discussion of them in a Congress of the Powers would not on that account be the less open to the most serious objection. An inspection of the Treaty will sufficiently show that Her Majesty's Government could not, in a European Congress, accept any partial or fragmentary examination of its provisions. Every material stipulation which it contains involves a departure from the Treaty of 1856.

By the Declaration annexed to the first Protocol of the Conference held in London in 1871, the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers, including Russia, recognised "that it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the Contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement."

It is impossible for Her Majesty's Government, without violating the spirit of this Declaration, to acquiesce in the withdrawal from the cognizance of the Powers of Articles in the new Treaty which are modifications of existing Treaty engagements, and inconsistent with them.

The general nature of the Treaty, and the combined effect of its several stipulations upon the interests of the Signatory

Powers, furnish another and a conclusive reason against the separate discussion of any one portion of those stipulations apart from the rest.

The most important consequences to which the Treaty practically leads are those which result from its action as a whole upon the nations of South-Eastern Europe. By the Articles erecting the New Bulgaria, a strong Slav State will be created under the auspices and control of Russia, possessing important harbours upon the shores of the Black Sea and the Archipelago, and conferring upon that Power a preponderating influence over both political and commercial relations in those seas. It will be so constituted as to merge in the dominant Slav majority a considerable mass of population which is Greek in race and sympathy, and which views with alarm the prospect of absorption into a community alien to it not only in nationality but in political tendency and in religious allegiance. The provisions by which this new State is to be subjected to a ruler whom Russia will practically choose, its Administration framed by a Russian Commissary, and the first working of its institutions commenced under the control of a Russian army, sufficiently indicate the political system of which in future it is to form a part.

Stipulations are added which will extend this influence even beyond the boundaries of the New Bulgaria. The provision, in itself highly commendable, of improved institutions for the populations of Thessaly and Epirus, is accompanied by a condition that the law by which they are to be secured shall be framed under the supervision of the Russian Government. It is followed by engagements for the protection of members of the Russian Church, which are certainly not more limited in their scope than those Articles of the Treaty of Kainardji upon which the claims were founded which were abrogated in 1856. Such stipulations cannot be viewed with satisfaction either by the Government of Greece, or by the Powers to whom all parts of the Ottoman Empire are a matter of common interest. The general effect of this portion of the Treaty will be to increase the power of the Russian Empire in the countries and on the

shores where a Greek population predominates, not only to the prejudice of that nation, but also of every country having interests in the east of the Mediterranean Sea.

The territorial severance from Constantinople of the Greek, Albanian, and Slavonic provinces which are still left under the Government of the Porte will cause their administration to be attended with constant difficulty, and even embarrassment; and will not only deprive the Porte of the political strength which might have arisen from their possession, but will expose the inhabitants to a serious risk of anarchy.

By the other portions of the Treaty analogous results are arrived at upon other frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. The compulsory alienation of Bessarabia from Roumania, the extension of Bulgaria to the shores of the Black Sea, which are principally inhabited by Mussulmans and Greeks, and the acquisition of the important harbour of Batoum, will make the will of the Russian Government dominant over all the vicinity of the Black Sea. The acquisition of the strongholds of Armenia will place the population of that Province under the immediate influence of the Power which holds them; while the extensive European trade which now passes from Trebizond to Persia will, in consequence of the cessions in Kurdistan, be liable to be arrested at the pleasure of the Russian Government by the prohibitory barriers of their commercial system.

Provision is made for an indemnity, of which the amount is obviously beyond the means of Turkey to discharge, even if the fact be left out of account that any surplus of its revenues is already hypothecated to other creditors. The mode of payment of this indemnity is left, in vague language, to ulterior negotiations between Russia and the Porte. Payment may be demanded immediately, or it may be left as an unredeemed and unredeemable obligation to weigh down the independence of the Porte for many years. Its discharge may be commuted into a yet larger cession of territory, or it may take the form of special engagements subordinating in all things the policy of Turkey to that of Russia. It is impossible not to recognise in this

provision an instrument of formidable efficacy for the coercion of the Ottoman Government, if the necessity for employing it should arise.

Objections may be urged individually against these various stipulations; and arguments, on the other hand, may possibly be advanced to show that they are not individually inconsistent with the attainment of the lasting peace and stability which it is the highest object of all present negotiations to establish in the provinces of European and Asiatic Turkey. But their separate and individual operation, whether defensible or not, is not that which should engage the most earnest attention of the Signatory Powers. Their combined effect, in addition to the results upon the Greek population and upon the balance of maritime power which have been already pointed out, is to depress, almost to the point of entire subjection, the political independence of the Government of Constantinople. The formal jurisdiction of that Government extends over geographical positions which must, under all circumstances, be of the deepest interest to Great Britain. It is in the power of the Ottoman Government to close or to open the Straits which form the natural highway of nations between the Ægean Sea and the Euxine. Its dominion is recognised at the head of the Persian Gulf, on the shores of the Levant, and in the immediate neighbourhood of the Suez Canal. It cannot be otherwise than a matter of extreme solicitude to this country that the Government to which this jurisdiction belongs should be so closely pressed by the political outposts of a greatly superior Power that its independent action, and even existence, is almost impossible. These results arise, not so much from the language of any single Article in the Treaty, as from the operation of the instrument as a whole. A discussion limited to Articles selected by one Power in the Congress would be an illusory remedy for the dangers to English interests and to the permanent peace of Europe, which would result from the state of things which the Treaty proposes to establish.

The object of Her Majesty's Government at the Constan-

tinople Conference was to give effect to the policy of reforming Turkey under the Ottoman Government, removing well-grounded grievances, and thus preserving the Empire until the time when it might be able to dispense with protective guarantees. It was obvious that this could only be brought about by rendering the different populations so far contented with their position as to inspire them with a spirit of patriotism, and make them ready to defend the Ottoman Empire as loyal subjects of the Sultan.

This policy was frustrated by the unfortunate resistance of the Ottoman Government itself, and, under the altered circumstances of the present time, the same result cannot be attained to the same extent by the same means. Large changes may, and no doubt will, be requisite in the Treaties by which South-Eastern Europe has hitherto been ruled. But good government, assured peace, and freedom, for populations to whom those blessings have been strange, are still the objects which this country earnestly desires to secure.

In requiring a full consideration of the general interests which the new arrangements threaten to affect, Her Majesty's Government believe that they are taking the surest means of securing those objects. They would willingly have entered a Congress in which the stipulations in question could have been examined as a whole, in their relation to existing Treaties, to the acknowledged rights of Great Britain and of other Powers, and to the beneficent ends which the united action of Europe has always been directed to secure. But neither the interests which Her Majesty's Government are specially bound to guard, nor the well-being of the regions with which the Treaty deals, would be consulted by the assembling of a Congress whose deliberations were to be restricted by such reservations as those which have been laid down by Prince Gortchakow in his most recent communication.

Your Excellency will read this despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and give him a copy of it.

I am, etc.,

(Signed) SALISBURY.

Prince Gortchakow to Count Schouvaloff.

(Translation.) *St. Petersburg, March* 28, 1878 (o.s.).

M. L'AMBASSADEUR,—Lord A. Loftus has communicated to me the Circular addressed by the Marquis of Salisbury to the Great Powers, dated the 1st of April.

It has been subjected to a careful examination, and we duly recognise the frankness with which it sets forth the views of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty on the Preliminary Treaty of Peace of San Stefano.

We find, however, the objections of the English Cabinet there set forth in great detail, but we have looked in vain for any proposals which it would be disposed to suggest towards a practical solution of the present crisis in the East. The Marquis of Salisbury tells us what the English Government does not desire, but does not tell us what its wishes are. We think it would be useful if his Lordship would be good enough to make this latter point known, with a view to arrive at a clear understanding upon the situation.

As regards the declaration of the views of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty on the subject of the Congress, I can only recall the course which on its side the Imperial Cabinet has followed on this question.

It has officially communicated to the Great Powers the text of the Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano, together with an explanatory map. We added that at the Congress, if it were to meet, each of the Powers there represented would have full liberty of appreciation and action, claiming the same right for Russia.

We can only reiterate the same declaration.

You will have the goodness to communicate the present despatch, with its annex, to the Government to which you are accredited.

Receive, etc.,

(Signed) GORTCHAKOW.

Annex.

Pro Memoriâ.

1. It is not accurate to say that the Treaty of San Stefano has created a new Bulgaria or a strong Slav State under the control of Russia. Bulgaria existed, though in a state of oppression. Europe verified this, and was desirous of providing a remedy. The Constantinople Conference indicated the measures deemed necessary to attain this end. In suggesting these measures the Plenipotentiaries assembled in the Constantinople Conference certainly did not contemplate rendering them inefficacious. It must be admitted that they had in view the endowment of Bulgaria with a national existence and a real administrative autonomy. In such case the Bulgarian State, though divided into two provinces, would have been founded in a germ, and this germ, developing itself under the *ægis* of Europe, would have achieved the result which the Treaty of San Stefano is designed to bring to maturity. The refusal opposed by the Porte, and the war by which it was followed, did not allow, as is admitted by the Marquis of Salisbury himself, of a pure and simple return to the programme of the Conference of Constantinople. The Treaty of San Stefano only makes it obligatory on the Porte to consent to a programme of reforms more complete, more precise, and more practical; but the very fact that the Treaty of San Stefano is a *preliminary* one indicates that in the mind of the Imperial Cabinet it was only a question of laying down a principle, without prejudging definitely the application, which required technical study, an exact appreciation of geographical necessities, and the reconciling of numerous interests.

It is for this reason also that many articles are expressed, as it were, in vague terms, leaving room for ulterior understandings as to the modifications deemed indispensable.

2. The Treaty of San Stefano has not placed the new State under the control of Russia; the Imperial Cabinet has done only what it had already effected in 1830 for Moldo-Wallachia. Experience has demonstrated that the work which was accomplished

at that period in those Principalities tended to contribute to the prosperity of those provinces. It does not appear to have resulted in a special preponderance of the influence of Russia to the detriment of the balance of power in Europe.

It may be added that if Moldo-Wallachia, which owes its existence to, and borders upon, Russia, has been able to make itself completely independent of her, with yet stronger reason may one count upon the same result for Bulgaria, whose territory would be separated from Russia in the expected eventuality of the cession of the Dobrudscha to Roumania.

3. The maximum term of two years has been assigned to the provisional occupation of Bulgaria because this lapse of time has been thought necessary in order to maintain order and peace, to protect the Christian and Mussulman populations against reciprocal reprisals, to reorganise the country, and to introduce national institutions, a native militia, etc.; and also because, if the occupation had been indefinite, such an arrangement might have been regarded as a step towards taking possession of the country, which in no way entered into the views of the Imperial Cabinet. But it is needless to say that, this term being approximative, the Imperial Cabinet is quite ready to shorten it as much as may be possible without endangering the success of the difficult task which it is proposed to work out in the interests of general peace.

4. The delimitation of Bulgaria has been indicated only in general terms. The only fixed principle which has been laid down is that of the majority of the population, and surely any principle more equitable and rational can hardly be imagined.

It meets the objections founded on the differences of race of the minority, whose interests, moreover, have been guaranteed by express stipulations. But the application of this principle has been reserved for a Mixed Commission, whose investigations made upon the spot can alone dissipate the doubt and uncertainty which still surround these vexed questions.

Complaint is made that the preliminary delimitation assigns to Bulgaria some ports on the Black Sea, but the Constantinople

Conference itself decided that the country could not prosper without outlets on the sea. With regard to the ports on the Ægean Sea, the commercial development of Bulgaria has alone been kept in view, and surely it will not be Russia who will principally benefit by this development, but rather England and the Powers whose Mediterranean commerce—much more active than that of Russia—has always been a powerful lever for the maintenance of their political influence.

5. The Preliminary Treaty in no way places Bulgaria under the rule of a chief chosen by Russia. It is formally stipulated that the Governor shall be elected by the native Administrative Councils, with the confirmation of the Porte and the assent of Europe, and that members of the reigning dynasties shall not be eligible for the office. One cannot see what better guarantee could be given for the freedom of elections.

As regards the organisation of the Principality, it is entrusted to an assembly of native notables. The Russian Imperial Commissioner has only a right of superintendence, to be exercised in concert with an Ottoman Commissioner. Moreover, an understanding between the Great Powers and the Porte is expressly reserved, in order that Special Delegates may be associated with the Russian Commissioner.

Meanwhile, the provisional measures taken by the Russian authorities for the administration of the country are far from being framed with the view, as has been affirmed, of drawing Bulgaria into the Russian political system.

Hardly any change has been made in the existing institutions to which the country is accustomed; care has only been taken that they should be carried out more effectually. The slight alterations which have been introduced are the abolition of the tax for exemption from the military service; the abolition of the tithes and the substitution in their place of a more normal impost; the abolition of the farming of the taxes, which was the source of the principal abuses; and, lastly, the right given to the Christian inhabitants in mixed localities to challenge at election time those Mussulmans who have previously made themselves

notorious by acts of fanatical persecution of the Christian population. Moreover, the state of siege to which the country was subjected during the war rendering the nomination of Russian Governors indispensable, Bulgarians have everywhere been associated with them as Vice-Governors; so that after the peace, as tranquillity becomes gradually restored in the country, these Vice-Governors may be able to replace the Russian Governors without causing any interruption in the regular course of the administration of the country.

The exclusive object of all these provisional measures has been to protect the national development, and to render possible the meeting of the first Bulgarian Assembly called together to regulate the institutions of the Principality.

6. The assertion that the Treaty of San Stefano would have extended the influence of Russia beyond the limits of Bulgaria, in that it stipulates for improvements in their institutions for Epirus and Thessaly, affords some reason for astonishment.

If Russia had made no stipulation in favour of those provinces, she would have been accused of sacrificing the Greeks to the Slavs.

If she had sought to obtain for them the vassal autonomy which is condemned in Bulgaria, she would have been accused of entirely destroying the Ottoman Empire, and of substituting Russian influence there in its place. The Imperial Cabinet has always understood the protecting mission which history has assigned to it in the East from a Christian point of view, without regard to race or creed; if it has stipulated for conditions more complete and more precise in favour of Bulgaria, it has been because that country had been the principal cause and theatre of the war, and that Russia had acquired there positive belligerent rights. But in limiting itself to stipulating for ameliorated institutions for the Greek provinces, it reserved to the Great Powers the faculty of demanding still more extended ones.

It is equally inaccurate that the Treaty of San Stefano stipulated that these institutions should be drawn up under the

direction of Russia. The general type to which they have been assimilated by the Treaty is that of the Cretan Règlement, which was granted by the Porte under the influence of the Great Powers. The Treaty stipulates that its application is to be made by a special Commission, upon which the native element shall be largely represented. It obliges the Porte, it is true, to *consult* Russia before putting it in execution, but it does not interdict the Porte from equally consulting the Representatives of the friendly Powers.

7. The subsequent clause, concerning the protection of the *members of the Russian Church*, must have been greatly misunderstood to be compared to that in the Treaty of Kainardji, abolished in 1856. The clause of Kainardji concerned the *Orthodox Greek religion*, and might include all the Christian subjects of the Sultan who professed that creed. The Treaty of San Stefano mentions exclusively monks, ecclesiastics, and pilgrims who are *Russian or of Russian origin*, and only stipulates for them the rights, advantages, and privileges belonging to the ecclesiastics of other nationalities.

From all this it is impossible to regard as well-founded the assertion that the general tendency of these stipulations of San Stefano is of such a nature "*as to increase the power of the Russian Empire in the countries where a Greek population predominates, to the prejudice of that nation and of every country having interests in the east of the Mediterranean.*"

8. Equal evidence, at any rate, of exaggeration may be found in the assertion that the general tendency of the stipulations of San Stefano as to the retrocession of Roumanian Bessarabia, the extension of Bulgaria up to the Black Sea, and the acquisition of the Port of Batoum, will render the will of Russia predominant throughout the vicinity of the Black Sea.

Russia has powerfully contributed in the past to emancipate Greece and Roumania.

It is not apparent that she has thereby acquired greater advantages than the other Powers. The retrocession of Roumanian Bessarabia would be only a return to an order of things

modified twenty-two years ago for reasons which have no longer a *raison d'être,* nor legal title, nor even pretext, since the freedom of the navigation of the Danube has been placed under the control and guarantee of an International Commission, and especially from the moment when Roumania proclaims her independence and Europe seems disposed to recognise it.

It must be remarked, besides, that this retrocession does not include all the part of Bessarabia ceded in 1856. The Delta of the Danube is excluded from it, and the project of the Russian Government is to restore it to Roumania, from which it was taken in 1857. This circumstance reduces considerably the importance of the retrocession which has been asked for in connection with the control over the navigation of the mouths of the Danube.

9. Batoum is the only good port in these parts. It is of great importance for the commerce and security of Russia. It is the only positive advantage that Russia derives from a war which she has carried on alone, and which has cost her so much. It is, then, in no way a gratuitous cession, and is far from being an equivalent for the *pecuniary* indemnity which it would represent.

10. As to the acquisitions in Armenia, they only possess a defensive value. It is possible that England would prefer to see these strong positions in the hands of the Turks; but from the same motives Russia sets a value upon the possession of them for the sake of her own security, so as not to have to lay siege to them in each war, as in the case of the fortress of Kars, which she has been obliged to take three times within the space of half a century.

These territorial cessions are a natural consequence of war.

If England had wished to save Turkey from them she had only to join with Russia, as was proposed to her on two separate occasions—first at the time of the Berlin Memorandum, and subsequently on the occasion of the mission of Count Elston Soumarokoff to Vienna—in order to put a united maritime pressure on the Porte, which would probably have sufficed to obtain the ends now acquired at the cost of so much bloodshed.

The English Government, having refused this, has no ground for denying to Russia, who has shed her blood, the right of demanding the creation of a state of things which shall relieve her henceforward from such sacrifices, or render them less onerous.

But what it is impossible to understand are the consequences to the freedom of European trade from Trebizond, through Persia, which it is endeavoured to deduce from these rectifications of frontier.

These assertions are in contradiction to those put forward on more than one occasion by various members of the British Cabinet, according to which the taking possession even of Erzeroum and of Trebizond by Russia would not constitute a danger to English interests. The rectifications of frontier in Asia, stipulated by the Treaty of San Stefano, are very far from approaching this extension. It is carrying distrust to an extreme to affirm that they would place Russia "*in a position to impede by prohibitive obstacles the commercial system of Europe.*"

11. The objections taken to the Treaty of San Stefano in regard to the indemnity claimed from Turkey are not better founded. Assuredly the amount of this indemnity is out of all proportion to the overwhelming charges which the war has entailed upon Russia. It may be that they exceed the actual resources of Turkey, and increase her difficulty in satisfying the claims of her creditors. But it is to be noted that Turkey failed in her obligations towards her foreign creditors long before the war, in consequence of the disorder caused by her maladministration. It is allowable to believe that if peace is re-established upon the rational bases which the Treaty of San Stefano has in view, and to which the sanction of Europe would give a solid and lasting character, it would result, as far as Turkey herself is concerned, in a diminution of her expenses and an augmentation of her resources, which would enable her to meet the exigencies of her foreign debt.

It is in view of these possible results that the stipulations of

San Stefano which relate to the indemnity have been retained in the vague terms which have been made the subject of reproach.

If the amount of the indemnity is criticised as being too high, the demand for an immediate payment would have been criticised still more severely. If the precise manner of payment had been stipulated, it would have been necessary to encroach upon a region already mortgaged to the foreign creditors of the Porte; and it is this that the Treaty of San Stefano has sought to avoid, by reserving the question for a subsequent understanding. It is true that by this precaution it is exposed to the suspicion of *seeking to paralyse or to dominate over Turkey for several years, or of meditating new territorial acquisitions as a substitute for the indemnity.*

It would have been more natural to have seen in this stipulation a desire to respect both the interests of Turkey and of Europe, and to support the Turkish Government in the fulfilment of its engagements and of pacific relationships which would be profitable to all. But against mistrust there is no remedy.

12. From the conclusion of the Marquis of Salisbury's despatch it is learnt with pleasure that "the object and earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government are still to secure good government, peace, and freedom for the populations to whom these blessings have been strange."

With equal satisfaction is seen the frank avowal that "this policy has been frustrated by the unfortunate resistance of the Ottoman Government itself; that in view of the modified circumstances of the present time the same result cannot be obtained to the same extent by the same means—that is to say, by the programme of the Conference of Constantinople—and that great changes may, and without doubt will, be necessary in the Treaties by which the south-east of Europe has up to the present time been governed."

If to these considerations be added the fact that the reiterated refusals of the English Government to join in exercising a collective material pressure on the Porte has prevented Europe from obtaining pacifically the results desired by the Cabinet of

London itself, it must be recognised that the war and the peace of San Stefano have answered to the exigencies of the situation which the Marquis of Salisbury has set forth with great frankness and so much high-mindedness.

This situation may be summed up thus: The existing Treaties have been successively infringed for twenty-two years—first by the Turkish Government, which has not fulfilled its obligations towards the Christians; then by the United Principalities, by the French occupation of Syria, and by the Conference of Constantinople itself, which constituted an interference in the interior affairs of the Ottoman Empire; and last of all by the entry of the English fleet into the Straits. On the other hand, the Marquis of Salisbury himself recognises that great changes can and must be made under the present circumstances.

It remains for us to learn how His Lordship proposes to reconcile practically *these Treaties and the recognised rights of Great Britain and other Powers with the benevolent designs towards a realisation of which the united action of Europe has always been directed—viz., a good government, peace, and assured liberty for the populations to whom these blessings have been strange.*

It remains also to be learnt how, outside the preliminary bases laid down by the Treaty of San Stefano, His Lordship proposes to attain the end desired by all, while making proper allowance for the rights acquired by Russia, through the sacrifices which she has borne, and borne alone, in order to render their realisation possible.

The despatch of the Marquis of Salisbury contains no answer to these questions. For these reasons it appears that the considerations which it contains would have found their place more naturally in the Congress, where the Plenipotentiaries, having all of them a full and entire liberty of appreciation and action, would have been in a position to draw up along with their objections any practical propositions of a character to ensure an understanding for the solution of the present difficulties in the general interest of a solid and lasting pacification of the East.

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